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Introduction
In early December, the Millennium Round of multilateral trade negotiations will be
launched in Seattle.  Judging from the statements emanating from the capitals of the world, the
round will be comprehensive, covering industrial goods as well as agriculture and services.  It
will go on for at least three years, but probably longer, and will be the first test of the new World
Trade Organization (WTO) under the leadership of its new Director General, Michael Moore. 
The WTO was established in 1995 following the Uruguay Round to provide an institutional
home for the complicated web of trade agreements that had grown up around the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The Millennium Round will provide a real
opportunity to begin the new century with an expanded and strengthened rules-based world
trading system.  With a successful start, the 21  century could eventually come to be known asst
the time when global free trade became a reality.
The Millennium Round will not be easy.  Technically, it will involve new and
complicated issues that will have to be debated and resolved.  The new issues include e-
commerce, competition policy, the environment and labour standards.  Further work also needs
to be done on the issues that were new in the last round such as trade in services and intellectual
property rights.  And then there is trade in agriculture, which is still badly in need of reform after
a modest start in the last round.
Politically, the round will be very controversial from the start and face very strong
opposition.  In addition to the usual resistance from business and agriculture groups that benefit
from protection and stand to lose the most from liberalization, there is the new public interest
opposition from national, labour and environmental groups that is less obviously based in raw
self interest.  For some of these public interest groups, the WTO has come to be regarded as a
symbol of all that is wrong with the world – the erosion of national sovereignty by globalization,
the degradation of the environment by multinational corporations, unsafe genetically modified
foods, and job losses and wage cuts blamed on low-wage foreign competition.  These public
interest groups don’t acknowledge the increased output and improvement in living standards
produced by freer international trade.  They ignore the opportunities to better protect the
environment and support society’s most vulnerable members that are made possible by the
increased income generated through trade.
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which was recently abandoned by
governments intimidated by misguided opposition from public interest groups, provides a good
example of what can happen when economists and trade specialists don’t participate as
prominently in the public debate.  The case against the MAI was not soundly based in economics,
but played on the public’s fears and ignorance.  There is a real risk that the same thing could
happen in Millennium Round.  But the stakes are higher this time.  A failure of the Millennium
Round would badly damage the WTO and threaten the world trading system.
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It’s important to the success of the Millennium Round that the public be given complete
and accurate information on the issues and understand fully how the world trading system works
and can be improved.  Seattle and Beyond: The WTO Millennium Round is our contribution to
improving the public’s understanding and appreciation of trade issues.  It is intended to serve as a
guide to all those concerned about the WTO and the issues faced in the Millennium Round.  We
hope that our readership will include interested laypeople and businesspeople as well as
economists, lawyers and trade policy practitioners.
______________________
 Seattle and Beyond

-1-
Chapter 1 
The Stakes in Seattle
Trade Negotiators Meet Protestors 
The Third WTO Ministerial Meeting, which is scheduled to be held in Seattle,
Washington from November 30 to December 3, 1999, certainly won’t be a quiet, dignified affair
as in the early GATT rounds.  In those good old days, small chummy groups of trade negotiators
used to meet in a stately chateau in Geneva to drink tea and cut deals.  This time when trade
ministers and officials gather behind the closed doors of the Washington State Trade and
Convention Center to go about the important, but unexciting, business of setting the agenda for a
new Millennium Round of multilateral trade negotiations, a rainbow coalition of protestors will
be massing outside to demonstrate against globalization.  And among them will be a core of elite
activists, shock troops trained at a nearby boot camp in the latest guerilla protest manoeuvres like
scaling buildings and blocking traffic.  Outnumbered as well as outyelled, the 5,000 official
delegates from 150 countries in attendance may experience some sleeplessness in Seattle.
The anti-trade protestors will make for much more colourful TV than what is going on
inside.  And as usual they will probably get most of the air time to express their specious
arguments and gut opposition to freer trade.  That’s too bad because the public deserves to hear
more about the benefits of trade and the key role the WTO plays in the world trading system.  It
also needs to hear some concrete ideas about what can be done to improve the system.  Nihilism
may be more fun, but it is not very constructive.
The demonstrations in Seattle will be far from spontaneous.  Planning has been underway
for months.  The Seattle City Council helped set the stage by voting unanimously to make the
city  an “MAI-Free Zone.”  Mike Dolan, the field director of Global Trade Watch, an offshoot of
Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen group, has spent much time in Seattle and elsewhere mobilizing
opposition to the WTO.  Environmental groups like Greenpeace, the Friends of the Earth and the
Sierra Club are planning to be in Seattle to make sure that their views about the environmental
havoc wreaked by trade gets plenty of press.  Labour groups, such as the US steelworkers and
longshoremen, will also be there to demonstrate against the harm that trade does to the workers
of the world regardless of whether they come from developed or developing countries.  Who
knows?  Canada’s own Maude Barlow may even put in an appearance in Seattle.
And if it wasn’t already hard enough to stand up to the opponents of the WTO who
claimed that it is in the pocket of big corporations, the Seattle host committee chaired by Bill
Gates of Microsoft and Phil Condit of Boeing had to embark on a campaign of creative financing
for the conference, the first WTO meeting ever to be paid for by the private sector.  In its letters
to corporate donors seeking money to pay for the Conference, the committee offered what looked
very much like access to participating trade ministers and officials.  Even though the committee
modified its letters when the US Government complained, the spot of influence peddling will not
be so easy to get out.
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Trade and globalization has become very hot of late.  And the opponents of trade have
tasted blood with their success in getting the industrialized countries to scrap the proposed
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which they claimed put corporations ahead of
people.  Perceiving the vulnerability of the fledgling WTO, the anti-traders are anxious to push
their advantage and to take on the WTO now when public support appears weak.
Governments, particularly in North America and Europe, were badly stung by the
apparent success of non-governmental organizations in stirring up opposition to the MAI.  A new
euphemism –  “civil society” – is used to refer to these groups.  “Managing the relationship with
civil society” has become a preoccupation of governments in the industrialized world.  Some
would even say an obsession to the exclusion of providing leadership for the new trade round.
As the Millennium Round gets underway, there will be many complicated and sensitive
issues on the table, just as there were in the failed MAI negotiations.  Unfortunately, unless
economists take a much larger role in the public debate than they have, the public’s
understanding of the issues will be distorted by the simplistic and illogical views voiced by the
outspoken opponents of freer trade.  Practitioners of the dismal science may not agree on many
things, but, since Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the one thing they do agree on is that free
trade improves economic welfare.  Comparative advantage and the potential gains from trade is
as close to a scientific theory as one gets in the social sciences.
Much is at stake in Seattle and particularly its aftermath.  The Millennium Round will be
an important symbol of the direction that world trade is going to take in the 21  century.  Eitherst
there will be continued progress towards an integrated global economy or a back-slide into
growing protectionism and uncertainty.  Trade dynamics is peculiar that way.  It can’t stand still. 
It either moves forward or it falls back, kind of like pushing a car up a hill.
Because there is so much at stake and so little understanding of the issues, we felt
compelled to write this book.  It’s intended to provide a straightforward presentation of the key
issues likely to arise in the Millennium Round from an economic perspective.  Hopefully, this
will be useful in clearing up some of the misconceptions that are likely to arise when the loudest
voices providing information on difficult economic issues are coming from those who know
diddlysquat about economics.
We provide, in this chapter, an overview of the stakes and issues of the Millennium
Round.  In subsequent chapters we deal with particular issues in more depth.  A final chapter
offers our concluding views on where the trade round is headed.
The Gains from Expanded Trade
Expanding trade is very important for the continued prosperity of the global economy.  It
enables countries with small internal markets, like Canada, the opportunity to take advantage of
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the economies of scale and scope that the larger international market offers.  This generates
increases in productivity and rises in living standards.  
Rapidly growing world trade, spurred by tariff cuts and the removal of quantitative
barriers over the course of eight rounds of  multilateral trade negotiations, has been the main
engine driving the global economy since the Second World War.  Tariffs of industrialized
countries were slashed from high-double-digit rates right after the war, to less than 10 per cent in
the 1960s, and to less than 4 per cent today.  Over the last three rounds, tariff reductions have
averaged a hefty 35 per cent.
Trade has outpaced output growth by a substantial margin since the war, accounting for a
growing share of output and employment.  From 1948 to 1997, trade grew 6 per cent per year,
while output rose only 3.7 per cent per year.  Over this period, trade mushroomed a spectacular
seventeen-fold, while output increased a more modest, but still hefty, six-fold.  By 1997 world
exports had reached a whopping US$5.3 trillion.
The WTO estimated that the Uruguay Round results alone would boost world trade
volumes by 6 to 20 per cent and raise world income by US$200-500 billion per year.  The
Canadian Department of Finance estimated the Canadian share of the gains to be CAN$3 billion
annually.  No small potatoes.
A widely cited study by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner of Harvard University found
that countries that were open to trade tended to grow much more rapidly than those that weren’t. 
Over the 1970s and 1980s, developed open economies grew 2.3 per cent per year and closed ones
0.7 per cent; developing open economies grew 4.5 per cent per year and closed ones only 0.7 per
cent.
Trade creates jobs as well as growth in output.  Canada is a good example of the
beneficial effects of trade expansion on job creation.  While the Canadian Government was
relatively modest, only claiming that 120 thousand new jobs would result from the Canada-U.S
Free Trade Agreement, employment increased 1.5 million or 11.8 per cent in the ten years
following its 1989 implementation.  Much of this can be attributed to the doubling in real
exports, which took place over this period.  Without the spectacular export growth, the Canadian
economy would have experienced very high unemployment because domestic demand growth
was weak.
Trade also lowers the prices that consumers pay for good and services and widens their
choices.  Most recently, the Uruguay Round liberalized the trade restrictions on textiles and
clothing imposed under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.  This has already resulted in significant
reductions in clothing prices in many industrialized countries.  The prices of other goods have
also been reduced or increased less as a result of the Uruguay Round tariff cuts, but because the
impact was small this has been less evident.  However, over the whole period since the Second
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World War, the price reductions have been much more substantial reflecting the magnitude of the
overall tariff decreases.
The WTO
The World Trade Organization, the focus of the controversy and consequently of this
book, is the member-directed institution administering the rules governing world trade.  It was
created in 1995 as the result of a Canadian Uruguay Round initiative.  The General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had finally been given an institutional home, completing the
Bretton Woods troika of international institutions.  The original American proposal made after
the Second World War to create an International Trade Organization to go along with the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank had been dropped in the face Congressional
opposition.  The world trading system had had to limp along without proper institutional support
for almost fifty years because of this unfortunate political retreat.
Over a series of eight rounds of trade negotiations under the GATT, a complex web of
some 60 agreements governing world trade grew up.  It has now been integrated as part of the
Uruguay Round outcome and placed under the WTO.  An updated GATT with annexes covering
specific sectors such as agriculture and textiles, and specific issues such as state trading, product
standards, subsidies and anti-dumping, has become the umbrella agreement mandating non-
discrimination for trade in goods.  A General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which
contains both a framework and specific commitments for opening up service sectors to
international competition, does the same for services.  An Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) provides protection to “intellectual property” such as
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets when trade is involved.  Finally, a strengthened
Dispute Settlement Understanding establishes procedures for resolving trade disputes without
resort to unilateral actions.  There are now 135 countries that are Members of the WTO and
bound by these agreements.  The number is growing all the time with important countries like
China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan negotiating to get in and Georgia completing the final
formalities required for admittance.
The importance of the WTO to the world economy is all out of proportion to its relatively
modest budget of only 124.8 million Swiss Francs in 1999 (a Swiss Franc equals about 96 cents
Canadian).  While this may seem like a lot of money, it’s not much for an international
institution.  The IMF spends that much on travel alone.
Canada is a middle-sized country that is heavily dependent on international trade. 
Exports account for more than 40 per cent of GDP and one job in three is export related.  While
it’s true that the lion’s share of this trade is with the United States and is governed by the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the WTO Agreements also apply and in some cases
cover areas largely untouched by NAFTA such as agriculture.  Canada has much to gain from a
Millennium Round that will extend and strengthen the WTO and its rules-based trading system. 
By the same token, Canada has much to lose from any weakening of the WTO which would
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jeopardize our future economic security.  The larger entities like the United States and the
European Union are more secure in their large internal markets and have less at stake.  A
strengthened world trading system would enable Canada to take advantage of growth
opportunities in other parts of the world and thereby diversify its exports, almost 85 per cent of
which currently go to the United States.
The Agenda
Some may ask, “Why another round of multilateral trade negotiations right now?  Didn’t
we just get through the Uruguay Round?”  While it may feel like the Uruguay Round just
finished, given that it involved so many difficult negotiations and took eight years, it was actually
formally concluded in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994, and has now been over for more
than a half a decade.  A trade regime like any other mechanism, even with regular maintenance
and tuning, can still use a major overhaul every five years or so.  There have been major changes
in computers and telecommunications that have fundamentally altered business practices and
government administration since the agenda was set for the Uruguay Round.  The participation of
developing countries, which are coming under the full disciplines of the WTO system according
to the timetable set in the Uruguay Round, needs to be enhanced.  Moreover, the WTO itself is a
new institution and its experience has provided many valuable lessons for institutional reform.
In addition, there was already an agreed built-in agenda for trade negotiations left over
from the Uruguay Round in agriculture (AA Article 20), services (negotiations of more specific
commitments under GATS Articles XIX and of disciplines for subsidies under GATS Article
XV), intellectual property (TRIPs Articles 65 and 71), government procurement (GPA Article
XXVII:7), and other matters.  This means that even without a new overall round, negotiations
will have to get underway soon in some of the most controversial sectors.  These negotiations
would be rendered much more difficult if the negotiating agenda were not expanded to enable the
broader trade-offs that are necessary to make sure that every WTO Member comes out an overall
winner.
In a speech before the WTO in Geneva in May 1998, President Clinton called for a new
round of global trade talks to be launched in a ministerial meeting to be held in the United States. 
His speech was so successful that it almost ended up getting the round named after him.  But the
name suggested by Sir Leon Brittain, the former EU Trade Commissioner, appears to be the one
that will stick, that is unless trade ministers decide to christen it the Seattle Round.  Since
President Clinton’s speech, a consensus has developed on the need for a Millennium Round
amongst the membership of the WTO.  In early May 1999, the Quad trade group consisting of the
US, EU, Japan and Canada agreed to support, at a minimum in addition to agriculture and
services, negotiations on tariff cuts for industrial goods in the next round of WTO talks.  In late
May 1999, OECD trade and finance ministers said that the new round of trade talks should have
“an ambitious, broad-based and balanced agenda.”  At the close of their June meeting, the trade
ministers of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which has 21 Pacific Rim countries
as members including the United States, Japan, China, and Canada, also endorsed a broad round
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of trade talks.  While leaving open the issue of the precise scope of the negotiations, the
developing country opposition to a comprehensive new round seems to have been transformed
into resignation, even though some developing countries such as Malaysia still claim they’re not
yet ready to start another round.
There are many issues that could legitimately be included on the negotiating table in the
Millennium Round.  These are summarized here and will be treated in greater detail in the
chapters of this book:
• Tariff Reductions Even after eight rounds, tariffs are still high on many industrial
goods (tariff “spikes”) and in many, particularly developing, countries.  In the
Bogar Declaration of November 1994, APEC leaders called for an elimination of
tariffs by its industrialized members by 2010 and by its developing members by
2020.  The First Summit of the Americas in Miami in December 1994 called for
the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005.  The
WTO could make a commitment similar to these two and seek to make significant
progress towards its attainment in the next round.
• Non-Tariff Barriers With lower tariffs, non-tariff barriers become more
important in limiting market access.  There are technical issues in the areas of
standards, rules of origin and customs valuation that need to be resolved.  The
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Rules of Origin, and
the Valuation Agreement could be improved.
• Regional Trade Agreements There has been a proliferation of regional free trade
agreements in recent years.  These include most notably the NAFTA, the EU in
Europe, and Mercosur in South America.  These agreements are beneficial as long
as they are trade creating rather than trade diverting.  But more recent bilateral
free trade agreements between the EU and the countries of Eastern Europe and
North Africa, and the proposed FTAA  have the potential to distort trade because
the less developed partners retain high tariffs on imports from the rest of the
world.
• Agriculture  Progress was made in the Uruguay Round in reducing domestic
subsidies, curbing export subsidies, and replacing non-tariff measures with bound
tariffs that can be transparently phased out over time.  However, substantial
domestic and export subsidies still exist, particularly under the EU Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP).  Moreover, the process of tariffication has resulted in
bound over-quota tariffs at such high levels that very little trade has developed. 
Importing dairy  products to Canada where over-quota dairy tariff rates are 200 or
even 300 per cent on some products is a good case in point.  Even where in-quota
access is available under low or nominal tariffs, such access is minimal.  Finally,
state trading enterprises have played a role in limiting competition and influencing
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both export and import prices of agricultural products falling within their
jurisdiction.  Much more must be done to eliminate export and trade distorting
domestic subsidies and truly to liberalize trade in agriculture.  But key WTO
Members such as the EU, Japan and Korea will continue to fight liberalization
tooth and nail.  In addition to trade liberalization, other difficult issues – touching
consumers directly – include trade in genetically modified organisms and the
application of sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations, the latter exemplified by the
recent dispute where the US and Canada squared off against the EU over
hormone-treated beef.  Notwithstanding internal political sensitivities over the fate
of supply-managed sectors and the Canadian Wheat Board, Canada has a huge
stake in liberalized trade in agriculture.   This is particularly true for our red meat
and grains producers and exporters of agri-food products.
• Services  Progress has been made in reaching agreements in such new economy
services as financial services and basic telecommunications since the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round.  Negotiations on many important issues such as labour
mobility, air and sea transportation services, and subsidies have yet to be
undertaken.  National treatment for market access needs to be expanded to cover a
much broader range of services and more modes of supply than those currently
listed in each Member’s schedules of commitments.  National and  most-
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, the two fundamental obligations of non-
discrimination of the GATT, should also become the rule for services rather than
the exception.
• Government Procurement  The numerous exceptions to the principle of non-
discrimination in the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) need to be
further circumscribed.  The coverage needs to be extended to cover non-federal
levels of government procurement.  This is a particularly sensitive issue for
Canada, which cannot gain access to procurement opportunities in other
countries’ non-federal sectors because many of the provincial governments refuse
to allow their own procurement to be covered.  The membership in the plurilateral
GPA needs to be expanded beyond the 26 countries that are currently parties.  An
Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement, which is being
developed, needs to be accepted by all WTO Members.  Government procurement
of services needs to be included in the GATS.
• Electronic Commerce With the success of companies like Amazon.com and Dell
computer, e-commerce is likely to become increasingly important.  The US Trade
Representative estimates that it should grow in the US from $8 billion last year to
$327 billion in 2002.  Not only does e-commerce promise to change the way we
do business, but it also interferes with governments' ability to tax and regulate
commercial transactions.  Inevitably, some international rules will be required and
the WTO is the preferred forum for their development.  At the insistence of the
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United States, there has been a moratorium on tariffs on e-commerce since 1998. 
However, it only applies to goods and services like software and accounting that
are delivered electronically, and not to goods that are ordered on the Internet but
physically delivered across borders.  Other countries are concerned about US
dominance of the Internet and may push for restrictions.  There are also concerns
about consumer protection and privacy.
• Antidumping, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  The increased reliance on
antidumping, and countervailing duties is an unanticipated outcome of the
Uruguay Round.  These measures need to be better disciplined by WTO rules to
prevent abuse.  There is also a need to consider how best to discipline subsidies
granted to services and service suppliers.
• Investment  Foreign investment and trade have become increasingly linked.  Aside
from the rather modest provisions of the TRIPs Agreement and the commercial
presence provisions in the GATS, there are few concrete rules governing
investment in foreign markets.  Businesses in developed countries are calling for
measures to prevent discrimination in the establishment and operation of
investment, protect the property rights of investors, and provide guarantees against
confiscation or other tantamount government measures.  Such rules would help to
promote investment and generate growth in the countries attracting the
investment.  Competition policy is also important to make sure that foreign
investors have access to all sectors and that foreign firms can compete on an equal
basis with domestic.  There is also a need to do something to prevent countries
from using financial incentives to lure investment away from other countries. 
With the demise of the MAI, it is now up to the WTO to develop rules for
investment on a more inclusive global basis.  
• Extraterritoriality  The extraterritorial application of one country's laws to another
is a hot topic at the WTO.  The worst offender is the US with its Helms-Burton
Act and Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.  Canada and the European Union have both
been subject to sanctions for trading or investing in Cuba.  Sherritt International’s
Ian Delaney is banned from entering the United States.  The EU has threatened to
take the US to the WTO over Helms-Burton, but backed off when the US claimed
a national security exemption.  It will be hard to keep this issue off the table in the
Millennium Round, but the United States will certainly try.
• Intellectual Property  This will continue to be an important issue for the
upcoming round.  The United States will be pushing for greater protection of
intellectual property in their strong sectors such as entertainment software,
computer software, and pharmaceuticals.  The US is certain to encounter
resistence from other nations, including some of their counterparts in the
developed world.  Developing countries, which have not been fully able to
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implement all their commitments under the existing TRIPs Agreement, will be the
greatest source of resistance.
• Culture  Culture is not covered explicitly by the WTO agreements.  The United
States is most aggressive in attacking barriers to the export of its cultural products
including television shows, movies, music, magazines and books.  Other countries
led by France and Canada seek to preserve their ability to protect culture from
foreign influences.  Canada recently lost a WTO challenge on split-run magazines
(i.e.  magazines with primarily foreign editorial content, but with advertising
directed to Canadians).  Under pressure from the United States, a negotiated
settlement was reached that gave US magazines access to Canadian advertising
revenue subject to certain limits.  Early rumblings suggest that the issue of the
treatment of cultural products will be a highly explosive one in the upcoming
round.
• Environment  Environmental regulation is another very sensitive area of
unfinished business for the upcoming round.  The nexus between environmental
and trade policy is extremely nebulous and puts much strain on negotiators and
legislators.  The perception that the WTO trade agreements threaten the
environment by preventing the enforcement of legitimate environmental measures
has been fostered by the well-known Dolphin-Tuna, the Shrimp-Turtle, and
Gasoline Standards cases where panels ruled against the United States.  While
current WTO provisions permit environmental measures necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health (GATT Article XX) provided there are no
alternative GATT-consistent or less GATT-inconsistent measure available to
achieve the desired objectives, better rules governing the interplay between trade
and environmental regulations are needed to strengthen the world trading system. 
Without them, it will be difficult to get the required support in North American
and Europe for other Millennium Round initiatives.
• Labour Standards  Much of the opposition to liberalized trade stems from a fear
that jobs will be lost to imports from countries where workers are paid low wages
and where labour operates under substandard conditions.  There is also some
genuine, but misguided, concern that the conditions of workers in these low wage
countries will be exacerbated by liberalized trade under the WTO.  These
concerns led to a labour side-agreement under NAFTA, which was carefully
crafted to avoid setting standards and to prevent standards issues from going to
dispute settlement.  There will be pressure to address the issue of labour standards
in the context of trade in the upcoming round.  One suggestion is for a greater role
for the International Labour Organization (ILO) in setting minimally acceptable
standards in cooperation with the WTO.  It’s clear that something will have to be
done in this round to satisfy the United States and Europe.  But it is also evident
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that whatever is done will have to be acceptable to developing countries and not
compromise their comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods.
• Dispute Settlement Mechanism  One of the biggest achievements of the Uruguay
Round was the establishment of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU).  It allows independent panels to decide cases put before them on a more
timely and definitive basis than under the old GATT.  Unlike in the past, WTO
panel decisions are now binding on Members unless overturned by the Appellate
Body on appeal.  Nevertheless, some weaknesses in the process have been
identified.  In particular, there is a need for: more clarity in implementing panel
decisions; greater openness and transparency in the process; opportunities for
private sector participation; and less delay in releasing panel decisions.
• Accession  The rules-based international trading system should be extended to
cover all economies as quickly as practicable.  Thirty countries and customs
territories have applied to join the WTO.  China, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan),
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania, and Vietnam are among the 20
applicants with which active negotiations are proceeding.  The most important of
these are China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan.  China almost reached
agreement with the Americans during Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to the US in
April, but the May 7   bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and theth
release of the Congressional report on nuclear espionage knocked the accession
negotiations badly off track.  It’s important to bring China and Russia into the
WTO club as soon as possible so that they can be full participants in the
international trading system, including during the Millennium Round.
The Process
Economic purists think the whole process of trade negotiations smacks of mercantilism. 
This is an outdated economic theory, much berated by Adam Smith and David Ricardo, that
encouraged export and discouraged imports so as to accumulate gold bullion, which the
mercantilists erroneously regarded to be the source of a country’s wealth.  Similarly, the basic
premise behind the eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations since the war is that a country
should try to get its trading partners to reduce their tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on its
exports as much as possible, while at the same time reducing its own as little as it can get away
with.  This flies in the face of the economic objective of maximizing consumer welfare, which
would be furthered not only by reductions in foreign tariffs and NTBs but even by a unilateral
reduction in tariffs and NTBs.  A pragmatic justification of the real-world process of trade
negotiations is that reductions in foreign tariffs and NTBs can only be secured by bargaining
away domestic tariffs and NTBs.  The end result is not only that a country gets foreign tariffs and
NTBs down but its own as well.  The validity of this justification has been demonstrated by the
success of  successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations in bringing down tariffs and
eliminating NTBs.  It’s hard to argue against success.
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 Concerning the exact nature of the process, there are different views on how best to
structure the negotiations  -- single-undertaking versus sector-by-sector or sector clusters. 
Single-undertaking is the most comprehensive approach.  Under it, nothing is settled until
everything is settled.  Previously agreed issues can be reopened at any time until all the issues are
resolved.  This is the way the Uruguay Round worked.  It enables the parties to the negotiation to
have the maximum flexibility in terms of trade-offs amongst the issues.  The downside is that a
single-undertaking negotiation can be difficult to bring to a conclusion and can take a long time
to complete.  That’s why US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky said, “We absolutely
will not sign on the notion of a single-undertaking if that means every issue and the kitchen sink
has to be decided before the core issues of market access are decided for the round to conclude.”
In contrast, sector-by-sector is a piecemeal approach.  Under it, the parties reach binding
agreements on each individual sector (or issue) and the whole round is complete when all the
sectors are settled.  There is no going back to reopen settled  sectors if the parties are dissatisfied
with the offers on subsequent sectors.  It may be easier to bring a sector-by-sector negotiation to
completion if it is possible to segment all the issues into nice compartmentalized sectors on
which agreement can be easily reached.  At the September APEC meeting in Auckland, the
United States was pushing a sectoral approach, but ran into heavy resistance from Japan which is
defensive about its agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors.
Intermediate in comprehensiveness between single-undertaking and sector-by-sector is
the cluster approach, which was proposed by former Canadian Trade Minister and now Canadian
WTO Ambassador Sergio Marchi.  It would group the sectors together into broad enough clusters
to allow meaningful trade-offs.  It may make it easier to reach agreement, but only if the right
clusters are created.  This may be harder than it sounds.
Originally, the EU and Japan favoured single-undertaking and the United States a sector-
by-sector approach.  But a consensus seems to be emerging in favour of a single-undertaking
approach as long as the package is kept “manageable,” to use the term employed by the US Trade
Representative.  But since what is “manageable” tends to grow because it must include what
everyone wants, this probably means another Uruguay-like round is probably in store.  
There is the possibility of an “early harvest” of agreements on some issues at Seattle
before a new round is launched.  These issues include electronic commerce and transparency in
government procurement.
The Timetable
The Uruguay Round was launched in Punta del Esta, Uruguay in September 1986 and
didn’t finally conclude until April 15, 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco, almost eight years later. 
There is almost universal agreement among WTO Members that this is an unacceptably long
period for a trade negotiation to take even on the basis of a single-undertaking approach.  As one
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wag put it, “They call it the Millennium Round because of when it starts, not because of how
long it is supposed to take.”
The APEC trade ministers and OECD trade and finance ministers have agreed to a three-
year target for the negotiations.  This will probably be accepted at the Seattle Ministerial as the
time frame for the Millennium Round.  But it’s one thing to set a deadline and another to meet it. 
So it is always possible that an agreement won’t be reached before the deadline.  The Uruguay
Round had several such deadlines that were passed unmet.  Nevertheless, if three years is
accepted as the target, it’s certainly unlikely that the negotiations will be allowed to drag on as
long as the Uruguay Round negotiations.  In addition, this time the WTO provides an
institutional setting that is more conducive to “rolling,” continuous negotiations.  If some issues
aren’t resolved by the end of the three years or shortly thereafter, it will always be possible to
mandate an ongoing work program in particular areas and to call an end to the round.
Obstacles
 There are many obstacles that will have to be overcome to complete a successful
Millennium Round.  In the first place, it will not be easy to get the process smoothly underway. 
The difficulty in choosing a new Director General of the WTO does not augur well for the ability
of member countries to come up with common agenda.  Decisions in the WTO are made by
consensus.  This worked all right in narrowing down the number of candidates from four to two,
but then a deadlock developed that left the WTO headless for six months.  The United States
backed Michael Moore, the former New Zealand Prime Minister and Trade Minister, and an
Asian block led by Japan stood firmly behind Supachai Panitchpakdi, the Thai Deputy Prime
Minister.  Both sides refused to budge.  The only way that a compromise could finally be reached
was to split, Solomon-like, a six-year term by making Moore the Director General for a three-
year term beginning in September to be followed by Supachai for the next three years.  This
unorthodox arrangement, with Moore finishing his term before the completion of the Millennium
Round, will make it more difficult to bring the negotiations to a timely and satisfactory
conclusion.  It also underlines the great difficulty of making hard decisions by consensus in the
WTO.
Decision-making at the WTO will also be hampered by an emerging conflict between the
Quad group (the United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada) that support further trade
liberalization and developing countries that are much less enthusiastic.  In past rounds, this was
not a problem as the Quad always dominated multilateral negotiations.
The forces of protectionism, which are on the rise particularly in the United States, are
another major obstacle.  Large increases in US steel imports from Japan, South Korea, Russia
and Brazil set off alarm bells last year.  Consequently, steel quota bills are currently before the
United States Congress and an accord limiting steel exports was reached between the United
States and Russia in July.  The United States has also been aggressive in extending the coverage
of products under the Canada-US softwood lumber agreement, which voluntarily restricts
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exports.  Trade disputes between the US and Europe over bananas and hormone-treated beef
could also lead to further protectionist or retaliatory measures.
The US Government also lacks fast-track authority which is necessary for the US
Administration to conclude a trade negotiation.  Without fast-track, the trade legislation
implementing the ultimate results of the Millennium Round agreement would be subject to
amendment in the US Congress.  This could put the Administration in the impossible position of
having to try to reopen any Millennium Round agreement to incorporate any changes enacted by
the Congress.  Other countries are unlikely to come to an agreement on these terms.  The 1998
bill providing fast-track authority was blocked by anti-trade Democrats, giving the President a
slap in the face from his own party.  While fast-track authority may not be necessary to begin a
trade negotiation, it is certainly necessary to conclude it.  In other trade rounds, the Congressional
authorization has lagged the start of negotiations.  For the Tokyo Round, it was fifteen months
after the round started before the fast-track legislation was passed; for the Uruguay Round, it was
two years.  In both these cases, the negotiators didn’t really get down to brass tacks until the
Administration finally got its mandate in the form of the necessary fast-track authority.
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Chapter 2 
Opening Markets More
Tariffs
Improved market access for goods, including in particular reduced tariffs, has been  the
main objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ever since it was concluded in
1947.  Over eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, great progress has been made in
lowering average tariff rates on manufactured goods levied by industrialized countries from 40
per cent before GATT  to around 4 per cent today.  Progress was also made in eliminating other
barriers to trade such as exchange controls, import licensing and quotas that were even more
damaging to trade than tariffs.
The GATT applied an easy three-step recipe to reduce the overall level of protectionism
in the world economy.  First, less visible non-tariff trade barriers were, wherever possible,
replaced with tariffs or, better still, eliminated.  Second, maximum (or “bound”) tariff rates were
negotiated.  Third, the bound rates were lowered further over time in subsequent rounds of
negotiations.
For most industrialized countries, bound tariff rates are the same as MFN tariff rates.  But
for developing countries, bound tariff  rates are often much higher than applied rates and serve as
a ceiling.  This gives these countries the flexibility to raise tariffs arbitrarily and unexpectedly if
they so choose.  In contrast, countries that bind their tariffs at applied levels must compensate
their trading partners if, for any reason, they raise their tariffs.
By far the thickest pile of paper produced by the Uruguay Round contains the detailed
schedules of bound tariffs by Harmonized System classification for each individual country
participating in the negotiations.  The Uruguay Round tariff cuts, which will be fully phased in
by the year 2000, will average almost 40 per cent and will lower the average tariff on industrial
products levied by developed countries from 6.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent.  The proportion of the
value of these products that will be duty free will rise from 20 per cent to 44 per cent.  The
proportion facing high tariffs above 15 per cent will fall from 7 per cent to 5 per cent.  And the
proportion of these tariff lines that are bound will increase from 78 per cent to 99 per cent.
Tariffs applicable on most of Canada’s exports to its most important trading partner, the
United States, which accounts for approximately 84 per cent of total Canadian exports, are set at
zero under NAFTA.  The tariff bindings negotiated under the GATT apply to the rest of
Canada’s trade, more than half of which is with the European Union (5.5 per cent) and Japan (3
per cent), Canada’s next most important trading partners.  
According to an OECD study, average tariffs will have been reduced substantially when
the Uruguay Round cuts are fully phased in, but they will still have some way to go (Chart 1). 
Among the four Quad countries, tariffs will average in the 4 to 7 per cent range and be higher in
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the European Union and Canada than in Japan and the United States.  Except for Switzerland and
Sweden though, bound tariff rates will be significantly higher in other advanced OECD countries
averaging from 9 to 25 per cent.  And bound tariffs will be even higher still in the developing
countries of Mexico and Turkey averaging 35 to 45 per cent.  This is representative of bound
tariff rates in the developing world.  Bound tariff rates are usually much higher than applied rates
in developing countries.  Applied tariff rates only averaged 14 per cent in Mexico and 10 per cent
in Turkey.
It’s not only the level of the tariffs that cause intersectoral distortions in production.  A
high dispersion of tariff rates combined especially with tariff “spikes” can also lead to a
misallocation of resources.  The same OECD study presents standard deviations for tariff rates as
an indicator of dispersion (Chart 2).  They are sufficiently high in the OECD’s view to be a
potential source of distortions.  (The extraordinarily high standard deviation of tariff rates in
Norway results from the tariffication of agricultural tariff rates.) Tariff “spikes,” which are
defined as exceeding three times the simple average of MFN tariff rates, are also prevalent in
most countries (Chart 3).
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A good example of a tariff “spike” occurs in truck tariffs, which are 22 per cent in the
European Union and 25 per cent in the United States.  The United States has relatively high
tariffs for textiles, ceramics and glass, but this doesn’t affect Canada because of the NAFTA. 
Some high tariffs facing Canadian producers include European Union tariffs on fish products (7
to 22 per cent), plywood (6 to 10 per cent), and non-ferrous metals including especially
aluminum (7.5 per cent).  
Even seemingly low tariffs can provide important protection.  The OECD tariff study
found a significant degree of tariff “escalation” in some countries.  When this occurs, effective
tariff protection increases as goods undergo further processing.  For example, the Japanese tariff
on lumber is only 4.8 per cent, but that’s high enough to make it hard for Canadian lumber
exporters to compete with Japanese lumber manufacturers who can import raw logs duty free.
In its recent report, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International trade
found that tariffs are still very high in many developing countries not covered by the OECD
study.  By region, tariffs are highest in South Asia, where they averaged around 45 per cent in the
early 1990s.  Next comes Africa, where tariffs average in the 25 to 30 per cent range.  Tariffs in
East Asia (excluding China) and Latin America average in the 10 to 20 per cent range.
A discussion of the extraordinarily high tariffs on many agricultural goods following the
Uruguay Round tariffication exercise is reserved for the next chapter on agriculture.
There is clearly lots of room to cut tariffs further in the Millennium Round, even taking
into account that they remain an important source of government revenue in many developing
and transition economies.  An ambitious objective for developed industrialized countries would
be to try to reduce tariffs to zero or as close thereto as possible.  For developing countries,
another round of 30 to 40 per cent reductions would be a reasonable objective.
Non-Tariff Barriers
While much progress has been made in eliminating or lowering non-tariff barriers, they
still exist and are important.  The OECD study referred to above examined the prevalence of
NTBs among OECD countries.  The NTBs considered fell under two rubrics: price controls, and
quantitative restrictions (QRs).  Price controls covered Voluntary Export Restrictions like those
used for automobiles and textiles, variable charges, and antidumping and countervailing duties. 
QRs included non-automatic licensing, export restraints, and other quotas and import
prohibitions.  The OECD study showed that QRs have not yet been confined to the dustbin of
history (Chart 4).  Ignoring Austria, QRs were most prevalent among the Quad countries,
particularly the European Union and the United States.  This suggest that the more advanced the
economy the more subtle a form that protectionism assumes.
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Trade Facilitation
Work has been underway at the WTO since the 1996 Singapore Ministerial looking at the
practical problems faced by traders in moving goods across borders.  This is to see whether
existing WTO trade facilitation obligations such as the Customs Valuation and Rules of Origin
Agreements are working and what more needs to be done.  At a symposium held in 1998, which
was attended by business representatives as well as government, there was an abundance of
complaints about the way excessive red tape, inadequate computerization, lack of transparency,
and failure to cooperate between customs and other government agencies made trading
needlessly difficult.  With just-in-time inventories and manufacturing, businesses are becoming
increasingly dissatisfied with bureaucratic delays in getting goods through customs.  Proposals
have been advanced by some countries, including the United States and Canada, to improve
existing trade facilitation provisions.  This work will continue in the Millennium Round, perhaps
even resulting in an Agreement on Trade Facilitation as well as modifications to existing
agreements.  More transparent procedures for trade and more efficient customs administration are
badly needed and would be welcomed by traders throughout the world.
Automobiles
The tariff waiver implemented by Canada under the Auto Pact, Canada’s preferential
trade agreement with the United States for its largest and most important industry accounting for
$86-billion in output, has been successfully challenged recently by Japan and the European
Union before a WTO panel.  They claim that the waiver of Canada’s 6.1-per-cent MFN tariff on
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certain vehicle imports from overseas is unfair and discriminatory because it is only made
available for imports by North America’s Big Three Auto Companies.  These three firms are able
to import cars from their subsidiaries or affiliates duty free  – Ford from Jaguar and Volvo,
Daimler-Chrysler from Mercedes Benz, and GM from Saab.  So is Suzuki, which acquired Auto
Pact status through its investment in the Cami Automotive assembly plant, a joint venture with
GM.  This preferential treatment contrasts with that of other importers of competing automobiles
such as Honda and Toyota, which also produce cars in Canada, but which must pay the 6.1-per-
cent duty on any cars that they import.  Japan and Europe in their complaint also challenged  the
Auto Pact more generally as being inconsistent with several of Canada’s WTO obligations.  The
alleged offending provisions concerned the performance requirements for the value of vehicles
assembled in Canada and Canadian content, which are tied to the duty waiver.
The panel’s preliminary ruling, which became known in mid-October and will probably
be approved by the WTO in January, found that the Auto Pact was inconsistent with several
WTO obligations and recommended that it, in effect, be abolished.  In particular, it found that the
duty waiver granted Auto Pact members was discriminatory and constituted a prohibited export
subsidy.  To comply, the Canadian Government will have to get rid of the Auto Pact, which can
be done by order-in-council.  The Canadian Government will also have to either eliminate the
6.1-per-cent MFN tariff, or apply it to all imports at the existing rate.
There are arguments on both sides of the issue.  On the one hand, the Big Three will
lobby the Government to retain the tariff and apply it to all non-North American imports.  They
will argue that, since the benefit of continued protection on the cars they produce in North
America would outweigh the loss of having to pay the tariff on the relatively few cars they
import from outside North America, they would be able to provide more economic activity and
employment in Canada if the tariff were retained.  This protection would, of course, be mitigated
by any reduction in the tariff resulting from the Millennium Round and subsequent trade
negotiations.  But the tariff would be a chip in these negotiations and could be useful in
negotiating tariff cuts by other countries.  
On the other hand, the Japanese producers, who obviously want to see the tariff
eliminated as soon as possible, will argue that the lower car prices that would result would be in
the interest of Canadian consumers.  Regardless of which side wins the day, however, it
shouldn’t have a very big affect on the Canadian automobile industry.  Automobiles are produced
in Canada today because of the strong competitiveness of the Canadian automobile industry and
not because of the tariff and the Auto Pact.  And most of the cars are made for export not for the
domestic market.
Textiles and Clothing
The sector that provides the initial impetus in the industrial development of many
developing countries is textiles and clothing.  It is labour intensive and makes good use of the
low-wage, unskilled labour that they have in abundance.  The competitiveness of the textiles and
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clothing industries in developing countries has long been considered a threat to the established
industries of the industrialized countries which necessarily must pay wages and benefits many
times higher.
The fear of lost jobs and depressed economies in producing regions if textiles and
clothing imports were allowed to replace domestic production gave rise to powerful political
pressures for protectionist measures.  The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which was created in
1974 to manage trade in textiles and clothing with the developing countries, was the institutional
response of the developed world to the prospect of soaring Third World textile and clothing
imports.  It established rules that enabled the importing developed countries to impose quotas
based on historical shares in bilateral negotiations with the producing developing countries.  It
also legitimized the use of quantitative restrictions to deal with import surges.  This approach
was obviously discriminatory and violated basic GATT principles.  However, the developing
countries that wanted access to the developed world’s textiles and clothing market had little
choice but to go along, like it or not.  But, it, at least, reduced the uncertainty they faced over
market access and gave them a share in the quota rents, rather than leaving all the rents to the
importing countries.
Given their visceral opposition to the patent unfairness of the MFA, the most important
achievement of the Uruguay Round for many developing countries was the new Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which embodied a plan to phase out the quantitative restraints of
the MFA.  At that time four WTO Members – Canada, the European Union, the United States
and Norway – still maintained import restrictions.
Under the ATC, the textile and clothing sector is being returned to normal GATT
disciplines over a ten-year transition period ending in 2005.  The products covered are yarns,
fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing.  The process of integration into the rules of
GATT is to be carried out progressively in three stages: in the first stage started on January 1,
1995 at least 16 per cent of products were integrated; in the second stage on January 1, 1998 an
additional 17 per cent was integrated; in the third stage on January 1, 2002 another 18 per cent
will be integrated; and on January 1, 2005 the remaining products will be integrated.  The ATC
also contains a programme for liberalizing existing restrictions by increasing existing quota
growth rates by a specified percentage.  In addition, it provides a special transitional safeguard
mechanism to protect against import surges of products that are not under quota but are not yet
integrated.  A Textiles Monitoring Body has been set up to oversee the implementation of the
ATC and make sure that any measures taken respect the rules of the agreement.
While quantitative restrictions are already well on their way to being phased out under the
ATC, developing country textile and clothing producing countries won’t be completely out of the
woods until all the products are integrated and the agreement terminated.  There is always a risk
that the phase out could be extended or additional restrictions could be imposed.  Textile and
clothing industry lobbyists in the developed world may be down but they’re not out yet.  The
United States Administration demonstrated this when it gave in to pressure from the American
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Textile Manufacturers Institute, and sought to extend the application of textile quotas to China
for an additional five years in its bilateral accession negotiations with China last April.
Forestry and Fisheries
There’s been an ongoing controversy between the United States and Japan in particular
over the forestry and fisheries sectors that could spill over into the Millennium Round.  The
United States, supported by Canada, became the champion of APEC’s  Early Voluntary Sectoral
Liberalization (EVSL) initiative.  Fifteen sectors were identified at the 1997 Leaders’ meeting in
Vancouver in 1997 for liberalization.  Forestry and fisheries were among the nine fast-track
sectors for which trade liberalization agreements were to be finalized for the 1998 Leaders’
meeting in Kuala Lumpur.  When it proved impossible to reach agreements, APEC passed the
buck to the WTO.  
The Japanese are still strongly opposed to any US efforts to achieve an agreement for
early liberalization in forestry or fisheries because of the political sensitivity of these sectors,
which are characterized by traditional lifestyles and account for much employment.  If the
Japanese had their druthers, these sectors would get special treatment like agriculture does under
the WTO rules.  Barring that, they want them to be part of the overall negotiations.  The United
States, on the other hand, are adamant on the need for quick progress.  As a leading exporter of
forestry and fisheries products, Canada’s interests coincide with the US on this issue.
Forestry and fisheries are special in that they both involve renewable resources.  Fisheries
are difficult because the widespread mismanagement of fish stock has lead to their depletion. 
This mismanagement has been compounded by enormous sectoral subsidies that encourage over-
fishing.  A World Bank study by Milazzo estimates that global fisheries subsidies are in the
US$15 to $20 billion range.  Other estimates put the subsidies as high as US$50 billion.  To
promote  conservation of fish stocks, these subsidies need to be curtailed by WTO disciplines.
Information Technology Agreement
After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, there was a major breakthrough at the 1996
Singapore Ministerial.  An Information Technology Agreement was reached to scrap customs
duties on telecommunications equipment, software and semiconductors by the year 2000.  This
agreement is important because it will make the benefits of the revolution in information
technology and  infrastructure available to users around the world more rapidly and cheaply.  It
will thus help to narrow the wide international gaps in the access to information technology, and
will raise global productivity.  But it was not only altruism that motivated the American trade
negotiators that were the main force pushing for the agreement.  The United States is the home of
the world’s leading edge information technology sector that is best placed to take advantage of
the increased demand for information products.  
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Countries Participating in the Information Technology Agreement
Australia Iceland Macau Singapore
Canada India Malaysia Slovak Republic
Chinese Tapei Indonesia Mauritius Switzerland (incl.
Czech Republic Israel New Zealand Liechtenstein)
Costa Rica Japan Norway Thailand
El Salvador Korea Panama Turkey
European Union Kyrgyz Republic Phillipines United States
Estonia Latvia Poland
Hong Kong, China Lithuania Romania
The ITA took effect on April 1, 1997 after participants accounting for 90 per cent of the
$500 billion world trade in information technology products had signed on to agreement
(including some like Chinese Tapei that were not yet WTO Members).  The first of four equal
agreed reductions in tariffs was implemented on July 1, 1997 and the last will be implemented on
January 1, 2000.  There are now 48 participants in the agreement including the fifteen EU
countries.  But all WTO Members benefit from the tariff cuts as they are made on a MFN basis.
Already one WTO case has involved the ITA indirectly.  In 1997, the United States
challenged the EUs reclassification of networking equipment from the category of computers to
telecommunications equipment, which had tariffs nearly twice as high.  The panel supported the
United States’ claim, but the decision was overturned on appeal.  The EU defused the
controversy by agreeing to have the disputed equipment covered by the ITA agreement, which
means that the offending tariff will be eliminated by January 1, 2000.
Efforts have been underway to expand the scope of the ITA.  The first review of the ITA
produced a long list of additional information technology products that could be added. 
Discussions went on through 1998 but no agreement could be reached on expanded coverage for
a so called ITA-II.  Resistance to further liberalization has been strongest from India and
Malaysia.  But with the ITA expiring next year, the US Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefshy  is hopeful that it will be possible to reach agreement on an ITA-II with coverage
extended to some 200 new products, accounting for an additional $13 billion in sales and
including radar and navigational equipment.  This could be one of the early harvests of the
Millennium Round.
Regional Integration Agreements
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Members of the WTO are allowed to enter into preferential customs unions and free trade
areas with other countries under certain specified conditions set out in Article XXIVof the
GATT.  They are also allowed to liberalize trade in services preferentially with specific countries
under GATS Article V.  The main difference between a customs union and a free trade area is
that a customs union has a common external tariff against third countries.   It also usually
involves a higher level of integration.
 
Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) have been proliferating and radically altering the
trade landscape.  Over the last fifty years, more than 150 such arrangements were notified to the
GATT and the WTO.  Most of these are still around in one form or another.  RIAs have
multiplied to such an extent that only a handful of WTO Members aren’t members of some
regional trade pact or other.  Half of international trade now takes place within the framework of
RIAs.
The reigning heavyweight RIAs are the European Union and the NAFTA.  Other major
agreements include the Mercosur, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the Australia-New
Zealand CRTA, South African Customs Union, and the ASEAN free trade area.  Canada has free
trade agreements with Chile and Israel and is currently negotiating with the EFTA.  The
European Union has free trade agreements with Central European countries and trade deals with
North Africa and Mercosur.  New Zealand just signed a trade pact with Singapore at the APEC
meeting in Auckland.  The EU has concluded a free trade arrangement with South Africa that
takes effect next year, and is currrently negotiating with Mexico.  Negotiations are underway for
a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).  And everyday more talks get underway –
New Zealand-Chile, Japan-South Korea, South Korea-Mexico – the list goes on.  These RIAs run
the course from a regional economic union (the EU) to bilateral free trade agreements.  
RIAs can be a step down the path to multilateral free trade if they are a manifestation of a
general willingness to open up markets and bring down trade barriers.  But they can just as easily
go the other way if they’re really disguised efforts to stake out markets and discriminate against
others.  
Concern about the contrasting tendencies for and against freer trade inherent in RIAs has
led the WTO to establish some basic conditions that a customs union or free trade agreement
must meet to qualify under the GATT.  First, the agreement must eliminate all the duties and
other restrictive regulations of commerce on “substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories in products originating in such territories.” Second, the proposed implementation of 
the customs union or free trade area must be in a reasonable period of time.  Third,  the
agreements can’t raise barriers to trade.  This means that, as a general rule, the duties and other
regulations can’t be made higher or more restrictive.   The WTO must be notified of the details of
any agreement and has the right to approve or reject it, or to recommend changes.
The process of vetting RIAs was sufficiently controversial in the Uruguay Round that an
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT was negotiated to clarify the
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rules.  It is in the interest of all non-members of an RIA that the agreement be trade creating and
not diverting.  But this is probably too much to ask given that almost all WTO Members benefit
from some trade diversion in their favour as a result of their membership in an RIA.  The rules
consequently are limited to preventing the worst forms of discrimination, namely raising barriers
against non-RIA members.  And since everyone is doing it, of course, nobody really wants the
WTO to adopt too tough a line.
The agreements that have the greatest potential to divert trade and merit the closest
scrutiny are those between developed countries and high tariff developing countries.  The most
obvious examples are the free trade agreements between the European Union and North African
countries.  Given the high external tariffs of these North African countries, it will be difficult for
non-EU countries to be competitive in their markets.  A similar criticism could be made by the
Europeans of the FTAA if it comes to pass.
If everyone is so keen on negotiating more and more bilateral free trade agreements, an
obvious question is why not go for a multilateral free trade agreement.  Clearly, bilateral free
trade agreements are a poor substitute for multilateral free trade.  It would be much more
efficient to have a single non-discriminatory agreement for everyone rather than a plethora of
discriminatory bilateral agreements.  But it is easier to negotiate bilateral agreements and
everyone thinks that they can gain some advantage over their competitors.  The politics works in
favour of bilateral agreements, hence their popularity.
One of the big achievements of a successful Millennium Round would be to get tariffs
down as close to zero as possible.  This would make the RIAs divert less trade and help to
improve the efficiency of the global economy.  For Canada, it would reduce the benefits of
NAFTA, but would create opportunities to diversify trade.  That wouldn’t be such a bad thing
given the current concentration of Canadian trade with the United States.
The Millennium Round could also, perhaps, as part of its institutional review of the
WTO, strengthen the provisions of Article XXIV.  One possibility would be to be more specific
about how long the RIA participants would have to eliminate all tariff barriers among
themselves.  This would require the participants to go all the way to a customs union or a free
trade area and not to enter into a discriminatory trade agreements of indefinite duration.
Trade blocks themselves, other than the European Union, will not play a big role as
participants in the Millennium Round.  Only the European Union and South African Customs
Union negotiated jointly in the Uruguay Round.  Mercosur should negotiate jointly if it is going
to become a real customs union, but the trade conflict between Argentina and Brazil after last
year’s devaluation of the Brazilian real make joint participation problematic.  Once again, except
for the EU, it will again be individual countries around the table.
There is also the question of the role of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)
in the Millennium Round.  APEC, while not a real RIA, includes the United States, Japan,
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Canada, and eighteen other Pacific economies (the word “countries” is a not used because of the
membership of Hong Kong and Taiwan).  It’s APEC’s sheer size, accounting for over half of
world output as well as more than half of the world’s population, and its potential to introduce
discriminatory measures that has worried outsiders, including most notably the Europeans, rather
than anything APEC has actually done.  So far, except for launching the Information Technology
Agreement, which became multilateral, and an aborted effort to achieve sectoral trade
liberalization, APEC has limited itself to enunciating grandiose targets for regional free trade by
2010 for developed countries and 2020 for developing countries.  In the declaration emanating
from the APEC’s leaders’ meeting in Auckland in September, the leaders passed the ball for
trade liberalization to the WTO calling for a comprehensive three-year round of multilateral
negotiations.  APEC will not be a force in the Millennium Round.  So the Europeans can stop
worrying.
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Chapter 3
Finally Time for Agriculture
The Stakes are High 
Negotiators at the Uruguay Round left a couple of land mines embedded in the WTO
Agreements for those who would dare to follow in their footsteps.  The most explosive of these
is the requirement to undertake negotiations on agricultural trade before the year 2000.  Not
wanting to rush things, WTO Members are waiting to the dying days of the century to comply
with this commitment.
In spite of the valiant efforts of scores of trade negotiators over the decades, agriculture
has remained largely outside the multilateral trading system.   Now the discrepancy between how
trade in industrial goods and trade in agriculture is treated in the WTO Agreements has become
rather too embarrassing to ignore.  It stands as a painful reminder of our negotiating fallibility. 
What’s more, it is something that the developing world will tolerate for only so long. 
Negotiators at the Millennium Round need to come to grips with domestic farm policies and
renew attempts to inflict a stronger rules-based system on agricultural trade.
Agriculture almost scuttled the Uruguay Round and is certain to generate some tense
moments in the upcoming set of negotiations.  But there is reason to believe that the time might
be ripe to make serious progress.  Agricultural prices have generally rallied since the Uruguay
Round.  While governments are still pursuing misguided domestic policies, some of the worst
lunacy has been curbed.  Although a series of trade disputes means their relationship is far from
cozy, at least the US and EU are not deep in the midst of a trade war over agriculture, as they
were back in the late 1980s.  They might therefore be more disposed to constructive compromise. 
Canada has a huge stake in the negotiation of clear rules for agricultural trade.  Our
abundant land and advantageous climate give us a natural advantage in certain types of
production, notably grains, oilseeds and red meat.  However, we do not have the financial
resources to compete against the treasuries of Europe and the United States.  As a result of
decades of profligate subsidization, agricultural markets are in disarray.  For many commodities,
world market prices bear little relation to the cost of production and do not correspond to the
price paid in any domestic market.  Rather, they are the result of food surpluses dumped by
countries that maintain impenetrable import barriers.  Until some discipline is imposed on
domestic agricultural policies, it is unrealistic to expect farmers to earn their living solely on the
basis of world market prices that are both depressed and highly unstable.  
  
The Context
Nobody said that this was going to easy.  Agriculture policy is exceedingly complex and
multi-faceted.  It extends to areas quite remote from traditional farming considerations to
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environmental and regulatory matters, to marketing arrangements, to biotechnology, food
security, animal welfare and rural development.      
Countries care deeply about their farm sectors.  This is true even in developed countries
where farmers can account for less than five per cent of the work force.  Looking at it rationally,
it makes little sense to subsidize and protect our agriculture sectors the way governments do,
particularly if foreigners are silly enough to practically give surplus food away on world markets. 
Taxpayers would not tolerate it if we ran our industrial sectors this way.  But farming is different. 
It can be less a job than a way of life.  Commuters on autoroutes like looking out at small,
picturesque farms as they speed along.  It does not occur to the Japanese business man, golf
fanatic that he is, that he would be a lot better off if some of his country’s inefficient rice farms
were turned into 18-hole paradises.  Whatever the rationale – some combination of concerns over
food security, respect for rural lifestyle and values, regional development considerations – our
feelings about agriculture are very deep-seated and complicated.  This is why agricultural trade
has been so terribly hard to liberalize.
Farming, among the oldest of the professions, has undergone a remarkable transformation
in recent years.  Technology has vastly increased yields and changed the nature of production. 
Technological change has affected all facets of the industry – improvements in seed varieties,
pest control, fertilizers, antibiotic and other disease treatments in animals, genetic research,
harvesting techniques, food transportation and distribution.  While food output has grown
sharply, market growth has been slow.  The result has been mounting production surpluses and a
stubborn reluctance on the part of governments to address the issue.
Progress on the agricultural trade file is complicated by the fact that no one has clean
hands.  This is certainly true of the developed country Members of the WTO.  We all have our
sacred cows.  In Canada, our dairy sector is highly protected along with poultry and egg
producers.  The sacred cow in Japan and in Korea is rice farming; in the United States it is the
sugar and peanut sectors; and in Europe virtually everything that grows is sacred.  This means
that none of the Quad Members, those who have taken a leadership role on other areas of trade
liberalization, can advocate reform with any credibility.  
Consider Canada’s position on the agriculture negotiations, for example.  We want free
trade in the cereals sector but are unwilling to compromise on our support to the supply-managed
sectors like dairy and poultry.  At best, the message we are giving is mixed.  
The stalemate has come at a considerable cost.  Agriculture has not shared the huge
benefits that have accompanied the expansion in world trade.  Canada is a case in point.  Our
industrial exports have grown astronomically over the past decade while net farm income has
been in free fall.  Farm income levels in the Prairies are hovering around the 1930s level.  Critics
of the multilateral trade agreement maintain that this is proof positive that trade agreements do
not work.  However, anyone familiar with the WTO Agreements could tell them that the farm
sector has yet to give liberalized trade an honest chance.   
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The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
The GATT amounted to little more than a hill of beans for the agriculture sector.  The
few rules that did exist were poorly disguised attempts to rationalize the trade distorting
agricultural policies of developed countries.  GATT provided exemptions for this and exceptions
for that with the result that governments had a virtual carte blanche to do whatever they pleased. 
While the Uruguay Round can hardly be accused of liberalizing world trade in agriculture, it at
least attempted to codify agriculture policy measures and impose a framework on the system,
reducing support measures modestly in the process.  It remains for the Millennium Round to take
the structure established in the last round and begin the painful process of trade liberalization.
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture accomplished three basic things.  The first is that it
called on Members to convert a host of non-tariff barriers such as import quotas, voluntary
export restraints, variable import levies and minimum prices into bound tariffs.  Some of these
tariffs ended up to be shamefully high, but at least they are visible and can be more easily
addressed in future sets of negotiations.  Some examples are the 300 per cent tariff Canada
imposes on butter imports, the 550 per cent imposed on rice imports into Japan, the EU’s 215 per
cent tariff on frozen beef and the 179 per cent tariff imposed on sweet powdered milk imports to
the United States.  Members must cut the high ex-quota tariffs by an unweighted average of 36
per cent between 1996 and 2000.
The following chart summarizes the results of “tariffication” for selected developed
countries.
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As part of the “tariffication” exercise, Members also had to provide imports access to a
certain percentage of their market.  This minimum access commitment applied to 3 per cent of
the importer’s market, rising to 5 per cent.  “Within access” tariffs can be applied by the
importing country.   In the case of fluid milk imported to Canada, for example, the “within
access” tariff rate is 17.5 per cent while the “ex-quota” tariff rate is 284 per cent.   
In actual fact, neither the minimum access nor tariff reduction requirements have caused
farmers to lose much sleep.  The minimum access commitments are very small.  A one-third
reduction in an astronomical tariff still leaves an astronomical tariff.  Various loopholes in the
tariff reduction requirements permit countries to cut more deeply in some sectors and reduce
others by only 15 per cent in order to meet their overall 36 per cent Uruguay Round obligation. 
The same pooling of product categories is permitted in order to meet minimum access
requirements.  There is still plenty of protection left to go around.  
The second thing accomplished in the Uruguay Round was to take some tentative steps in
the direction of disciplining export subsidies.  The Agreement stops well short of prohibiting
them altogether, like it does for export subsidies on industrial goods.  Instead, Members have
agreed not to impose any new farm export subsidies and to cut some existing ones.  The
Agriculture Agreement lists the type of export subsidies that are subject to the reduction
commitments.  
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Finally, the Uruguay Round tried to make some sense of domestic subsidies.  It
categorizes domestic support measures into three distinct types – the Green, Blue and Amber
Boxes – and subjects some subsidies to reductions according to a schedule of commitments. 
Certain programs, notably direct payments to producers and income support measures, are not
affected by the reduction commitments.
Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures
It’s easy to spot the authentic trade policy wonks.  They are the ones who use the term
“sanitary and phyto-sanitary” in cocktail party conversations and even appear to understand what
it means.   
For those who don’t know, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures are regulations that
relate to animal and plant health.  Trade policy experts and consumer advocates care deeply
about such measures because of their potential to distort world trade.  As tariffs and other more
conventional types of barriers come down, countries that feel protectionist often resort to
technical barriers as a way of restricting imports.
Article 2 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
asserts the right of Members to establish health and safety standards provided they are based on
“sound scientific evidence” and are administered in a consistent manner.  Members are also
encouraged to rely on international standards whenever possible.  
While this is both sensible and fair, administering the Agreement has been quite
complicated.  Everybody knows that scientists do not always agree.  Moreover, countries, like
individuals, have vastly different conceptions of what is safe.  Imposing one’s standards on
another, even when accompanied with scientific evidence, is not as easy as it sounds.  Consumers
confront almost daily stories about things like e-coli, dioxin-contaminated food and mad-cow
disease.  Carried away by fear, they pressure their governments to impose higher standards on
food safety than might be justified by hard scientific evidence.  
All the challenges associated with sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards were played out
with vigour in the recent WTO case over beef hormones.   The 10-year old EU ban on imports of
beef treated with growth enhancing hormones was successfully challenged at the WTO by the
United States and Canada.  The EU reaction to the case can only be described as one of denial.  It
has refused to comply with the WTO panel and Appellate Body decision.  The WTO, in turn, has
permitted the US and Canada to suspend trade privileges on imports from the EU worth US$124
million.
The six hormones at issue are considered safe by the US Food and Drug Administration
and by the JECFA, a joint committee of the World Health Organisation and the Food and
Agriculture Organisation.  However, the EU argues that the hormones are often wrongly
implanted and can end up excreting higher than safe levels.  It also maintains that accurate tests
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have yet to be developed to detect some of the most dangerous toxins associated with the
hormones.  In the meantime, it has sponsored a series of new risk assessment studies and is
awaiting the outcome of 17 ongoing studies before deciding how to respond to the panel’s
decision.  
The issue of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures is one of the thorniest facing
negotiators in the upcoming round.  The challenge promises to get even more complicated with
the promotion of genetically modified organisms by companies like Monsanto.  Resistence to
food made from genetically modified crops is particularly strong in Europe.  Among the events
scheduled for Seattle is an antibiotech “teach-in” aimed at trade policy officials.   
On one side of the negotiating issue are countries like Canada and the United States that
favour a science-based approach.  Canada’s position is understandable in light of our experience. 
Canadian exporters have faced a battery of foreign restrictions ranging from bans on canola and
beef sales to Europe, salmon and pork exports to Australia and bottled water exports to South
Korea.  Stronger disciplines in this area would reduce the potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory impediments to trade.  
The EU position is that WTO rules are inadequate for regulating genetically modified
organisms and hormones.  It would like to see more recognition of the precautionary principle
that would permit restrictions provided the scientific evidence does not rule out the possibility of
a risk to safety or health.  In Europe’s view, current WTO rules place too much onus on the
country with the safety concern to justify its trade restriction.  In the end, negotiators will have to
maneouvre between two quite different perspectives: that consumer concerns should prevail or
that scientific evidence should be the determining factor in deciding whether restrictions are
warranted.
There are no easy solutions mostly because there is very little common ground.  Labeling
can paper over some concerns, but only when the importing country concedes that safety is not a
real threat.  The EU ruled out the labeling option in the hormones case, for example.
  
The WTO might have to give some credence to the concerns of consumers and non-
governmental organizations over food safety.  After all, having important WTO Members like
the EU refusing to comply with WTO decisions respecting sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards
is a blow to the multilateral trading system.  At the same time, negotiators must resist pressures
to abandon scientific principles entirely.  Member governments have to do a better job of
promoting the scientific model within their own food regulatory agencies and engendering
consumer confidence in it.  Countries need to be encouraged to harmonize their standards and
rely on international standards as much as possible.  This argues for better institutions to conduct
basic research in the area, share findings and develop scientific consensus.  Another answer
might be to create an international scientific body that would operate at an arm’s length from
governments and provide advice to domestic regulatory agencies and WTO panels.  
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Issues of biotechnology and food safety impinge heavily on national sovereignty.  
Pushing too hard and fast in this highly emotional area will only weaken support for trade
liberalization generally.   The basic axiom should be that more information is better than less.  If
consumers are properly informed, they will make the right choices.  Ultimately, this is in the best
interests of food producers and food consumers alike.      
Market Access
The Uruguay Round made agricultural import barriers far more visible.  However, the
Agreement called for only cursory reductions in these barriers.  It is now up to negotiators in the
Millennium Round to begin the difficult process of cutting tariffs and expanding market access.  
There are various options for cutting tariffs, ranging from across-the-board cuts, zero-for-
zero offers or graduated reductions that would affect higher tariffs more deeply.  Chances are that
some hybrid approach will be necessary.  An overriding objective must be to ensure that the most
protected sectors face meaningful reductions.  The huge triple-digit tariffs should be addressed
with a vengeance.  US sugar beet and sugar cane growers, Japanese rice farmers and Canadian
dairy producers should all feel a little less comfortable when the round is over.  
As part of the tariff reduction exercise, the special safeguard mechanism will have to be
reassessed.  Currently, where ex-quota imports increase, a special safeguard can be invoked to
block the imports.  The trigger thresholds – both price and volume – for initiating the safeguards
are easily attained.  They should be made stricter in the next round of negotiations.
This means a balanced approach to tariff reduction and market access expansion.  It
should no longer be possible for countries to shield their most sensitive sectors from foreign
competition by pooling their market access commitments into broad categories and selectively
improving access within the category.
The market access loophole created in Uruguay Round is illustrated by the example of the
sugar imports to the United States.  In meeting its Uruguay Round market access commitment,
the United States provides raw sugar imports access to some 15 per cent of its market.  However,
imports of refined sugar, the more value-added product, is restricted to a mere 0.2 per cent of the
market.  Because the access commitment is for a broad product category, the US maintains that it
has complied with its WTO commitment.  Fortunately for its sugar refiners, and unfortunately for
ours, it has hardly done so in an even-handed fashion.  
An obvious solution is to require separate market access commitments for each distinct
product.  These would be based on the size of the importing country’s market for individual
products.  In Canada’s case, this would no longer mean an overall import quota for cheese but
separate access for Cheddar, Brie, Emmental and other varieties.
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In addition to requiring separate market access commitments for individual products,
these commitments should be expanded in the next round.  A minimum initial level of 5 per cent
of the market and a doubling to 10 per cent over the next five years is a reasonable objective for
negotiators.  It goes without saying that countries might have to adjust “within quota” tariff rates
to ensure that their new minimum access commitments can be met.
          
Export Subsidies
The Cairns Group has operated as the moral conscience of the agricultural trading world
for over a decade.  The group represents 15 agricultural exporting nations, including Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, and South Africa but conspicuously not the United States or European
Union.  In its latest meeting of members, the Cairns Group calls for the complete elimination of
export subsidies in the next round of negotiations.  
It is a bit of a chicken and egg scenario.  Countries will be unwilling to abandon export
subsidies unless they are sure that world markets will provide farm producers a decent return. 
However, an improvement in prices and market stability depend on the elimination of the highly
distorting export subsidies.  
  Fortunately, the always interesting internal dynamic of the European Union might give
agricultural trade negotiations a boost.  The cost to Brussels of providing subsidies to all
members in an ever-enlarging European Union is proving increasingly hard to bear.  Questions
are also being asked about why farmers are entitled to exactly the same levels of financial
support, irrespective of whether they live in Portugal, Britain or France.  Pressures to
“nationalize” Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy could give Millennium Round negotiators
the opportunity they need to achieve an agreement to phase out export subsidies.
Care will have to be taken to ensure that other types of support are not used as a
replacement for export subsidies.  Better rules might be necessary, for example, concerning the
use of export credit, guarantee and assistance programmes.   
Supporting Farmers in Ways that Do Not Distort World Markets
Elsewhere in the WTO Agreements, the symbol of coloured traffic lights are used to
denote subsidy categories.  To make things complicated, the Agriculture Agreement uses
coloured boxes.  
Green Box subsidies have little or no trade-distorting effects.  Included in this category
are such things as advisory and marketing services and farm support programmes that are
“decoupled” from production in that payments are not contingent on production levels.  Green
box subsidies cannot be challenged by foreign governments and do not have to be reduced.  
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The Blue Box subsidies category was created in a last-ditch effort to salvage agriculture
negotiations during the Uruguay Round.  US and EU direct payment programmes fall into the
Blue Box category.  Somewhat to the consternation of other countries, blue box subsidies do not
have to be reduced as part of the overall subsidy reduction commitments.  
The final category is the Amber Box.  Amber box subsidies can cause distortions to trade
and are subject to reduction commitments.  
Since the Uruguay Round, WTO Members have made a concerted effort to operate
domestic support programmes in a manner consistent with Green Box principles.  Programmes
have gradually been shifting from price supports and per unit or per acre subsidies towards crop
and income insurance plans.  The newer breed of subsidy programs are more akin to stabilization
schemes and are occasionally tied to the use of responsible environmental practices.  The fact
that financial assistance is better targeted and is independent of production levels has reduced
trade distortions and improved agricultural markets.  Even the United States and European Union
have implemented farm support packages that appear to be quite compatible with many of the
Green Box conditions.  While progress has been made, there is still much more to be
accomplished.  
Millennium Round negotiators should strive to eliminate the Blue Box category, thereby
opening the trade distorting domestic support programmes of the US and EU to the possibility of
trade challenge and subsidy reduction commitments.  The EU is certain to resist this attempt,
claiming that its producers are entitled to additional protection because of the higher standards of
food and environmental safety they observe.  Other countries should not be dissuaded by
Europe’s argument, however.  Even if it were true that Europe’s farmers are more concerned
with health and environmental matters, they can always be rewarded with decoupled subsidies
that do not distort world trade.  
As with market access, negotiators will have to be vigilant to ensure that subsidy
reductions are accomplished in a balanced fashion.  Up until now, countries have been able to
comply with the letter of their commitment but ignore the spirit by reducing some subsidies but
keeping others high.  Reduction commitments need to be made on a disaggregated basis to
ensure that all sectors are brought into the multilateral trading system.    
Managing Supply Management
Supply management is unquestionably the single hardest issue facing Canada’s
agricultural trade negotiating team.  It is certainly the one that will get them into the biggest heat
back home.  Accustomed as our negotiators are to championing the cause of freer trade, having to
switch sides and fight to shield our dairy, chicken and egg sector from foreign competition, all
the while keeping a straight face, cannot be an easy task.  
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In truth, Canada’s supply management system is hardly the worst example of agricultural
protectionism in action.  It does result in higher consumer costs but Canada’s food prices are
amongst the lowest in the world and significantly lower than those in Europe.  Proponents of
supply management maintain that it results in stable and predictable markets that benefit both
producers and consumers.  What’s more, it accomplishes this without bleeding the government
treasury dry.  Unlike the US sugar or European grain programmes, Canada’s supply management
system controls production and generates only minimal food surpluses.  Hence, it is not nearly as
trade distorting as other types of agricultural support.
The difficulty with Canada’s supply management system is that it has to severely restrict
imports in order to work.  Otherwise, lower import prices would undermine the much higher
domestic support prices.  The second problem with supply management is that it is rather
insidious.  To maintain high domestic price levels, a host of substitute products, processed
products and generally related products have to be regulated too.  For example, margarine has to
be on the import control list or the high domestic butter prices would seem out of wack.  The list
of dairy blends that are subject to import restrictions grows by the day, along with the ingenuity
of American processors for developing new recipes using powdered milk.  Frozen pizza makers,
chicken-pot-pie producers and other food manufacturers dependent on supply managed products
all have to be taken care of to ensure that they stay competitive with foreign producers who use
much cheaper food inputs.  
An example of the kind of trouble we have created for ourselves is illustrated by the
American and New Zealand WTO challenge to Canada’s milk pricing system.  The Canadian
system works by guaranteeing milk producers a high price for milk they sell to the domestic
market, provided they do not produce more than their production quota.  Farmers can produce
more than the quota amount and sell it on world markets but only at the considerably lower world
price.  Canadian food processors are allowed to buy industrial milk at the lower world market
price for production that they are intending to export.  The rationale is that they would not be
able to compete against foreign processors if they had to pay the high domestic prices for their
milk requirements.      
In the opinion of the WTO panel, Canada’s two-tiered pricing system amounts to an
export subsidy to dairy processors.  A recent WTO Appellate Body ruling upheld the panel’s
view.  While it should be fairly easy to change the milk pricing system to comply with this
particular WTO ruling, it should give us reason to reflect on the future of supply management.    
There are good made-in-Canada arguments for reforming the supply management system. 
It rigidly controls production and restricts internal trade with the result that farms are probably
smaller and less efficient than they would otherwise be.  The more stringent the restrictions are,
the more valuable the production quota becomes to those who hold it.   Quota-holders have a
huge stake in perpetuating the status quo and are willing to fight hard to protect it.   To make
matters even worse, there is a Canadian unity angle.  A disproportionate number of Canada’s
-36-
dairy producers live in Quebec.  All in all, it is little wonder that governments have been
reluctant to take the issue on.
While our supply management system survived the Uruguay Round pretty well intact, it
might not be so lucky in the next set of negotiations.  There will be pressure to expand market
access commitments which, combined with trade challenges to the two-tiered pricing system,
could spell the beginning of the end for high domestic support prices.  
To date, Canada’s response has been to stick its head in the sand.  Our government does
not want to be even seen to be advancing a position or it would be eaten alive by the supply-
management boards and producers.  This is unfortunate for a couple of reasons.  First, it means
we are not able to play a meaningful role in other areas of the agricultural trade agenda where
Canada could gain much from better trade disciplines.  Second, we also risk being left out in the
cold in last-minute deals affecting supply management.  We are marginal players in the
agriculture trade scene.  The real action occurs in the US-EU arena and, to some extent, in the
Cairns Group where Australia is particularly active.  Our only hope for influencing the outcome
to our advantage is to be active and constructive participants from the very outset.  
 
State Trading
Fingers are almost certain to be pointed Canada’s way in the next round of trade
negotiations over state trading enterprises.  State trading enterprises are government-sponsored
monopolies engaged in the export or import business.  One of the most notorious is the Canadian
Wheat Board.
The Canadian Wheat Board has long operated as the sole exporter of Canadian grain.  Its
scale of operation is thought to give it an advantage in foreign markets over private sellers who
deal in smaller quantities.   The United States has launched a series of trade challenges at the
Wheat Board on the grounds that it secretly subsidizes exports.  So far, none of the US
challenges have found their mark but it might yet get its way in the Millennium Round.     
Given the havoc big export-subsidizers like the United States have inflicted over the years
on international grain markets, picking on the Canadian Wheat Board is a bit like the pot calling
the kettle black.  Sadly for the Board, however, it has some detractors in its own back yard. 
Many Canadian grain producers are also frustrated at the Board’s monopoly power since it
prevents them from marketing their grain directly or with private companies.  
It is quite likely that negotiators will agree that state trading enterprises should be more
transparent.  For example, these entities could be required to disclose more details about their
revenues and financial dealings.  More complete information about their operations would
placate the concerns of domestic constituents as well.    
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Attention in the next negotiating round will also focus on state-sponsored import
monopolies like the Canadian Dairy Commission and provincial liquor boards.  The concern
there is that such bodies act to unfairly restrict imports.  Many of the newly acceding WTO
Members, notably those from former centrally-planned economies, rely heavily on state trading
enterprises to handle importation.  Over time, the problem should become less urgent as
expansions in minimum access requirements loosen their monopoly over imports.   In the
meantime, they should also have to become more transparent operations.  
Going Bananas
The relative absence of rules governing agricultural trade has meant that food fights have
figured very prominently in the work of the WTO dispute settlement body.  One of the most
notorious battles has been over bananas.  Not only has the bananas case severely tested the mettle
of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Undertaking but it has raised some very complicated questions
about preferential trading agreements, development assistance and the compliance provisions of
the WTO dispute settlement regime.  
The United States, spurred on by three home-grown banana heavy-weights, Dole,
Chiquita and Del Monte, successfully challenged the European Union’s preferential marketing
practices for bananas.  The European system is a tangled collection of tariffs and quotas aimed at
supporting producers in former colonies in the Africa, Carribean, and Pacific Region (ACP
countries).  Europe feels duty-bound to protect growers in their former colonies by granting them
exclusive access to its market.  The United States views bananas as big business and well as
strategic politics.  
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Cartoon by  Jeff Danziger, Los Angeles Times Syndicate, April 15, 1999.  Reprinted with
permission of Jeff Danziger.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Despite having lost the case, the EU has refused to implement the WTO ruling and bring
its practices immediately into compliance.  Disagreements within the EU over how to proceed
are delaying action.  Old colonial powers like France don’t want to do anything that will weaken
their ties with their banana-producing, former colonies.  Countries like Germany that have not
had colonies in recent years are more interested in cheaper bananas and avoiding US trade
sanctions.  In the meantime, while the EU dillydallies, the WTO has granted the United States
permission to impose close to $200 million worth of retaliatory tariffs against European imports
as compensation.  
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The European quotas make for bad trade policy and bad development policy.  The system
results in prices in Europe that are roughly twice US levels.  However, little of this extra
consumer spending finds its way to banana growers in recipient nations as most is hived away by
European importers and wholesalers.  Arguably, this money could be much better devoted to
direct cash assistance to banana-producing countries.  Within the developing nations, the
production quotas separate growers into haves and have-nots.  Those lucky enough to hold export
licenses are substantially better off than their unendowed brethren.  As with Canada’s system of
production and import quotas for supply managed commodities, the banana quotas have fostered
a convoluted regime of rent-seeking.  
In the end, Europe’s former colonies would be far better off with a better WTO deal on
agriculture.  This is where the EU’s precious energy should be devoted.
An Agenda for Action  
The Millennium Round will be judged a failure unless meaningful progress is made
liberalizing trade in food and food products.  It’s high time that agriculture gets dragged kicking
and screaming into the multilateral trading system.  The onus is on the developed world to make
this happen and to demonstrate to developing country members that the WTO is an institution
that serves their objectives too.
Success will depend on achieving progress in all the critical negotiating areas of market
access, reform of domestic support measures, export subsidies and sanitary and phyto-sanitary
barriers.  Though quite different ways of protecting the farm sector, they are highly interrelated. 
The danger is that as one area gets subjected to greater trade disciplines, governments could well
search out other trade-distorting ways to shore up producers.  
It is not too late for Canada to begin to show some leadership on agriculture.  We can
only talk out of two sides of our mouth for so long.  Canadian farmers have a natural advantage
in the production of some commodities like oilseeds, grains and red meat.  Yet, our ability to
participate in world markets is hamstrung by our refusal to engage in discussions over supply
management.  We should be willing to undertake constructive reforms to our supply management
system in exchange for changes to the considerably more egregious farm programmes of our
major trading partners.  Unless we are willing to go down this path, we take the chance that a
solution will be foisted on us in the Millennium Round.  That is hardly in the best interest of
Canadian farmers.
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Chapter 4 
Second Crack at Services
Trade in Services Booming
Although trade in services is only a fraction of trade in goods (one fifth for Canada), it
has been growing much more rapidly.  Between 1990 and 1997, exports of commercial services
grew 8 per cent per year while merchandise exports only increased 6 ½ per cent.  By 1997,
exports of commercial services had surpassed US$1.3 trillion, and accounted for almost one fifth
of total exports.  And there is still plenty of room for growth.  Services are the mainstay of
modern industrialized economies, accounting  for almost two-thirds of output and more than
two-thirds of employment.
Trade in services is important for the three main areas of the world.  North America’s
share of world exports of services is almost 20 per cent; Europe’s almost 46 per cent; and Asia’s
almost 23 per cent.  
The most dynamic component of services trade is not the traditional transportation or
travel services, but other services which include fast-growing financial services, construction
services, and computer and information services.  Services are at the heart of the new information
economy.  It is these services that are key in raising productivity in the production of goods and
in  making an economy more competitive.
Services are not like goods, which cross borders in neatly-stacked boxes that can be
inspected by customs officers and subjected to duties and other tax-like measures.  Their flow is
invisible.  The barriers to trade in services are usually regulatory inside the border rather than
border measures like tariffs and quotas.  A trading regime for services has to be different from
one for goods.
The GATS
By the time the Uruguay Round got underway in 1986, trade in services, like the camel in
the tent, had become too important to be ignored any longer.  Notwithstanding strong resistance
at the outset from many developing countries, the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
which was negotiated over this round, represents a first effort to establish multilateral, legally-
enforceable rules for trade in services.  Patterned on the GATT, it covers all services, except
those provided in the exercise of governmental authority, and seeks to ensure transparency in
regulations and inquiry points.  It also specifies that regulations must be “administered in a
reasonable, objective and impartial manner,” and that international payments with respect to
covered trade in services should normally be unrestricted.  
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Most fundamentally, the GATS seeks to implement the two key basic principles of non-
discrimination – most-favoured-nation and national treatment, which are the core of the GATT. 
Unfortunately though, as for many copies, the original was much better.  In the GATS, the MFN
principle allows exceptions and national treatment applies only in certain sectors and subject to
such limitations as specified in each WTO Member’s schedule of commitments.
The GATS covers all four ways or “modes” of providing an international service:
• cross-border supply of services sold from a supplier in one country to customers
in another (e.g.  overseas telephone calls);
• consumption abroad of services in another country by nationals of a different
country (e.g.  hotels and tourism);
• commercial presence of subsidiaries or branches in another country to supply
services (e.g.  foreign insurance company branches);
• presence of natural persons in another country to supply a service (e.g. 
accountants).
Because the GATS imposes obligations with respect to the “commercial presence” of
foreign service suppliers in a country, it effectively covers investment abroad.  This makes it the
first multilateral investment agreement.  And it was negotiated without all the muss and fuss of
the MAI.
The MFN principle as applied to the GATS means that, if a country allows foreign
services or service suppliers market access, it must allow equal access for all services and service
suppliers of the other Members of the WTO.  The qualification is that countries are permitted to
list exceptions to MFN treatment in individual sectors.  These exceptions could only be made at
the time of the initial agreement, and no more can be added.  By April 15, 1994 when the Final
Act of the Uruguay Round was signed, 61 lists of such exceptions had been submitted.  The
exceptions are to be reviewed after five years and are to end after ten years.  Countries are
expected to remove the exceptions even sooner when other countries agree to reciprocal market
access commitments such as has already occurred in basic telecommunications and financial
services.  The principle of MFN treatment should eventually become unqualified as it already is
for the GATT (except of course for customs unions and free trade areas which are allowed under
both agreements).
The GATS also imposes a national treatment obligation.  This means that foreign and
national services and service suppliers must be given equal treatment under the regulations
governing applicable service sectors.  But there is a very big qualifier attached.  The national
treatment obligation only applies when a country makes a positive commitment in its schedule. 
In contrast, the national treatment obligation in the GATT applies generally.  Once a good is
admitted across the border, it can not be subjected to discriminatory taxes, regulations or other
internal measures.  If this was too ambitious for the countries negotiating, it would have been
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better, at a minimum, to have incorporated a national treatment obligation in the GATS that was
subject to specific listed exceptions in a schedule (the so-called negative list).  Such an approach
would have been more transparent and the nature of the benefits accruing from the obligation
more ascertainable.
The situation is not quite as bad as it seems with respect to national treatment, however. 
Once a country makes a commitment with respect to a sector, national treatment applies to all
services in the given sector unless the country enters a reservation.  Hence another problem: these
reservations tend to be very broad.  An effort needs to be made to make the reservations as
narrow as possible.
The schedules of commitments with respect to national treatment under the GATS serve
the same role as the tariff schedules under the GATT.  They are the focus of the negotiations to
improve market access.  A country will offer to accord national treatment in a specific sector in
return for national treatment in the same or different sector from another country.  These
concessions are in turn “multilateralized” so that all parties to the negotiation can enjoy the
benefit.  Specific commitments are binding in the same way as tariff commitments are binding
under the GATT.  They provide a reasonable assurance of stability in market access and can only
be withdrawn with compensation.
There are twelve broad sectors listed in the GATS schedules of commitments, which
follows the GATT Secretariat’s classification scheme.  Within this broad framework,
commitments are specified by numerical references to the Central Product Classification System
of the United Nations.  By July of this year, there were 132 schedules of specific commitments
submitted and agreed.  Their sectoral distribution is shown in Table 1.  The sector with by far the
most commitments was tourism and travel related services.  Even the least developed countries
are keen on attracting foreign investment in tourism and travel.  Financial services, business
services and communication services also have relatively large number of commitments.  In
financial services and communication services, the number of commitments went up as a result
of the Financial Services and the Basic Telecommunications Agreements reached after the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
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Table 1
Specific Commitments by Sector
01.  Business Services 89
02.  Communication Services 85
03.  Construction and Related Engineering Services 60
04.  Distribution Services 38
05.  Educational Services 32
06.  Environmental Services 40
07.  Financial Services 91
08.  Health Related and Social Services 34
09.  Tourism and Travel Related Services 114
10.  Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services 49
11.  Transport Services 70
12.  Other Services not Included Elsewhere 9
Total 711
Source: http:www.wto.org/wto/services/websum.htm dated 7/31/1999.
The industrialized countries with their more developed service sectors have been the ones
most willing to make commitments for more sectors.  Developing countries, particularly the least
developed, have been the least willing.  The European Union has made commitments with
respect to all twelve sectors.  The United States and Japan have made commitments with respect
to eleven sectors including all sectors but the residual “other” category.  Canada has only made
commitments for eight sectors, leaving out educational services, health related and social
services, and recreational, cultural and sporting services as well as the “other” category.  This
reflects Canada’s traditional concerns about education and health, which is largely in the public
sector, and worries about external, especially American, threats to Canadian culture.
The GATS allows governments to negotiate agreements to recognize qualifications for
the purpose of authorizing, licensing or certifying service providers.  But in order to prevent
these mutual recognition agreements from being discriminatory and becoming additional barriers
to trade, it requires that all WTO Members be given an adequate opportunity to join them.  WTO
Members are also required to work together to establish common international standards and
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criteria for the recognition and practice of the trades and professions involved in the international
delivery of services.
The GATS is overseen by the Council for Trade in Services.  This body, made up of
representatives of all the member countries, serves the same function for the GATS as the
Council for Trade in Goods serves for the GATT.  Members must notify the Council for Trade in
Services of any changes in regulations affecting services covered by specific commitments and of
any recognition agreements for qualifications.  Domestic regulations are the main form of
barriers for service trade.  That is why a Working Group on Regulation has been established.
Trade in services has aspects that make it unique.  And some types of services are quite
different from others.  This is reflected in some of the GATS annexes:
• Movement of Natural Persons This annex establishes the right of an individual
providing a service to temporarily stay in a country and makes the distinction
between such an individual and any individual seeking employment or to
immigrate.
• Air Transport Services This annex limits the coverage of the GATS to the
relatively minor categories of aircraft repair and maintenance, the marketing of air
transport services, and computer reservation services.  The more important traffic
rights are excluded to remain under the current system of bilateral air service
agreements, whereby a country grants another country’s carriers landing rights in
exchange for landing rights in the other country.
• Financial Services This annex, which defines financial services, excludes the
activities of central banks, and social security or public retirement funds from
coverage and makes clear the governments’ right to take prudential measures to
protect the public and to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.
• Telecommunication Services This annex requires governments to provide foreign
service providers access to public telecommunications networks and services on a
reasonable and non-discriminatory basis.  This is important because some service
suppliers absolutely need access to supply their services.  For example, money
transfers, on-line information services and data-base retrieval require good
communication links to operate.  Providing access to the network is not the same
thing as opening up the market to supply public telecommunication services.  That
would require a further specific commitment.
Subsequent Negotiations
The Uruguay Round was not the end of service sector negotiations, but rather the
beginning.  Negotiations continued in four areas: basic telecommunication services; financial
services; movement of natural persons; and maritime transport.  Agreements were reached on
basic telecommunication services and financial services by early 1997.  Concerning movement of
natural persons, guidelines and disciplines have been developed for the accountancy sector as a
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model for facilitating trade in professional services.  More general talks to improve specific
commitments in the movement of natural persons were completed in July 1995 without any
concrete results.  Negotiations on maritime transport, which had earlier proved difficult in the
context of both the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and GATT,  were suspended in 1996.
  
Telecommunication Services
No commitments were made during the Uruguay Round on basic telecommunications
services.  The fact that basic telecommunication services were delivered by government
monopolies in many countries, including those in Europe at the time of the completion of the
round in 1994, made the liberalization of trade in this sector a tricky business.  It was much
easier to liberalize trade in some of the more value-added telecommunication services.  Some
commitments covering these services such as allowing third-party supply of Private Branch
Exchanges found their way into some of the original GATS schedules.  But the big prize  – the
$675 billion market for basic telecommunication services including local, long distance and
international services for home and business – was left for further negotiations.
A path-breaking agreement was finally reached on February 15, 1997 liberalizing trade in
basic telecommunication services.  By the time the agreement came into force on February 5,
1998, 72 countries representing over 90 per cent of the market had submitted commitments on
basic telecommunication services, including 59 countries that committed to a complete set of
“reference rules” for regulating the telecommunications sector.  These rules require countries to
open their market to foreign investment and competition, to establish an independent
telecommunications regulator, to make interconnection guarantees, and to agree to WTO 
surveillance.  Commitments made by most governments covered local, long-distance and
international voice services, data transmission, cellular/mobile markets, leased circuits, and
satellite services.  Some of the commitments are subject to a phase-in period.
As a general rule, the benefits of the Telecommunications Agreement are extended to all
WTO Members on a MFN basis.  But each signatory was given the option of filing an MFN
exemption, which 9 countries actually submitted.  This included an American exemption for one-
way satellite transmission of Direct-to-Home (DTH) and Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS)
television services and digital audio services.  
The liberalization of the market for telecommunication services before the agreement
entered into force had already lead to dramatically lower phone rates in North America and
Britain.  In 1998, the Europeans were already moving to privatize state monopoly
telecommunication companies and to liberalize the market for telecommunication services.  The
WTO Telecommunications Agreement will help them to secure the benefits of lower telephone
rates and improved quality of services.  The over 46 participating developing and transition
economies with telecommunication rates that are 10 or 20 times those in North America will also
benefit.
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While Canada refused to allow majority foreign ownership of telecommunication
companies, there were major changes here as well.  Teleglobe Inc., which lost its monopoly on
overseas calls for Canadian carriers, has managed to sell services to carriers world-wide.  The
Telesat monopoly on fixed satellites is scheduled to end in March 2000.
Financial Services
Even though many countries made specific commitments on market access and national
treatment during the Uruguay Round, the offers were not considered sufficient to call an end to
the negotiations by the time of the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting in April 1994.  Treatment was
still based on reciprocity and broad exemptions to the MFN principle persisted.  The negotiations
in the financial sector were extended until June 1995, six months after the coming into force of
the GATS.  These negotiations, which resulted in a modest “interim agreement,”  also proved not
to be enough.  Again negotiations were resumed.  Fortunately, these proved to be more fruitful.
The Asian financial crisis touched off by the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997
held the feet of some previously recalcitrant negotiators to the fire.  This facilitated the
negotiation of  a new and improved set of financial services commitments under the GATS.  The
process culminated on December 12, 1997, when 71 countries agreed to the new Financial
Services Agreement.  This gave an important signal to the world that the Asian crisis was not
going to be allowed to derail the move to more open global financial markets.
The new pact, which brought to 104 the number of countries with commitments in
financial services, came into force on March 1, 1999.  It covers more than 90 per cent of the
enormous global market for financial services, which takes in $40 trillion in domestic bank
lending, $20 trillion in securities trading, and over $2 trillion in insurance premiums.  
The Financial Services Agreement lightens or scraps regulatory restrictions on foreign
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies.  The new commitments made included the
elimination or relaxation of restrictions on foreign ownership, the juridical form of commercial
presence, and the expansion of existing operations.  WTO Members have also undertaken to do
something about measures that enforce the segmentation of banking, securities and insurance or
that restrict geographical expansion.  This is important in the United States where the Glass-
Steagall Act and the McFadden Acts restrict opportunities for foreign financial institutions.
In the final agreement, the United States, India and Thailand withdrew their broad
reciprocity-based MFN exemptions.  Several other countries also curtailed the scope of their
exemptions.  The United States submitted a new MFN exemption in insurance, which was
targeted at Malaysia but was made generally applicable to countries that force US insurance
companies to divest.
Canada’s new financial service commitment reaffirmed the Government’s previously
announced intention to permit foreign banks to directly open branches in Canada.  It also allowed
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foreign bank subsidiaries operating in Canada to open branches.  This was something that US
and Mexican banks already could do under the NAFTA.
The United States, which was the driving force behind the financial service talks, expects
to be the big winner as the agreement opens up global markets to the highly competitive US
financial services industry.  In spite of what four of Canada’s six biggest banks said about the
need to be bigger to survive when they were trying to justify mergers, Canada does have world
class financial sector and can be a winner too.  Moreover, in the end, everyone will gain from
freer trade in financial services because of the increased access to lower cost capital ushered in
by the agreement.
Even though the financial services agreement marks a big step forward in opening up
trade in financial services, many barriers remain.  Countries with a comparative advantage in
financial services like the United States and the United Kingdom can be expected to push for
further liberalization in the Millennium Round.  
Professional Services
As a first step towards imposing more disciplines on service sectors involving the
professions, the accounting sector was picked as a pilot to develop rules to facilitate trade in
these services.  First, the WTO Council on Trade in Services adopted guidelines for the
recognition of qualifications in the accountancy sector on May 29, 1997.  These guidelines,
which are non-binding, were prepared to make it easier for governments to conclude agreements
on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications.  Second, the WTO Council for Trade in
Services adopted Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accounting Sector on December 14,
1998.  These disciplines, which apply to all countries with specific commitments for the
accounting sector, cover the administration of licensing requirements, qualification requirements
and procedures, technical standards, and transparency requirements.  Under the disciplines,
regulatory measures can’t be more trade-restrictive than necessary to attain such legitimate
objectives as protecting consumers, and ensuring the quality of the service and professional
competence.  These disciplines are to be integrated into the GATS and become legally binding at
the end of the next round of service negotiations.  In the meantime, WTO Members agreed not to
take any inconsistent measures.  The work program for accountancy now needs to be extended to
other professional services such as engineers, architects and legal consultants.
Maritime Transport
Although there are some commitments in the GATS schedules with respect to ocean
transport, port facilities and auxiliary services, maritime transport has proved a hard nut to crack
for trade negotiators.  Countries have many restrictions on maritime transport such as the Jones
Act in the United States which limits foreign participation in domestic transport.  Failing to reach
any agreement during the Uruguay Round, an additional round of marine transport negotiations
was scheduled to end in June 1996.  All that the group could agree on by that deadline was to
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suspend the negotiations until the commencement of the next comprehensive service sector
negotiations in the year 2000.  The MFN obligations were also suspended, but at least a standstill
was imposed on any new barriers.  Maritime transport remains a sector where trade barriers
abound.  Liberalization in maritime transport should be an important objective of the Millennium
Round.
The Service Agenda
The GATS (Article XIX:1) requires negotiations to begin by the year 2000 to increase the
number and level of commitments in countries’ schedules.  This is a major part of the WTO’s
built-in agenda that has set the stage for the Millennium Round.  Because many more barriers to
trade exist in the service sector than in the goods sector and because they take the much more
intractable form of regulatory obstacles, further liberalization of trade in services must be a key
objective of the Millennium Round.  The Uruguay Round was just a beginning.  Much must be
done before trade in services is as free as trade in goods.  
An indication of the magnitude of the task needed to liberalize trade in services is
provided by Table 1.  The shortfall of the number of specific commitments from the number 134
(the total number of WTO Members when the table was prepared) reveals the number of WTO
Members that have not made commitments to liberalize in a specific sector.  For instance, the
existence of just 91 commitments in financial services means that 43 WTO Members have not
made commitments.  Only 70 Members have signed the Financial Services Agreement, leaving
64 that have not.  The cup may be either half empty or half full depending on your point of view. 
But one thing is clear; it’s not full.  In addition, only 38 WTO Members have made commitments
in distribution services, leaving 96 that have not.  This is important because an open distribution
system with equal access is important for providing access to goods.  If your goods aren’t on the
shelves , they don’t get sold.  This has been a perennial problem in penetrating the Japanese
market.  It was the main complaint made by the United States before the WTO in the recent Fuji-
Kodak challenge.  In this 1997 case, the US argued unsuccessfully that Japanese government
measures kept Kodak out of distribution and retailing in Japan.
In subsectors within the sectors, the number of WTO Members that have not made
commitments is even higher because a commitment in any subsector counts as a sectoral
commitment even if there are no commitments for other subsectors.  For example, only 14 WTO
Members have made commitments in the audio-visual subsector of the communication sector. 
This is a particular sore point for the Americans who push US pop culture exports of action
movies and rock music.
The differences between goods and services is becoming increasingly blurred. 
Manufacturing firms are providing financing and ongoing service support to sophisticated high-
tech products and service firms are packaging technologically advanced products with their
services.  Products can no longer be put in hermetically-sealed boxes to be governed by the
GATS or the GATT.
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Since the GATS is a separate agreement from the GATT, there is an issue of how to
handle overlapping topics.  For instance, does it make sense to have different rules for investment
in service-producing industries than in goods-producing industries as currently exists?  What
about rules for movement of natural persons?  These questions are even more complex for firms
that produce goods as well as services.  At a minimum, the two agreements have to be consistent
and the negotiations coordinated.  An alternative would be to carve out the negotiations on the
cross-cutting issues and place the disciplines concerning the treatment of enterprises under a
separate agreement that would apply regardless of whether the enterprise produced services or
goods.
Speaking before the World Services Congress in Washington last June, US Trade
Representative Charlene Barshefsky proposed that the “request-offer” approach of the GATS be
replaced by a better negotiating approach.  She suggested that the “zero-for-zero” and formula
approaches, which were used to negotiate tariffs for goods, could be applied to services.  Under
these approaches, negotiators could agree to get rid of all barriers in a sector or to reduce them to
a certain negotiated level.  Such a more aggressive approach appears to be more promising than
the slow and painstaking process of waiting for countries to offer up the barriers themselves.  
Another approach that appears promising is that pursued in the telecommunication
negotiations.  It involves developing a common regulatory framework for a sector, which would
be accepted by all WTO Members.  This approach could be systematically applied sector by
sector starting with the sectors such as maritime transport where the barriers are the greatest 
Rules governing three areas of the GATS were left unfinished in the Uruguay Round:
subsidies, safeguards, and government procurement.  This was partly because time ran out and
partly because it wasn’t clear what, if anything, needed to be done.  But commitments for future
action were made.  GATS Article XV requires Members to enter into negotiations to develop
disciplines for subsidies.  GATS Article XIII promises further multilateral negotiations on
government procurement in services.
Subsidies is probably the easiest area to deal in theory.  The same kinds of disciplines that
apply to subsidies on goods could be extended to subsidies for services.  Disputes over service
subsidies could be handled under the dispute settlement system.  While export subsidies are not a
big problem for services, domestic subsidies in such areas as transportation and
telecommunications are very high.  They are also extremely difficult to measure.  The big
problem would be convincing countries that currently make heavy use of subsidies to accept the
disciplines.  Special rules would have to be negotiated for certain sensitive sectors such as health,
education, and pensions where subsidies are used to pursue important social policy objectives.
In the context of trade in goods, safeguards are measures that protect domestic industries
from surges in imports.  In the past, they were useful in convincing governments to agree to trade
liberalization in sensitive areas like agriculture.  On the bright side, traded services can’t be
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stored and are thus less subject to surges than imports of goods.  Safeguards are consequently
less necessary for service imports.  Nonetheless, some Members may seek some form of
safeguard protection as a trade-off for more liberalized trade in services.
Given that government procurement of goods is not covered by the GATT, it should not
be surprising that government procurement of services is not covered by the GATS. 
Procurement of services is more difficult to deal with than procurement of goods.  Procurement
of services is characterized by small contracts and difficult issues of determining quality. 
Nevertheless, there are services such as financial services, transportation, telecommunications,
and construction that should be subject to disciplines.  The most sensible approach would
probably be to convince all WTO Members to become signatories to the plurilateral Government
Procurement Agreement rather than establish a separate set of disciplines under GATS. 
Irrespective of what is done about procurement, there is still the issue of the definition of the
government sector excluded under the GATS to be resolved.  From the point of view or exerting
discipline on as large a share of government procurement as possible, the narrower the definition
the better.  If the definition were limited to core government or public administration, the GATS
obligations would be binding on many government agencies and enterprises and thus would
exercise a greater discipline on government procurement of services.
The United States, with its dynamic service sector, is the champion of  freer trade
in services.  Canada’s service sector is not that far behind, especially in commercial services, and
definitely can use the competition to catch up.  A dynamic and competitive service sector is
essential for an economy’s overall competitiveness.  That’s another reason why the GATS
negotiation is so critical for the success of the Millennium Round.
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Chapter 5 
Taming Procurement
The Rules or Lack Thereof
Governments like to think that they are a rule unto themselves.  Consequently,
government procurement has never been subject to the discipline of multilateral trading rules
under the WTO and its predecessor GATT.  Under Article III:8 of the original GATT 1947, it
was excluded from  the national treatment obligation for goods.  More recently, in the GATS, it
was carved out of the main commitments for services.  Since procurement of goods and services
by governments and their agencies accounts for 10 to 15 per cent of GDP, its non-coverage is an
important gap in the international trade covered by multilateral rules.  
The lack of rules is made even more serious by the fact that government procurement is
often not guided by the principle of “best value for money” as determined by fair and open
competition on the free market.  Instead, it often results from political decisions made behind
closed doors.  In most countries, purchasing is frequently used to support local firms and regions. 
This can be the result of specific prohibitions on foreign suppliers, or various types of
preferences.  Alternatively, it can result from more insidious measures and practices that deny
foreign firms the opportunity to bid on government requirements.  These include excessive sole
source tendering, tailored technical requirements, and a general lack of transparency.  
The first successful international effort to tackle the problem of government procurement
was made during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  In the first Agreement on
Government Procurement that entered into force on January 1, 1981, a select group of
participating countries offered to open up their procurement opportunities to other countries in
return for access to their procurement markets.  This agreement was plurilateral rather than
multilateral meaning that, unlike most of other GATT agreements, it applied only to countries
that specifically signed on to the agreement.
The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, which came into effect on January 1,
1996, is based on the earlier agreements, but expands the scope of coverage to include some
services and construction as well as goods by specified public entitities.  Purchases of goods and
services over SDR 130,000 (over Can $250,000)  by governments and agencies are covered and
purchases of construction services over SDR 5 million (or around Can $10 million).
The GPA provides an opportunity to bid on more than US$250 billion per year in
government contracts.  The total value of contracts won by foreign supplies covered by the
agreement was US$30 billion based on information collected for the 1990-94 period.  The
juxtaposition of the large opportunities with the modest results shows that, even with the GPA,
foreign suppliers are only getting a small share of the government procurement market.
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Signatory Member Countries of Agreement on Government Procurement 
Austria Germany Korea Singapore
Belgium Greece Liechtenstein Spain
Canada Hong Kong Luxembourg Sweden
Denmark Ireland Netherlands Switzerland
EU Israel Netherlands for Aruba United Kingdom
Finland Italy Norway United States
France Japan Portugal
Observer Governments
Argentina Chinese Tapei Latvia Poland*
Australia Columbia Lithuania Slovenia
Bulgaria Estonia Mongolia Turkey
Chile Iceland Panama* *
* Negotiating Accession
Observers - International Organizations
IMF OECD
There are now 26 GPA Member countries, including Canada, the United States, the
European Union and Japan, 15 observer governments, and two observer international
organizations.  
The foundation, on which the Agreement on Government Procurement rests, is the
simple, but powerful, principle of non-discrimination or national treatment, which means that
member countries are required to give the goods, services, and suppliers of other members
treatment that is “no less favorable” than they give their own.  To ensure that there is no
discrimination, the agreement sets out procedures for providing transparency of laws, regulations,
procedures and practices governing procurement.  It also establishes norms in respect of technical
specifications and tendering procedures and prohibits offsets.  Finally, it requires member
countries to establish formal bid challenge procedures.
The GPA is not the only procurement agreement to which Canada is a party.  The rules
governing procurement between Canada and the United States are also covered by Chapter 10 of
the NAFTA.  And government procurement relations between Canada and Mexico are subject to
Chapter 10 of NAFTA, but not the GPA.
Limitations of the Agreement
-53-
There are important limitations to the scope and coverage of the Agreement on
Government Procurement.  As a plurilateral agreement, it applies only to member countries and
then only to procurement by specified government departments and enterprises, and non-central
levels of government.  Moreover, its coverage is limited to specified goods, services and
construction services, above certain monetary thresholds.  The rule is: if it’s not specified, it’s not
covered.
The first limitation is that membership in the Agreement has so far embraced only the
major industrialized countries.  No developing countries have yet joined, although some are
observers.  Developing countries generally have the most discriminatory procurement practices,
either out of misguided efforts to promote economic development or out of simple corruption. 
Consequently, they are the members that need to be brought under the agreement the most, both
for their own sakes as well as for the sakes of other members.  Their taxpayers would benefit
from lower cost goods and services, and other countries would benefit from expanded markets. 
The United States is pushing to extend the AGP to all WTO Members.
The second important limitation is peculiar to Canada.  It’s Canada’s lack of access to the
procurement of non-central levels of government under the Agreement.  Since the Canadian
Government was not prepared to make commitments with respect to Canada’s provincial and
local government procurement, other countries are allowed to have derogations from most-
favoured-nation status for Canada with respect to their own sub-central government procurement. 
Canadian exporters are thus not able to benefit fully from the Agreement in obtaining access to
procurement by non-central levels of government in other member countries.  
Motivated in part by worries about opening up procurement in the health and education
sector to foreign suppliers, the Canadian provinces have refused to go along with any deals
negotiated by the Canadian Federal Government that would allow the United States to retain Buy
American and small business carve-outs.  While the concerns about the impact of the GPA in
their areas of jurisdiction are legitimate, provinces are going beyond their jurisdiction when they
try to dictate to the Canadian federal government on the exact nature of the access deal that must
be negotiated with the United States.
It is particularly ironic that Canada, which has a preferential trading relationship with the
United States under the NAFTA, has less favorable access to state and local government
procurement in the United States than other countries such as the European Union and Japan,
which have no such special trading arrangement.  Canadian suppliers have their provincial
governments to thank for this.
The third important limitation pertains to the scope and coverage of the Agreement that is
set out in the general notes provided in the appendix of each signatory.  Important listed
exclusions include urban transportation and defence, and set asides for small and minority
businesses.
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There are also technical problems with the Agreement.  Many of the procedures specified
are unnecessarily complex and need to be updated to reflect the way business is currently being
done using computers and modern telecommunications.  For instance, the forty-day period for
tendering is considered unduly long now with computerized bidding for many goods and
services, and the requirements that invitations to participate in an intended procurement be
published in a listed publication and that “tenders normally be submitted in writing either directly
or by mail” are not consistent with computerized procurement systems.  Accepted modes of
transmission of information in the Agreement need to be brought into the information age and
should include e-mail.
A review of the Agreement on Government Procurement as required under Article
XXIV:7 is currently underway in the WTO Committee on Government Procurement, which is
made up of representatives of signatories of the Agreement, and is scheduled to be ready this fall. 
The review is aimed at simplifying the administrative rules in the Agreement and making them
consistent with current business practice.  It is also seeking to cover more procurement and to
eliminate “discriminatory measures” or exceptions to coverage.  An effort is being made to
complete these negotiations before the Seattle Ministerial.  These improvements are expected to
increase the attractiveness of the GPA to other prospective new members.
The Canadian Government, under pressure from the provinces, has been preoccupied
with bilateral Canada-US issues in government procurement.  These include Buy American
provisions and the small business “set-asides.” This is how they work.  In the United States, the
Federal Government often provides funds to state and local governments requiring that the
money be spent on suppliers and products that have a certain minimum proportion of US content. 
This is allowed under both the GPA and the NAFTA because it is not a direct purchase of the
Federal Government that is covered by the Agreements.  For example, the Transportation Equity
Act for the 21  Century (TEA-21), which provides financing for transit, highway and airportst
projects carried out by state and local governments and private sector organizations, has Buy
American provisions that require all steel and manufactured stock to be 100 per cent American
content and all rolling stock to be 60 per cent American and assembled in the US.
The small business “set-asides” are Federal Government procurement preferences in the
United States that reserve a certain proportion of government contracts for small business.  These
set asides are large, amounting to 23 per cent of the Federal Government’s contract budget, and
have usually been met or exceeded.  And the US businesses benefitting are not so small either by
Canadian standards, having as many as 500 employees in manufacturing (even 1,500 in some
sectors) and revenue of up to US$17 million in services.
Without assurances that the United States will eliminate, or at least reduce, such
discriminatory measures, the provincial governments have been unwilling to make commitments
with respect to the procurement under their jurisdiction.  These provincial government concerns
are understandable.  But, without the ability to commit provincial government procurement, the
Canadian Government has come under heavy fire in the WTO Committee on Government
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Procurement for failing to deliver on its own commitments in its Annexes 2 and 3 of the GPA to
cover procurement under provincial jurisdiction.  Canada’s response to this criticism is that these
commitments were conditional on getting commitments from the provinces, and, since no such
commitments were received, there was no obligation to make an offer under these Annexes.
Regardless of who is right or wrong, the result is still the same: Canadian suppliers are
deprived of preferred access under the GPA to the procurement market of  sub-central levels of
government in the other signatory countries.  In addition, Canada’s inability to get agreement
from provinces to make procurement commitments is a major embarrassment that makes it
difficult for the Canadian Government to provide the necessary leadership in the government
procurement negotiations leading up to the Seattle Ministerial and that will undermine its
credibility at the bargaining table.  
The GPA has been important in opening up the large government procurement market of
the major industrial countries to suppliers from other countries.  Extending the Agreement to
other, particularly developing, countries and improving its functioning is important for the future
of the international trading system.  The industrialized countries that are members of the GPA
need to push harder to get developing countries, particularly the newly acceding countries, to join
the GPA.
If Canada is to play a key role in negotiating a new strengthened Agreement on
Government Procurement that will open up sub-central procurement markets in other countries to
Canadian suppliers, the provinces need to be much more cooperative with the federal
government.  Only then will the Canadian Government be able to offer access under the GPA to
provincial procurement in return for access to sub-central levels of procurement in other
countries, including at the state and local level in the United States.
Disputes  under the GPA
There have been three disputes under the new GPA.  The first one dealt with Japan’s
procurement of a navigation satellite.  On March 26, 1997, the European Community requested
consultations with Japan regarding a Ministry of Transport procurement tender to purchase a
multi-functional satellite for the installation of a navigation system for air traffic management. 
The EU complained that the specifications referred specifically to a US satellite based system
called MTSAT Satellite-based Augmentation System (MSAS) and consequently discriminated
against European companies that supplied another comparable system called the European
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS).  Consultations resulted in a mutually
agreed solution for the establishment of technical cooperation in the field of interoperability to
produce a global seamless navigation system, thus ending the dispute.  Requirements for
interoperability will have to be mentioned in all future procurement starting in 1998, provided
that it proves feasible.
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The second dispute concerns the complaints of the European Union and Japan about a
Massachusetts state law that prohibits state authorities and other state entities from procuring
goods and services from anyone doing business with Myanmar (Burma), a country with a
particularly odious human rights record.  The request for consultations and the establishment of a
panel was made in June 1997.  As a US court case was underway, the panel did not report
according to the normal timetable.  In February 1999 following a US court ruling barring the
implementation of the state law at issue, the European Union and Japan requested that the panel
suspend its work.  Unless the US court decision is overturned, the dispute appears to be resolved.
The third dispute, which was launched in February 1999 and is still underway, concerns
the Korean Government’s procurement practices in the construction of the new Inchon
International Airport.  More specifically, the United States contended that four particular
practices were inconsistent with Korea’s obligations under the GPA: requirements that prime
contractors must have manufacturing facilities in Korea; requirements that foreign suppliers
partner with Korean firms; the absence of access to challenge procedures; and bid deadlines that
are shorter than the GPA-required 40 days.  During the consultations, Korea asserted that the
entities responsible for the procurement were not covered by the GPA.  Consequently, in May
1999, the United States requested that a panel be established.  The panel is now underway with
an interim report due before the end of the year.
A fourth dispute relating to government procurement practices is also brewing.  The
United States is considering making a complaint against Japan concerning Japanese government
construction contracts.  It particularly irks the Americans that a Japanese company is building the
new Los Angeles subway, while their construction companies are shut out of Japanese
governmental markets.
The disputes show that governments are starting to exercise their rights and obligations
under the GPA.  At least for the countries covered, the Agreement is beginning to impose
significant discipline on government procurement.
Transparency in Government Procurement Agreement
In an effort to make government procurement practices more transparent, the United
States proposed at the Singapore Ministerial in 1996 that a Working Group on Transparency in
Government Procurement Practices be established.  The purpose of this Working Group was “to
conduct a study on transparency in government procurement practices, taking into account
national policies, and based on this study, to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate
agreement.” In contrast to the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, this is a
multilateral exercise aimed at achieving a WTO agreement on transparency.  The intention was
that the text of such an agreement could be ready for the Seattle Ministerial and that it could
possibly be part of an early harvest of the negotiations.
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The objective of an agreement on transparency is the worthy one of making certain that
potential suppliers are provided with adequate information on the rules governing particular
tenders.  This allows suppliers to make an informed decision on whether or not to participate. 
This would save much wasted and frustrated effort by suppliers who never had a realistic chance
to be selected under existing rules, but who didn’t have enough information to know this in
advance.
The information that would have to be published should at a minimum include: notices of
procurement; policies and procedures; laws; evaluation criteria; contract awards; reasons for sole
source procurement; bid challenge provisions for suppliers; and dispute settlement provisions for
countries.  While it is understood that a transparency agreement would not require countries to
change preferential or discriminatory policies, at least it would make the rules clear for everyone.
The transparency agreement should apply to all levels of government, non-central as well
as central.  Again the Canadian Federal Government and the provinces, with the shared objective
of increased transparency, need to cooperate if Canada is to offer a unified and credible front in
the transparency negotiations.
A transparency agreement is a useful step in the direction of a multilateral Agreement on
Government Procurement to replace the current plurilateral one.  Once governments become
accustomed to transparent procurement, it may not be as difficult to convince them to go the rest
of the way to non-discriminatory procurement on a multilateral basis.
A transparency agreement will also help to combat corruption and related practices in
government which is a big problem in some countries where government procurement decisions
are often influenced by bribes or favouritism of one sort or another.  The twenty-nine OECD
countries have already entered into a Convention on Combating Bribery, which took force in
February 1999.  Under this Convention, OECD countries have agreed to cooperate in adopting
and enforcing national legislation making it a crime to bribe public officials.  This is good as far
as it goes, but action also needs to be taken in the countries where the bribes are being received
to make sure that the offending officials are punished.  
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Chapter 6 
The E-Commerce Juggernaut
E-Commerce Takes Off
Electronic Commerce, which is defined is a 1998 WTO study as “the production,
advertising, sale and distribution of products via telecommunications networks,” has taken off for
the stratosphere with the Internet.  For what it’s worth, the WTO estimates that by the turn of the
century the value of e-commerce will have reached US$300 billion and international e-trade will
represent 20 per cent of this or US$60 billion and growing.  These are, of course, guesstimates. 
The only existing information on e-commerce flows is for the United States and a few other
industrialized countries and data for cross border transactions simply does not exist.  Needless to
say, it always takes a while for statistics to catch up with reality, but as usual policy can’t wait.
The potential for further growth of e-commerce is mind-boggling.  Internet-based
commerce, which currently accounts for only 2 per cent of all commercial transactions, is
expected to swell to 50 per cent in ten years.  The 13-per-cent share of consumer shopping
currently conducted electronically is expected to more than double by 2007.  The greatest
potential for expansion is in financial services, telecommunications, advertising, travel,
entertainment and professional services.  But who knows for sure with such a new and
revolutionary medium?
The Incredible Lightness of E-Commerce
E-commerce transactions have the same four stages as more conventional transactions  –
searching, ordering, paying, and delivery.  For the commerce to qualify for an “e,” at least some
of its stages must be electronic.  Usually, at a minimum, this includes ordering.
E-commerce is not only over the Internet.  More mundanely, it also can occur over the
telephone or fax.  Just pick up the telephone and make an order.  The delivery may be made in
the traditional way of post or van, but it still counts as e-commerce.  Much Internet-based
commerce still relies on old-fashioned delivery methods.  
ATM machines, which deliver banking services, are also a very specialized form of e-
commerce.  No one has yet figured out how to get currency into or out of a computer.  But many
banks offer Internet banking, which enables customers to pay bills and switch money from one
account to another.
Professional services can also be delivered electronically.  Architects and engineers can
speak to clients over phones and send drawings and designs electronically.  Doctors can provide
diagnosis and prescribe treatment electronically.  Accountants can prepare financial statements
on line.
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 The quintessential form of e-commerce occurs on the Internet for digitalized products
like software, books and music.  All four stages of the transaction can be conducted
electronically.  The product can be ordered, paid for by credit card over a secure system, and
downloaded electronically.
Internet-based commerce, like the Internet, is still in its infancy.  It is the most exciting
type of e-commerce, and is largely a US-based phenomenon with 85 per cent of Internet revenues
generated in the United States.  The pioneers are Microsoft, Dell Computer, Amazon.com,
Charles Schwab, Home Depot, e-Bay, Realtor.com, E*Trade, Adauction, Chemdex, and NTE. 
You name it and they sell it over the net – software, computers, books and music, securities,
building supplies, merchandise, real estate, advertisements, chemicals, transportation services. 
Even groceries and flowers are now being offered in the United States.  And everyday something
else is offered as  “cybermalls” proliferate.
Canada is not far behind in e-commerce.  Canadians are already accustomed to cross-
border shopping.  Making purchases in the United States is nothing new even if the medium is. 
Canada has also sprouted its own growing number of “virtual shops” on the web – Chapters.ca
sells books, Corel.com software, and HMV.com  music.
The best part of Internet shopping is that you don’t even have to take your hands off the
keyboard or get out of your ergonomically designed chair to find the lowest prices and the best
products or to make a purchase.  And no fossil fuels are burned and pollution created, other than
the small amount required to generate the electricity necessary to power the computers.
With Internet-based commerce, all you have to do to open a shop is construct a web page,
subscribe to a secure and reliable payments system, and set up a system for ordering and
delivering purchases.  The computer will replace many salespersons and shop clerks.  The costs
are much lower than for a traditional retail store.  The potential size of the market is enormous,
reaching 300 million PCs with Internet access.  This will enable many small and medium-sized
businesses to participate in international trade for the first time.
Internet-based commerce is spurred by lower transaction costs such as search costs,
delivery time and charges, and travel and transportation costs.  Internet search engines can
tirelessly search out the lowest prices.
Consumers outside the US, and particularly those in high-income industrialized countries,
have watched the emergence of Internet-based commerce through their computer screen with
growing fascination.  This has not gone unnoticed by their suppliers who are hastening to join the
Internet revolution before their customers disappear in cyberspace along with their revenue.
The same advantages of the Internet that spur domestic e-commerce also foster
international e-commerce.  The Internet makes international advertising and price comparisons
possible just as it does domestically.  It also reduces  transportation costs for digitalized products
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to zero, making formerly high-transportation-cost international suppliers competitive for these
products.  On the internet, consumers can buy digitalized products anywhere in the world and
have them delivered almost instantaneously for free.  
The Moratorium on Customs Duties
The United States, which has a massive comparative advantage in e-commerce and is
probably the only country with a whopping surplus in e-trade, is understandably the champion of
free trade in digitalized products.  On February 19, 1998, it presented a proposal to the WTO
General Council calling for an agreement among WTO Members “to maintain...  current
practices not to impose import duties on electronic transmissions.” The United States and the EU
had earlier reached an agreement on December 5, 1997 “to work together towards a global
understanding, as soon as possible, that: (i) when goods are ordered electronically and delivered
physically, there will be no additional import duties in relation to the use of electronic means;
and (ii) in all other cases relating to electronic commerce, the absence of duties on imports
should remain..” 
In its May 1998 “Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce,” the WTO General
Council agreed to establish a comprehensive work programme to examine trade-related issues
relating to e-commerce” and to “continue ...  current practice of not imposing customs duties on
electronic transmissions.” The moratorium on customs duties will be reviewed at the Seattle
Ministerial in the light of the results of the work programme.  It is important that this moratorium
be transformed into zero bound tariffs on e-commerce and become a permanent feature of the
international trading regime.  This dynamic sector must be allowed to flourish and make its full
potential contribution to the global economy.
GATT, GATS or What?
E-commerce doesn’t fit neatly into one of the WTO’s boxes.  Goods like books and
music CDs that are ordered electronically but delivered physically across the border are covered
by the GATT and all the usual customs duties and procedures apply.  But if they’re digitalized
and delivered electronically, there are no duties.  
Computer software can also be delivered electronically.  But there is no tariff on
computer software because of the Information Technology Agreement.  The only duty is on the
value of the disk or CD containing the software.  Thus the issue of different treatment of
electronic and physical delivery does not arise.
Some e-commerce such as for professional services could be covered by the GATS if it
falls under any of the specific commitments made by countries to provide national treatment. 
These commitments can vary depending on mode of supply.  Is the acquisition of professional
services from abroad “cross-border supply” or “consumption abroad?”  The answer to this
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question can make the difference between gaining market access and being denied if the
commitment is only with respect to one mode.
On a theoretical level, it’s not obvious whether the delivery of digitalized information
over the Internet should be considered trade in goods or in services.  Some types of e-commerce
have a permanency like goods.  Others are intangible.
Whether e-commerce is trade in goods or in services is important because it determines
whether it should be covered by the GATT or the GATS.  There are important distinctions
between these two agreements.  As noted above, the GATT covers cross-border supply of goods
and governs tariffs, whereas the GATS covers cross-border supply of services, the consumption
of goods abroad, natural presence and commercial presence.  The GATT provides for general
national treatment, while the GATS provides only for specific national treatment commitments. 
The GATT has a general prohibition against quantitative restrictions, whereas the GATS permits
Members to limit market access.  If e-commerce were to fall under the GATT and be subject to
zero tariffs, it would have much more liberalized market access than it would under the GATS. 
Nevertheless, because of the widely different characteristics of some of the transactions falling
under the rubric of e-commerce, it is unlikely that it will be possible to develop one overall
regime for this rapidly growing new form of international trade.  Various WTO bodies are
looking into these issues and will report on their conclusions at Seattle.
Legal and Regulatory Issues
Regulatory principles that were accepted by the signatories of the WTO
Telecommunications Agreement and the GATS Annex on Telecommunications provide the
required access to the telecommunications network to carry out e-commerce.  This is important
in establishing the interconnections necessary for the growth of e-commerce.
The Internet is still the wild, wild west.  There are not yet laws and regulations for
Internet-based commerce; these will have to be developed.  But new laws, rules or regulations
should not be any more restrictive than necessary.  Complex legal issues must be resolved.  For
instance, which country’s law applies, the buyer or the seller’s?  Are electronic signatures and
documentation sufficient for a legally binding contract?  To get the ball rolling, the OECD has
proposed a uniform international commercial code for international electronic commerce.  
For international e-commerce to take place, digital signatures and certifications must be
interoperable across countries and internationally-accepted encryption methods must be available
in all countries.  The Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) Standard developed by two of the
main credit card issuers meets these criteria.  In this case, it’s the private sector rather than the
government that is providing the framework for e-commerce.  While the Internet may have got
its initial push in the late 1960s from the government in the guise of the Defense Department and
the Advanced Research Projects Network in the United States, the emergence of the World Wide
Web in the 1990s that led to the rapid expansion of e-commerce was a private sector
development.
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Governments will also inevitably want to regulate the content of the Internet.  The WTO
identifies three categories of regulation of e-commerce.  The first seeks to prohibit or control
content in the pursuit of universally-shared objectives such as the prohibition of child
pornography or other information of a criminal nature.  This type of regulation will have broad
public support in most countries.  The second category of regulation seeks to prohibit or control
content deemed politically subversive by particular governments.  There will be much less
agreement about the appropriateness of this type of regulation because political objectives are not
necessarily shared by other jurisdictions.  The third seeks to protect consumers through licensing
or qualification requirements and requirements for the provision of information.  This type of
regulations is also recognized as useful as long as it is not more restrictive than necessary.
Because of its unique and decentralized nature, the Internet will severely try the capacity
of any one government, or even governments collectively, to regulate.  Governments will have to
rely on Internet users to regulate themselves to a much greater extent than has ever been the case
for any other medium.  This is not necessarily a bad thing as it will preserve the flexibility and
innovativeness which is the Internet’s strength.  
The WTO, as the watchdog of the international trading system, is not in a position to
judge the legitimacy of domestic regulatory objectives and their enforcement.  However, there
are two fundamental principles embodied in all the WTO agreements that it will need to ensure
are respected.  These are the “non-discrimination” and the “least-restrictive-trade” rules for
regulations.  The regulations should provide “national treatment” to make sure that foreign e-
commerce suppliers are treated the same as domestic suppliers and should provide MFN
treatment to make sure that foreign suppliers from different countries are treated equally.  The
regulations should also be specified so that they are no more trade-restrictive than necessary to
achieve their objectives.
The WTO will also have to determine whether e-commerce constitutes “cross-border
supply,”  “consumption abroad,” or some combination of the two.  This will have important
implications for the national treatment commitments made under the GATS, if that is where e-
commerce were to fall.
Intellectual Property
Much e-commerce is in products such as software and information that need to be
protected by intellectual property rights.  The TRIPs Agreement specifies that “computer
programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works.” (Article 10:1). 
Other information including databases is also protected.
It’s one thing to have an international agreement that provides protection for digitalized
products like software, books, and music.  It’s another thing to enforce property rights in
digitalized product when they can be reproduced at a zero cost and distributed across the web for
free.  Software piracy can be almost impossible to stop.  An important issue in the Millennium
Round will be to reach agreement on adequate enforcement mechanisms.
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Government Procurement on the Net
Government procurement on the Internet is another kind of e-commerce.  Governments
are routing an increasing share of their procurement through the Internet because it enables them
to reach the most suppliers and to get the best prices.  It’s also an easy way to meet the
requirements for openness and transparency in the Government Procurement Agreement.  The
procurement section of the WTO  website has hotlinks to all the member governments
procurement sites.  As the GPA is modernized and streamlined, the web and e-commerce will
play a much larger role.
Free Trade in Digitalized Products
E-commerce has the potential to increase competition and consumer choice throughout
the world.  It also promises to be a powerful transmission mechanism for the new information
technologies that will shape the 21  century.  A key objective of the Millennium Round shouldst
be to preserve an environment free of tariff and quantitative restrictions for trade in digitalized
products.  If this objective is met, all of the other questions become secondary.
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Chapter 7
Disciplining Subsidies and Antidumping
Unfair, Unschmair
When things start to go wrong in any trade relationship, it doesn’t take long for at least
one of the parties to accuse the other of unfair trading.  This is much easier than having to admit
that a competitor might have beaten us fair and square.    
A case in point is government subsidization.  Producers the world over naively believe,
often despite much evidence to the contrary, that their own governments do not provide
subsidies.  On the other hand, they will steadfastly maintain that any success a foreign producer
experiences is entirely attributable to support it receives from its home government.  It is exactly
this kind of reasoning that has given rise to a veritable arsenal of unfair trade instruments
including countervailing duty safeguard actions.  Worse still are domestic trade policies that
permit governments to take unilateral action against perceived injustices in the trade arena.   
Another tactic for intimidating “unfair” traders is to threaten an antidumping action. 
Dumping is trade-speak for when an exporter sells goods at a lower price in a foreign market
than it charges at home, or at a price that does not cover the full costs of production.  Up until
recently, the United States and Canada were among the biggest users of antidumping actions.  It
was our dirty little secret.  Now that new Members of the WTO have discovered this versatile
and effective tool for restricting foreign competition, developed nations are thinking reform.  The
thought that a developing nation might end up passing judgement on whether our exporters are
acting unfairly offends our own sense of fair play.  
Pejoratives like “unfair” do not help advance the cause of trade liberalization much.  Nor
do such labels contribute to the predictability or certainty of the trading system.  What is “unfair”
to one party can seem perfectly “fair” to another.  So far, it has been mostly in the eye of the
beholder.  
Clearly, good rules are needed to preserve the integrity of the international trading
system.  Firms that receive government subsidies and act in an anti-competitive fashion should
be prevented from taking customers away from their competitors who play by the rules.  By the
same token, exporters themselves need to be guarded from ill-founded allegations of “unfair
trading” that are merely a guise for plain old protectionism.  Some progress was achieved in the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, primarily in improving subsidy and dumping calculations,
but much more remains to be done.
As with other areas of the trade agenda, negotiating objectives will have to be realistic. 
Some see trade remedies as the price we must pay for the tremendous progress achieved on other
fronts, most notably in reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers.  Countries might be more reluctant
to abandon more traditional – and arguably, more damaging – types of protection if they believe
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that they will be left powerless to deal with unfairly traded goods that hurt their own producers. 
While there might be something to this argument, we should let someone else make it.  Canada
cannot afford to be too accepting when it comes to trade remedies.  Not with the importance
exports have to our economy.  We must continue to take the high road and press for reform
whenever we have the chance, beginning with the Millennium Round.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies
The Uruguay Round made substantial progress in disciplining the use of trade-distorting
subsidies.  Moreover, in providing a mechanism to resolve disputes over unfair trade, it made the
rules in this area much more enforceable.  
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures contains clear
definitions of what a subsidy is.  To be considered a subsidy, three conditions must be met:
• The government must either provide a financial payment or disbursement or it
must forego revenue that is otherwise due;
• This must confer a benefit on the recipient; and
• The subsidy must be “specific” in the sense that it is provided to only certain
enterprises, industries or groups of industries.  Payments that are generally
available, like unemployment insurance benefits are to all Canadians, would not
be counted a subsidy.       
It is not enough for a government simply to provide financial assistance.  The
government’s action must be targeted in some way and must provide a verifiable advantage to
the recipient.  This ensures that only those subsidies that distort trade become the focus of WTO
attention.  
The Agreement then categorizes subsidies into three classes.  Trade practitioners often
use the traffic light metaphor of red, amber and green light subsidies as a characterization.  Red
light or “prohibited” subsidies are export subsidies and subsidies that are tied to local content
requirements.  Prohibited subsidies must be removed.  At the other end of the spectrum are green
light or “non-actionable” subsidies.  Regional development, R&D, environmental and generally
available subsidies are classified in the green category.  All other subsidies fall into the amber
category.  Amber subsidies are “actionable” which means that they can be challenged if they
cause material injury to the domestic industry of another Member in its own market or serious
prejudice to the interests of another Member in a third country market.  
The alternatives available to a WTO Member that wishes to challenge a foreign subsidy
practice depend on the type of subsidy and the nature of the harm that it causes.  
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Prohibited subsidies –  the most heinous kind of subsidies – are subject to abbreviated
dispute settlement and enforcement procedures.  If a measure is found to be a prohibited subsidy,
the dispute settlement panel must recommend that the subsidizing Members withdraw the
subsidy immediately.   
Unlike the situation for red light subsidies where their mere existence only has to be
established, amber light subsidies are subject to an injury test.   Members who challenge an
amber light subsidy first must demonstrate that the subsidy falls into the actionable category and,
second, must show that it causes them economic harm.  Economic harm is usually established by
demonstrating that the subsidy caused prices to fall or sales to be lost to the subsidized goods.
Actionable subsidies can be subject to a countervailing duty action or to a serious
prejudice action, depending on whether they affect a challenger’s home market or whether they
affect the challenger’s sales into a third market.  If subsidized imports cause material injury to
domestic producers, a countervailing duty can be imposed.
Subsidized goods that are hurting sales into a third market can be challenged on “serious
prejudice” grounds.  This was an option open to Canada in challenging the Brazilian
government’s subsidy to its regional aircraft industry over the 1997-99 period.  A countervailing
duty action was out of the question since Canada was not importing the subsidized Brazilian
aircraft itself.  However, the Brazilian subsidy was displacing sales of the competing Canadian
product into the US and European markets and causing serious harm in the process.  In the end,
Canada did not need to pursue a serious prejudice challenge against Brazil because the Brazilian
subsidy fell into the prohibited category.     
The Uruguay Round’s other achievement was that it made disagreements over subsidies
subject to the WTO’s dispute settlement provisions.  Generous allowance is made for
consultations aimed at reaching mutually agreed upon solutions.  However, if consultations fail,
the end result is a final and binding determination.  This gives the subsidies rules teeth.
The Canada - Brazil Dispute over Subsidies to Regional Aircraft
The recent Canada-Brazil battle over subsidies to regional aircraft provides an interesting
glimpse into the workings of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
Bombardier, the world’s third largest civil aircraft producer has long been concerned
about subsidies provided by the Brazilian government to its home-grown aircraft manufacturer,
Embraer, Bombardier’s chief competitor in the regional aircraft business.  After years of arm-
twisting, Bombardier was finally able to persuade the Canadian government to challenge the
Brazilian subsidy programs at the WTO.  What ensued was an ugly, hard-fought battle that,
despite wending its way through all the WTO dispute settlement processes, may still be far from
over.
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What rankles Bombardier so is Brazil’s PROEX program.  PROEX provides a 3.7
percentage point interest-rate “buy down” to foreign purchasers of Embraer aircraft that, in the
view of the WTO panel and supported by the WTO Appellate Body, constitutes a prohibited
export subsidy.  While Brazil maintains that PROEX is merely to overcome the disadvantages of
being a developing country, in actual fact the subsidy payments are applied to the foreign buyer’s
own financing costs even if it already has a AAA credit rating.  The PROEX subsidy can amount
to some $1 million on the price of a $16 million aircraft.  This provides Embraer with a massive
advantage in the marketplace.
Outraged by Canada’s challenge, Brazil launched an attack of its own.  It charged that
Canada subsidizes its aerospace industry and breaks a host of WTO rules in the process.  The
first government programme the Brazilians challenged was the Technology Partnerships Canada
(TPC) program, a retread of the old Defence Industry Production Program (DIPP) that provides
royalty-based financing to Bombardier, Pratt and Whitney and a handful of other high tech
manufacturers.  Brazil also complained that loans made by Export Development Canada and
using Canada Account money to support aircraft exports amounted to prohibited export
subsidies.
The WTO panel ruled that Canada’s research and development assistance under the TPC
program constitutes an export subsidy.  In smaller economies like Canada’s, high-technology
industries can end up exporting virtually all of their production.  This is the case for aircraft
where the Canadian market is very small.  Subsidies to these industries can, for all intents and
purposes, look an awful lot like export subsidies, even though that was not the objective of the
government in designing the programs.   Annoying as this is, it is a relatively small matter to
modify TPC to bring it into compliance with WTO requirements.  Not so for PROEX, however,
which was dealt a mortal blow by the WTO panel.  
The Brazilians love a good fight and were not prepared to admit defeat on this one.  We
Canadians are a much more reticent lot and refuse to gloat, even in the face of victory.  The
WTO’s decision was clear:  PROEX must be immediately abolished, TPC must be fiddled with. 
Canada scored a big triumph at the WTO.  Although, it was hardly portrayed that way in the
press coverage of the WTO cases.   
 Canada has to remain vigilant to ensure that we did not win the battle only to lose the
war.  Indications are that Brazil is busy finding creative ways to continue providing PROEX
subsidies.  The complexity of this type of market transaction and the level of secrecy required
make it most difficult to keep track of what a competitor is doing.  The WTO needs complete
information to convict.  Once burned, Brazil is unlikely to be as forthcoming in the future. 
Often, by the time the information is available, the sale is already lost.  
The Canada-Brazil wrangle and other recent disputes over subsidies have highlighted
some shortcomings in the WTO rules.  These will have to be addressed in the next round of
negotiations.
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The Foreign Sales Corporation Case
Tax breaks can also constitute export subsidies under the SCM. Agreement. This was
underlined by a WTO panel decision released in July 1999 on an EU challenge of the US Foreign
Sales Corporation (FSC) program.  Under this program, US corporations, including such giants
as Microsoft and Boeing, get a 64-per-cent corporate tax reduction on profits earned by offshore
subsidiaries on exports of goods that have a high level of US content. These subsidiaries are
located mainly in the Virgin Islands, but also in Barbados and Guam. The Foreign Sales
Corporation is a major incentive estimated by the EU to cost the US Treasury US$2 billion per
year. The EU charged that this tax reduction constituted a prohibited export subsidy and gave US
goods an unfair price advantage in foreign markets.  The panel agreed and ordered that the
program be abolished before October 1, 2000. This was the same fate as a predecessor program
called the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC), suffered at the hands of a GATT
panel in 1976. Apparently, the changes to the program were not sufficient to make it WTO-
consistent.
The United States has long complained that European Value Added Taxes, which are
rebated on exports, provide an unfair advantage for European companies competing with
American on international markets. The Foreign Sales Corporation tax benefit pales beside the
magnitude of these taxes. These grumblings have intensified following the loss of the FSC case.
The US has never challenged the EU on the VAT, but if it were to do so it would make for an
interesting case, raising interesting public finance issues about the legitimacy of a destination
versus an origin basis for indirect taxation. Canada with its GST would have much at stake in the
resolution of the issue.
Subsidy Issues for the Millennium Round
The Uruguay Round left many subsidy issues for the next round of negotiations.  By far
the most important is the question of agricultural subsidies which was discussed in detail in
Chapter 3.  In terms of industrial subsidies, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures calls for a review of its provisions on amber and green light subsidies.  This provides
negotiators with an opportunity to strengthen the subsidy disciplines by expanding the list of
actionable subsidies.  
The next round of negotiations also provides a chance to address issues related to
notification, transparency and enforcement.  The more we know about the programmes in place
in other WTO countries, the less potential there is for trade-distorting practices.
Dumping on Antidumping     
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The last round of trade negotiations left the decades-old antidumping code essentially
intact.  While some important changes were made to improve administrative practices,
particularly in calculating the amount of duties that can be applied, the highly protectionist
instrument remains very much alive and well.
Economists do not think much of antidumping measures.  To them, it is quite natural for
firms to want to price differently in different markets.  It is just a case of adapting to local
competitive conditions.  When demand is weak, it also makes sense to sell goods at less than
fully allocated costs.  This sort of thing is done all the time within a national market.  What is
perfectly normal behaviour for firms operating in their home markets is potentially illegal for
exporters.  If foreign firms engage in these practices, they can be hit with dumping duties and
driven out of import markets.  Inevitably, it is the consumers and domestic users of the dumped
product that pay the penalty for the protection in the form of higher prices.  
There are some situations where there is a legitimate justification for putting a stop to
dumping.  One such situation is when predatory pricing is occurring and the exporter is intent on
destroying domestic producers to gain a monopoly for itself.  Unfortunately, the antidumping
regime is poorly equipped to determine whether an exporter’s actions are really predatory in
nature.  Most competition regimes, including those in Canada and the United States, would do a
much better job.
Another situation where antidumping protection is justified is to deal with the effects of
trade restrictions in the dumper’s home market.  Occasionally, import restrictions prevent the
normal process of arbitrage that works to equalize prices between the exporter’s and importer’s
market.  This arose, for example, when the Canadian sugar industry was swamped by low-cost
dumped and subsidized sugar imports from the United States and Europe in the early 1990s.  
The US essentially prohibits imports of refined sugar.  What’s more, Europe and the US provide
generous subsidy programs and price support schemes that generate massive surpluses in
production.  The surplus sugar entered Canada in vast quantities, threatening to destroy the
Canadian industry.  Canadian refiners could not retaliate by exporting sugar into the US or
Europe to take advantage of high prices there.  The only option was to pursue a countervailing
duty and antidumping case.  
Arguably, the US and Europe should never have been able to support their domestic sugar
growers in such a trade-distorting fashion.  Sadly, however, the agricultural area is one where
trade rules are still very permissive.  Unless and until better rules are developed to discipline the
harmful combination of import restrictions and domestic price support, antidumping actions will
remain a weapon that many WTO Members will be unwilling to relinquish.  
The truth is that few antidumping actions can be justified on the grounds of predatory
pricing or import restrictions in the exporter’s home market.  Most are examples of simple
protectionism.  The prospect of being hit by an antidumping complaint is terrifying to exporters. 
Just ask the Canadian steel industry about the millions and millions of dollars they have spent in
the past decade defending themselves in US courts and administrative tribunals.  
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To say that the gains from trade are not fully realized when an antidumping regime is in
place is a massive understatement.  What then is the alternative?
Safeguards
One possibility for steering WTO Members away from using antidumping actions is to
encourage them to instead pursue safeguard cases.  
Safeguard or emergency actions are another form of trade remedy.  As trade remedies go,
however, they are somewhat less atrocious.  Unlike countervailing and antidumping actions,
Members pursuing a safeguard case do not need to prove that the imports were traded unfairly. 
All that has to be established is that import volumes have been so high or increased by such an
extent that they are causing serious injury to the domestic industry.  If so, some kind of
temporary import restriction can be imposed.
The trouble is that WTO Members do not much like safeguard actions.  Safeguard actions
have a higher injury standard than do antidumping actions.  Since more “hurt” has to be
demonstrated, it is harder to put safeguards into place.  Also, the WTO Agreement requires
countries imposing safeguards to compensate the exporting country.  
Members will not substitute safeguards for antidumping actions unless changes are made
to the Antidumping Agreement to make it less appealing to use.  One possibility would be to
raise the injury standard.  Another would be to make the antidumping protection more temporary. 
A number of other refinements could be made to the system which would have the effect of
lowering the protective duties.  There are many options available to pursue, if the will exists.  
Competition Policy Offers Some Hope
Competition laws in most developed nations are well-equipped to deal with situations of
predatory pricing and abuse of dominant position,  “lawyer-speak” for monopolists behaving
badly.  The good thing about competition policy measures is that their preoccupation is with
protecting the state of competition, not with protecting domestic producers per se.  Freeing
markets from anti-competitive influences should mean lower prices and more choice for
consumers.  
In the Canada-Chile Trade Agreement, the two countries agreed to suspend the use of
antidumping measures on bilateral trade and to rely on competition law instead.  This example
notwithstanding, an “internationalized” competition policy regime is probably too far-fetched an
alternative to antidumping, at least for the time being.  The best evidence of this is that even
Canada and the United States cannot agree to pursue the idea seriously.  
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What are the prospects for multilateral reform if even Canada and the United States,
despite our similar regimes and harmonious bilateral relationship, refuse to dump antidumping
measures between us?  The answer is not very good.  
Many WTO Members have quite rudimentary competition regimes.  Some lack them
altogether.  Until Members have confidence in their own regimes and those of their trading
partners, we will be stuck with antidumping.  
Competition policy is an important new item on the Millennium Round agenda in its own
right.  Work is already underway to better coordinate competition policy regimes internationally. 
The OECD has an active work plan in this area.  The WTO Working Group on Trade and
Competition has been busy selling the message to developing countries that competitive market
structures are conducive to growth and wealth creation.  Canada is engaged in discussions with a
number of countries on cooperation and information exchange.  Competition policy measures
already form part of some WTO Agreements, notably the Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications.
The multilateral game plan is very long term in nature.  The idea is to start slowly by
affirming the basic principles of transparency, national treatment and most-favoured-nation. 
Next, efforts will be made to promote better cooperation and communication through the sharing
of information and through technical cooperation.  Ideally, measures to encourage WTO
Members to enforce their own competition laws would be desirable, as would some dispute
settlement mechanism.  Down the road, more ambitious objectives, such as harmonization and
replacement of antidumping regimes might be tackled.   
Lasts Words on Trade Remedies
We will probably never be entirely rid of unfair traders or of those who unfairly hound
their trading partners on that basis.  The only hope for lessening the effects of unfair trade is to
address the issue on several levels.  First, we need stronger disciplines on the use of unfair trade
measures such as subsidies.  This accomplishes two objectives.  First, it reduces the use of trade-
distorting practices which is good for the integrity of the international trading system.  Second,
stronger disciplines might make it easier to convince Members to weaken or even abandon their
use of trade remedies.  The argument is that better policing of unfair trading practices will make
the high-powered weapons both unnecessary and downright dangerous to leave lying around.  
    At the same time, we need to promote the idea of competition policy as a replacement
regime for antidumping measures – the least endearing of all the trade remedies.  The odds of
actually achieving this on a multilateral level are remote at best, certainly in the short term. 
However, better coordination and cooperation in the use of competition laws is a worthwhile
objective in its own right.  The high degree of interplay between trade, investment and
competition issues make it a natural in terms of Millennium Round priorities.
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Canada should never lose its sense of innocence and determination when it comes to
reforming the global use of trade remedies.  Despite being both a charter Member and a frequent
flyer of the antidumping and countervailing duty club, the truth is we been more hurt than helped
by trade remedies.  We should be prepared to gladly curtail our use of antidumping measures in
exchange for the United States’ agreement to do likewise.  Getting the rest of the world on-side
would be an added bonus.  If our negotiators aim high in this area, we might live to see the
realization of their efforts.
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Chapter 8 
The Return of the MAI
The Spectre at the Table
Our research has yielded no support to rumours that federal trade negotiators admit to
having recurring nightmares featuring Maude Barlow, Chairperson of the Council of Canadians,
in a starring role.  But there is no denying that the rift between the prospective deal-makers and
the representatives of “civil society” is vaster when it comes to trade and investment than it is for
any other area.  
Despite the resounding defeat of the MAI initiative within the OECD, WTO Members, in
a fit of masochism, have signaled a willingness to consider negotiations on investment in the
upcoming Millennium round.  This support remains pretty lukewarm at present.  Even the US,
which is widely credited with championing the “corporate agenda” on foreign investment, has
signaled that it considers it an open question whether a modest package on investment could be
included in the WTO talks.  Clearly, the objective is to tread carefully in this mine-infested area.   
If talks do proceed, negotiators can expect spirited opposition worldwide from non-
governmental organizations who are buoyed by their self-proclaimed success in killing the MAI. 
Any progress on the investment file will depend on winning over these powerful opponents – a
difficult challenge indeed.  It will also mean crafting a deal that will bridge the interests of
developed countries intent on drafting clearer rules to protect foreign investors with the desire of
developing country Members to resist the prospect of foreign domination.
The Links Between Investment and Trade 
Global stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI) reached US$3.5 trillion in 1997, a 23 per
cent increase over the previous year.  Increases in FDI have significantly outpaced the growth in
international trade in recent years, continuing a fundamental international economic trend that
has characterized the 1980s and 1990s .  
 
Foreign investment has rather a bad reputation in certain circles.  It conjures up visions of
greedy young men in red suspenders creating havoc for developing – and even developed –
;nations.  Notwithstanding the exhortations of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, however,
foreign investment flows are an essential facet of today’s business environment.  In a world of
transnational organizations, strategic firm alliances and world product mandates, investment
policy can matter as much or more than conventional trade policy.  Foreign investment leads to
the transfer of technology, ideas and best practices between global enterprises.  It increases
wealth and employment and acts as a conduit for the transfer of goods and services.  It provides a
way to access foreign markets in spite of trade barriers.
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Groups like the Council of Canadians have made a name for themselves preaching
against the evils of foreign investment.  The fact is that foreign capital has been an essential part
of Canada’s economic achievements since our very beginning as primarily a fur and fish trading
nation.  It has paved the way for many of our industrial successes, not the least of which is motor
vehicle production, our number one sector in terms of employment and trade.  Far from making
us beholden to foreign masters, inward foreign direct investment has contributed importantly to
Canada’s strength and independence as a major economic power.  
Preferring to portray Canada as the perennial victim though, the Council of Canadians
would rather ignore the fact that Canada is now a net exporter of investment capital worldwide. 
In 1997, the stock of FDI in Canada was estimated to be $188 billion, less than the $194 billion
Canadians invested abroad.  This subtle but significant shift reflects our coming of age as a
economic player and underlines the critical links that bind us to the global economy.
Bombardier’s success in foreign markets provides an excellent illustration of how
outward investment can benefit Canadians.  Bombardier has grown from its origins in a small
Quebec town to a world leader in the field of transportation.  It now ranks as the third largest
civil aerospace manufacturer in the world, the second largest manufacturer of passenger rail and
mass transit car equipment and a global leader in the recreational products area with its highly
successful Sea-Doo and Ski-Doo vehicles.  More than 90 per cent of the companies revenues of
over Can $11 billion are generated in markets outside of Canada.  Significantly, 42 per cent of its
50,000 employees are located in Canada.  
Investment in foreign markets has been central to Bombardier’s strategic success.  The
company now operates plants in 12 countries.  Establishing a local market presence has been
particularly important in the mass transit business because of local requirements for a customized
product and government procurement practices favouring domestic suppliers.  Foreign
investment has permitted Bombardier to sell a Canadian product to foreign markets, generating
jobs here at home.    
The Case for Multilateral Rules on Investment 
Critics of negotiations on trade and investment maintain that it is all part of an
underhanded plot by multinationals to force their corporate agenda on unsuspecting governments. 
Clearly, international standards proscribing what is fair and not fair when dealing with foreign
investors would help the business community.  What is less apparent, but equally compelling, are
the gains that would flow to developing nations and to taxpaying citizens the world over from a
liberalized investment regime.  
First, the corporate agenda.  Most multinational companies can provide chapter and verse
on investment restrictions they encounter in international markets.  The obstacles can be as
seemingly innocuous as the measures instituted by developed nations to restrict foreign
ownership in strategic sectors like broadcasting, banking or resource development.  In the
developing world, foreign investors can be outrightly prohibited, forced into joint ventures with
-75-
local firms or coerced into dealings with local authorities that lead to the transfer of funds,
technical expertise or a variety of other favours.
One common scenario is something like the following: an exporter of manufactured
goods is told that in return for access to a foreign market, it must establish a local commercial
presence.  In addition to the costs of constructing and operating a plant that might well be
superfluous to its business needs, the company has to put up with many capricious demands from
local authorities.  To address domestic concerns over foreign investment, it is told that the plant
must be established in a specific location, in partnership with a local business person and that it
must employ local contractors and engineers and purchase its materials from local suppliers. 
Even with these conditions met, the investor is not home free.  It faces a constant threat of
expropriation or other forms of interference by government officials.  
Foreign investment restrictions increase operating costs for businesses.  The costs are
both out of pocket and the costs that come from delays, uncertainty and from the inefficiencies
that arise from building smaller than optimal plants in less than desirable locations and operating
them according to somebody else’s rules.  Multinational companies have come to accept
restrictive investment  regimes and work around them.  Many have employees whose sole task is
to understand and provide what makes local officials happy.  Sadly, once they reach this point,
multinationals can become advocates for the retention of investment restrictions as a means of
keeping competitors out of their favourite markets.  This, more than anything, should convince us
of the need for a liberalized investment regime.        
Stronger rules governing trade and investment might not be all gravy for the business
community.   One area where multinational corporations will not be leading the charge for
reform is in the area of investment incentives.  As taxpayers, we shake our heads at the way
companies shop from jurisdiction to jurisdiction looking for the most generous package of tax
breaks, grants and other hand-outs when deciding where to locate a plant.  Japanese car
manufacturers are adept at squeezing every last goodie out of states, provinces and municipalities
when contemplating the construction of  factories in North America.  New Brunswick’s former
Premier Frank McKenna was renowned for his tendency to pull out the cheque book whenever
he got into a conversation with business interests, even within hearing range of his fellow
Premiers on Team Canada trade missions in Asia.
When governments pay companies to locate in their jurisdiction, it costs the taxpayer
money and it makes poor economic sense.  Quite often, these businesses fall short of achieving
their true potential because they were enticed somewhere where the business fundamentals just
don’t add up.   They ultimately pay a price in terms of competitiveness which costs the economy
as a whole.  
But the benefits to developed countries like Canada of a freer investment regime pale in
comparison to the advantages that would flow to the developing world.  An open and predictable
climate for investment would bring needed capital and know-how to developing countries. 
Evidence strongly supports the fact that FDI improves wages and living standards, particularly in
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CANADA’S BILATERAL FIPA PARTNERS
Poland                                 Argentina                                 Hungary
Costa  Rica                          USSR                                 Ukraine
Philippines                           Barbados                         Venezuela
Egypt                                  Armenia                                Latvia
Trinidad & Tobago             Ecuador                              Panama
Thailand                              South Africa                       Croatia
Uruguay                               Romania                           Lebanon
Czech & Slovak Republics 
low income nations.  Foreign investment provides one of the best means for disadvantaged
nations to better their economic circumstances.  
Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia was quite wrong in blaming foreign investors like
George Soros for his country’s financial crisis.  His real problem lay much closer to home.  If
investors have more certainty that local regimes would not yield to drastic measures like capital
controls and expropriation during times of economic hardship, they would be much more
inclined to keep their capital in place and weather the economic storms.  This provides far better
insurance than exchange controls and other restrictions do in averting an economic crisis.  
It is exactly for these reasons that the IMF and World Bank, in the wake of the recent
Asian Crisis, are encouraging countries to liberalize their investment restrictions as a condition
for assistance.        
Canada’s Investment Agreements with Other Countries      
Largely unnoticed in the spectacular interest surrounding the MAI is the fact that Canada
has already signed onto a number of investment agreements.  In addition to the NAFTA
provisions governing investment contained in Chapter 11 of the Agreement, Canada has bilateral
Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs) with over twenty countries.  
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The NAFTA Chapter 11 and FIPA provisions are more or less the same.  All contain the
following key elements:
• most-favoured nation commitment to treat foreign investors from the signatory
country no less favourably than other foreign investors;
• national treatment provisions ensuring that foreign investors are treated on an
equal footing with domestic investors;
• rights to transfer funds freely and without delay;
• rules on expropriation, including compensation;
• permission for foreign investors to have free choice in senior personnel;
• disciplines on performance requirements (such as domestic content rules and
technology transfer requirements) imposed on foreign investors;
• the right for governments to adopt environmental measures consistent with the
principles of the agreement;
• a commitment to keep government policies towards investors transparent; and 
• provisions for the resolution of disputes, both state-to-state disputes and investor-
state
Canada has negotiated special treatment for sensitive sectors in these agreements.  We are
able to implement policies in the cultural, social, health and education field that might otherwise
run afoul of the commitments made in Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.  
FIPAs may provide Canadian investors protection, but their geographic coverage is far
from complete.  There are 135 Members of the WTO, yet we only have twenty-two agreements. 
Simple mathematics reveals why bilateral agreements are a cumbersome and imperfect substitute
for a multilateral agreement.  Full coverage for all the WTO countries would require 9,045
separate treaties when one would suffice.
WTO Investment Rules
Investment rules also form part of existing WTO agreements.  The Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) prohibits some performance requirements (such as
domestic sourcing and export restrictions) in some goods-producing industries.  The General
Agreement on Trade in Services provides for the “right of establishment” for foreign service
providers wanting to establish a commercial presence and commits Canada and other WTO
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Members to provide non-discriminatory treatment to specified service industries.  Coverage of
the TRIMs and the GATS Agreements is limited, however.  In the case of the former, only goods
are covered.  In the latter, only service sectors where countries have made commitments are
subject to disciplines.  
Canada has already made far-reaching commitments in the investment area, particularly
with respect to US and Mexican investors under the NAFTA.  Why then does the prospect of an
investment pact with other WTO Members cause such concern?  One would think that the
payoff, in terms of gaining easier access for our investors to foreign markets, is greatest in the
multilateral arena.        
The MAI Debacle
Negotiations aimed at reaching a Multilateral Agreement on Investment were launched in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1995.   The OECD, which is a
29-member association for developed nations, proposed that the MAI be a free-standing
agreement open to both OECD and non-OECD Members.  The objective was to achieve a
comprehensive framework providing high standards for liberalization and investment protection
and a system for resolving disputes.  
It did not take long for members of the NGO community to zero in on what the OECD
was up to.  Web sites were established, fund raising drives launched and book deals signed. 
Groups such as our own inimitable Council of Canadians proclaimed that negotiators were
creating a bill of rights for multinational corporations.  The result, they maintained, was that
governments would be powerless to set their own social, environmental, cultural and health
policy without challenge from foreign companies.  The horror stories and scare tactics were
spectacular and, quite often, blatantly false.  
Unfortunately, in an area as complex as investment finance, the patriotic message of those
opposed prevailed over the more complicated but reasoned arguments of the advocates.  There
really was no contest.  Canadians were convinced that Maude Barlow loves her country more
than do our captains of industry and trade policy officials.  
It is an interesting question, though, whether the NGO crowd really did defeat the MAI. 
Their self-congratulations aside, there is ample reason to believe that the MAI was doomed at
birth even without their interventions.
In the first place, the forum was all wrong.  Sure, it is usually easier to reach an agreement
on just about anything among “like-minded” countries of the OECD, but investment is different. 
The truth is that investors from OECD nations do not have trouble doing business in other OECD
nations.  The difficulties lie elsewhere, notably in the developing world.  Consequently, for
multinational investors there was no real upside to an investment pact among rich nations, at
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least not enough to put up with the heat inflicted by opponents to the MAI back at home.  Better
to wait until there is an agreement worth fighting over.
Second, indications are that MAI negotiations got bogged down over other substantive
issues.  Matters such as culture caused serious problems for the negotiations.  Further, a concern
arose over the ability of member nations of the European Union to maintain autonomy in the
negotiations.  France, for example, shared Canada’s interest in safeguarding culture and wanted
to strike out on its own in this area.        
It’s not clear whether governments have learned anything from the MAI fiasco.  They
certainly are keeping a low profile on upcoming negotiations.  This is smart.  The last thing they
need is to spook domestic opponents into generating a groundswell of resistance so early on.  
The success of the entire Millennium Round depends on keeping as many domestic
constituencies as possible on side and committed to the benefits of trade liberalization.    
A “Wish-List” for a Multilateral Pact
With the MAI defeat so fresh in our minds, what is the best strategy for success in the
Millennium Round?  The answer lies in aiming for the achievable.  The focus should be on the
big prize: a pact with developing country members and their implicit recognition that foreign
investment is a positive force in helping them to realize their economic goals.  
As such, a multilateral investment agreement should do little more than affirm the
principles of national treatment, transparency and most-favoured-nation.  Indications are that
developing countries are the most resistant to granting “rights of establishment” to foreign
multinationals.  This is understandable given their history of domination by the East-India and
United-Fruit-type companies of this world.  Hence, it might be most realistic to limit ourselves to
rules governing the treatment of existing investors in this round of negotiations.  Disciplines on
the use of performance requirements would also be desirable as would some code of conduct in
cases of expropriation.  Assurances will have to be provided with respect to the sovereignty of
member governments in sensitive areas such as environment, culture and social policy.  
Investment is one area where the WTO can act in concert with its two Bretton Woods
sisters in advancing the interests of the developing world.  The IMF and World Bank can play an
important role in convincing developing nations of the folly of measures such as exchange and
capital controls.  There is no reason why the WTO should be left taking all the heat on the trade
and investment file.    
Another element that would be desirable to include as part of a multilateral investment
pact is a set of disciplines governing the granting of investment incentives.  Taxpayers the world
over would rejoice if their governments would agree to cease and desist in the bidding war game
to give away money to corporations.  While the likelihood of ever achieving meaningful
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multilateral disciplines on investment incentives in this round is slim, it shouldn’t stop us from
continuing to ask our corporations and governments for rules in this area in the hope that they
might finally see the light.  
Canada is poorly suited to claim a leadership role in negotiations on investment
incentives.  We have strongly resisted any attempts to have provinces and municipalities bound
by multilateral commitments and it is at this level where most investment incentives are granted. 
Notwithstanding disciplines in the Agreement on Internal Trade, provinces continue to open their
pocketbooks to almost any investment opportunity that comes calling.  That is why multilateral
agreements are so important.  They save countries from costly mistakes made by their
governments.   
Investor-State:  Are the Critics Right?
Most of what the critics say about investment pacts are dead wrong.  They might be on to
something in their criticism of investor-state dispute settlement, however.  It is conspicuously
absent from our wish-list of desirable provisions for a multilateral pact as it is from the Japanese
and European negotiating positions on investment.     
 Under the investor-state obligations of the NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and Canada’s FIPA
bilaterals, foreign investors who believe that a government regulation or policy has reduced the
value of their investment are entitled to “sue” the government for compensation.  
A recent example is the NAFTA challenge brought by The Loewen Group Inc., a
Canadian-based funeral home and cemetery business, against the US government in late1998. 
The claim seeks compensation for a $500 million jury verdict in Mississippi in an earlier breech
of contract case.  Loewen was effectively prevented from appealing the Mississippi case because
of requirements to post a $625 million bond – a condition it considered excessive and punitive. 
The company is maintaining that it was subjected to “discrimination, denial of the minimum
standard of treatment guaranteed by NAFTA and uncompensated expropriation, all in violation
of NAFTA.”        
          
Loewen’s worthy quest aside, there are a couple of problems with investor-state
provisions that trouble even the most hardened free-traders.  The first is that they can undermine
a government’s sovereignty to conduct legitimate domestic policy and regulatory initiatives.  As
such, they can end up undoing exemptions negotiated as part of trade agreements in areas such as
social and environmental policy.  
The other big problem with investor-state provisions is that they treat foreign investors
better than domestic investors.  Most countries in the developing world safeguard the rights of
investors in situations of expropriation by providing compensation at market rates.  Very few
jurisdictions formally extend the same privilege to investors who retain ownership of their
property but suffer a reduction in its value because of government action.  
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Negotiators might be well-advised to tread carefully in the area of investor-state when
crafting multilateral rules on investment.  Developing countries might find these rules
particularly hard to swallow, especially since they already make policy-makers in the developed
world uneasy.  
Extra-territoriality
The extraterritorial application of one country's laws to another is a hot topic at the WTO
that has found its most controversial application with respect to investment. The worst offender
is the United States with its Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (more
commonly known as Helms-Burton) and the Iran-Lybia Sanctions Act.
The Helms-Burton law, which permits US citizens to sue foreign companies making use
of properties expropriated in these countries (Title III of Helms-Burton) and allows the
government to deny visas for executives and shareholders of companies doing business there
(Title IV), is designed to punish Cuba by discouraging foreign investment.  While the US
Administration has regularly suspended the right to sue under Title III, liabilities have still been
accruing. Canada and Mexico have been subject to sanctions for trading or investing in Cuba
under Title IV.  Canadian businessman, Ian Delaney, the Chairman of Sherritt International and
several other senior executives have been banned from entering the United States because their
company has been using facilities confiscated from Freeport-McMoRan of New Orleans.  Canada
has passed its own Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act to try to shield Canadian companies
from Helms-Burton.
The Iran-Lybia Sanctions Act requires the US Administration to impose sanctions on
foreign firms that invest more than $20 million a year in the energy sectors of the two countries. 
The US government further antagonized an EU already upset over Helms-Burton with its threats
to penalize the French oil company Total for its plans to invest $2 billion in the Iranian gas
sector.
The EU launched a WTO case against the US for its extraterritorial application of
economic sanctions in October 1996, but suspended the for a year in an effort to reach a
settlement. Under the terms of the April 1998 deal, the US agreed to suspend sanctions against
multinational companies doing business in Cuba, Iran and Libya; and the EU promised to
discourage investment in these three countries by prohibiting governments from providing
financial aid to companies that break the US law against investing there. This agreement does not
really permanently resolve the problem of the extraterritorial application of US laws as they
remain in force and can still be enforced. But it was the best that the EU could get in the
circumstances. The EU knew that nothing good would come from pursuing the dispute through
to a final panel decision. The US was already boycotting the panel on the grounds of the
“national security” exception in Article XXI of the GATT, and had indicated that it would refuse
to submit to any ruling on the same grounds. This would have undermined the credibility of the
whole dispute settlement mechanism, which was something the EU definitely did not want to do.
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A related dispute involving the EU has just cropped up and more talks are underway. The
EU is complaining that a US law known as “Section 211" violates the WTO TRIPS Agreement.
Section 211, which prohibits the recognition in the US of trademarks confiscated by Cuba, was
invoked by a US court in a lawsuit over the ownership of the Havana Club label to deny Havana
Club Holding, which is owned jointly by Pernod Ricard and a Cuban company, the right to use
the brand in the United States. The court ruled that under section 211 the label belongs to
Baccardi, which obtained the required consent from the original owner of the brand, the Jose
Arechabala family. The EU has threatened to take this case of the extraterritorial application of
US law to the WTO. The issue of extraterritoriality of US economic sanctions has clearly not
been resolved and is also likely to come up in the Millennium Round.
Whither Goest Investment? 
Who really knows what the on-again-off-again investment negotiations will generate by
way of a multilateral pact?  Member countries are understandably reluctant to show their hand at
this stage for fear of igniting the fires of opposition back at home.  Despite their coyness,
expectations are that negotiations will proceed as part of the next round of negotiations.  Member
countries of the WTO know that success in the trade and investment area is important to
continuing the momentum of liberalization, given the tremendous interplay between capital and
trade flows in today’s global economy.  
The chances of success in the Millennium Round depend on keeping expectations in
check.  The best outcome would be a deal that includes developing countries, however modest its
contents.  Successive rounds can tackle the harder elements such as universal rights of
establishment and curbs on investment incentives.  In light of these humble expectations, Canada
should have little trouble safeguarding its sensitive sectors like culture, especially since our
concerns in this area are shared by other WTO Members.   By all rights, investment negotiations
ought to give critics like the Council of Canadians little to bay about.  But that won’t stop them
from campaigning bitterly against any agreement, thus ensuring that negotiations on investment
will be one of the most eventful in the upcoming round.  And then there is the issue of the
extraterritorial application of US sanctions legislation, which will undoubtedly come up, but will
not be resolved because of US sensitivity over national security.
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Chapter 9 
Protecting Intellectual Property
Intellectual Property and Trade 
The ancient Greeks used to preach that knowledge is power.  But even those clever
Greeks could not possibly have imagined how strong the link would turn out to be between
technological know-how and global prosperity.  Today it is truer than ever that those who control
the ideas end up holding all the cards.  
Protecting ideas has become an important trade issue.  The WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) formally brought the setting of standards and the
enforcement of intellectual property rights into the multilateral arena.  Possible extensions to the
TRIPs Agreement will be one of the most contentious areas of the Millennium Round, one that is
certain to accentuate the divisions between the developing and developed world.  
One might well ask what the protection of ideas has to do with trade liberalization? 
Indeed, protecting intellectual property rights can end up restricting competition and trade –
something one would think the WTO would want to avoid.  Ultimately, though, companies are
more likely to export to and invest in other economies if they are satisfied that their products and
processes will not be pirated.  The argument is that trade will expand, along with the technology
that accompanies it, if intellectual property rights are enforced worldwide.
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Cartoon by Stuart Carlson © Milwaukee Sentinel 1999.  Reprinted with permission of Universal
Press Syndicate.  All rights reserved.
______________________________________________________________________________
What are Intellectual Property Rights? 
Intellectual property rights are the entitlements that are granted to individuals or
companies for their original creations.  Ordinarily, intellectual property rights give the creators
exclusive rights to use their creations for a specific period of time.  
There are two main branches of intellectual property with two quite different sets of
concerns.  The first is copyright which applies mostly to literary, musical, artistic, photographic
and audiovisual works.  In recent years, the coverage of copyright has been expanded to
computer programs and data bases.  It has also been broadened to include “neighbouring rights”
which extend property right protection in the sound recording industry from the composers and
lyricists to producers and performers as well.
The second branch is loosely coined industrial property.  It can be further sub-divided into
two areas.  One is chiefly concerned with protecting signs of various sorts – trademarks and
geographic indications (which are names for goods that are based on the location where the good
is produced.  Examples include “Champagne” and “Cognac”).  The second area of industrial
property rights is primarily concerned with inventions, innovations and the creation of
technology.    
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The WTO TRIPs Agreement
The WTO certainly did not invent intellectual property.  The concept of patent, copyright
and trademark protection at the international level has been around for at least a hundred years. 
The Berne Convention, which protects copyrights, was originally signed in 1886.  The World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which provides a forum for negotiating and
administering various treaties on intellectual property, was created in 1967.  Like many similar
international organizations, however, the WIPO lacks provisions to enforce its treaties and
obligations.      
Although raised toward the end of the Tokyo Round, intellectual property protection was
successfully negotiated for the first time at the Uruguay Round.  The TRIPs Agreement obliges
all WTO Members to enforce its minimum standards by implementing them in their domestic
legislation.  While developing Members were given a generous time frame for implementation,
developed nations had only one year to incorporate into domestic law the proper kind of
administrative and criminal procedures to make intellectual property rights fully enforceable.
The TRIPs Agreement also makes disputes over intellectual property matters subject to
the WTO’s dispute settlement system.  There have already been a handful of disputes over
intellectual property issues including the European Union’s current challenge of Canada’s patent
protection of pharmaceutical products.  The EU maintains that Canada violates the requirements
of the TRIPs Agreement because it offers patent protection for a 20-year period, which
commences with the date an application for patent is filed.  According to the EU, the 20-year
protection period should begin once all the regulatory approvals have been granted, which might
be as long as several years after the original patent application was made.   
There is a great deal of interplay between the TRIPs Agreement and a variety of other
intellectual property treaties that are administered by the WIPO.  The TRIPs Agreement requires
WTO Members to adhere to provisions of a variety of international conventions governing
intellectual property including The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the more recent
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.
  All of the seven target areas in the TRIPs Agreement (see box) must adhere to the basic
principles of national treatment and most-favoured-nation.  The Agreement establishes a set of
minimum standards for intellectual property in certain specific areas.    
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The TRIP Agreement’s Seven Target Areas for Intellectual Property Rights
• copyright and neighbouring rights;
• trademarks;
• geographical indications;
• industrial designs and models;
• patents;
• layout designs of integrated circuits; and
• protection of undisclosed information.  (Undisclosed information is the
TRIPs term for trade secrets) 
Several of the TRIPs Agreement’s provisions bear special notice.  Article 27 of the
Agreement requires Members to make patents available without discrimination for any
inventions, products and processes, in all fields of technology.  The patent period is typically 20
years.  Certain exceptions are permitted under strict conditions.
The Agreement excludes patents on higher forms of life such as whole plants and
animals, although it gives discretion to individual Members in this area.  The United States,
Europe and Japan are among those that do allow patents on higher life forms.  Canada does not
as yet.  The Agreement’s provisions on biotechnology are to be reviewed in the next set of
negotiations.  This is certain to be one of the most controversial areas of discussion and possible
negotiation.  
It is still early days for the TRIPs Agreement since many countries still have time left to
implement its obligations.  It remains to be seen whether it will achieve its stated purpose.
Copyright
Although we might be reluctant to admit it, we have probably all been guilty of breaking
copyright laws in one way or another.  Photocopying excerpts from a textbook, copying a friend’s
CD onto a cassette tape or recording a favourite television show on our VCR all qualify as
unlawful duplication.  However, this is penny ante stuff compared to the possibilities for piracy
that the new technologies provide.  The prospect of musical or artistic masterpieces being
downloaded free from the Internet greatly concerns those in the cultural community.  This is just
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one example of the scope for unauthorized reproduction, publication and transmission available
in the digital age.  
It is difficult to find anyone who does not believe that people should be prevented from
stealing the creative inventions of musicians, writers and other artists.  Artists need the protection
of copyright in order to support themselves through their artistic efforts.  Otherwise, we will have
potential Picassos washing dishes for a living.  Clearly, we would far rather see Alanis Morrisette
properly rewarded for the music she creates than toiling in the Ottawa bureacracy to make ends
meet.
The trouble is that it is virtually impossible in this age of technological sophistication to
prevent unlawful duplication of cultural works.  Short of banning the sale of CD burners and
restricting access to the Internet, a government’s options are few.  The issue becomes one of
finding a way for all users to compensate the creators and artists for the possibility that some
users might steal from them.   
Many do not like the mechanisms imposed to ensure fair compensation for artistic
products.  A case in point is the criticism that has accompanied the special tax imposed on blank
cassette tapes and compact discs sold in Canada.  The idea was to use the tax proceeds to
compensate composers and musicians for infringements in their intellectual property rights.  
The TRIPs Agreement requires WTO Members to adhere to the Berne Convention.  The
Berne Convention applies to books and other written works, musical compositions, film works
and various artistic works.  The TRIPs Agreement added computer programmes and
compilations of data to the Convention’s scope.  The Convention requires Member countries to
protect the works for the life of the “author” and for 50 years after his or her death.
The copyright provisions of the TRIPs Agreement are adequate but could do with a bit of
updating.  The Canadian Recording Industry Association maintains that all WTO Members
should ratify two 1996 treaties of the World Intellectual Property Organization dealing with
copyright, performance and phonogram issues.  The treaties update the standards and legal
principals governing copyright in the electronic age.   Canada has begun the process of ratifying
and implementing the WIPO treaties itself.
Protecting Industrial Property
The far more complicated issue is that of protecting industrial property.  It raises
fundamental questions of fairness and entitlement that are not easily resolved in the international
context.
The two sides of the debate line up as follows.  The so-called “multinational viewpoint”
which is advanced by US and EU negotiators, is that strong enforcement of intellectual property
rights is essential for the innovation process.  Unless inventors are confident that their ideas will
be protected and rewarded, they will be unwilling to undergo the time-consuming and expensive
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process of research and development that is so beneficial to the economy and to society as a
whole.   It follows that countries that vigorously enforce intellectual property rights make
themselves better locations for inward investment.  This was the argument used to justify
Canada’s patent drug legislation.  
The US and EU perspective has a number of detractors, beginning with developing
country nations.  They wonder why they are expected to pay so dearly for ideas that originate in
the developed world, especially when these ideas would dramatically improve the well being of
their citizens.  A case in point is the drug regime used to treat AIDS, a disease that is devastating
Africa.  The AIDS cocktail that has been effective in treating patients in North America is
prohibitively expensive and beyond the means of most African residents and nations.  The South
African government has passed legislation that would allow local pharmaceutical companies to
manufacture imitation AIDS drugs in defiance of the patents that exist in the US and Europe. 
South Africa is certain to incur the wrath of its powerful trading partners, in spite of its noble
intentions.
These sort of strains exist even within developed nations.  Groups such as the Friends of
Medicare point to the high percentage of Canada’s overall health care costs that are accounted for
by patented pharmaceuticals.  Shortening the drug patent period from its current 20-year term
would give cheaper generic drugs earlier access to the market.  The savings in health care costs
could be considerable.  Tempting as this might be, the government made important commitments
on patent protection to the brand-name drug industry in return for scores of jobs in Montreal
ridings.  
The other problem with vigorous patent enforcement is that the current trend is to patent
anything that moves.  The prospect of patenting human genes or rain forest bio-diversity is
positively repugnant to some, especially since the source of the patented substances – remote
aboriginal communities or rain forest dwellers – could end up paying to access to their own
material.   The advent of new biotechnologies and genetic materials complicate the issue even
more.  
Intellectual property protection is both the cause of and the solution to some of the
problems in the developing world.  Inventors and scientists give the problems of the developing
world scant attention.  While the best pharmaceutical brains in the world have dedicated
themselves to improving the sex lives of well-healed Westerners through medications like
Viagra, millions of children in Africa die from malaria and other potentially preventable diseases. 
The sad truth is that a malaria vaccine would never pay for two reasons.  The first is because its
likely customers are impoverished.  Second, without patent enforcement, any effective vaccine
that was developed would be quickly pirated.  
This same imbalance in priorities applies to research aimed at improving agricultural
yields.  Crops grown in tropical nations are neglected in favour of the needs of farmers in
temperate zones.  The fact that seed varieties are being patented at a furious pace, 
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taking them out of reach of the developing world, makes developing nations even more
frustrated.  
Developing countries are painfully aware that they lack the necessary knowledge and
technology to adequately provide for their citizens.  They view the intellectual property right
system as somehow limiting their access to this knowledge, perpetuating a world of “haves” and
“have nots”.   This is the perspective that they are likely to bring to Seattle and later to Geneva.
Hard Choices for the Millennium Round 
What is a poor Canadian IP negotiator to do?   On one hand, groups like the Business
Council on National Issues urges Canada to insist that creators of intellectual property have
adequate incentives and effective protection.  This position is also advanced by the US and
Europe whose multinationals offer the enticing prospect of jobs and investment to those
countries that offer safe havens for patented technologies.  To ignore the implicit threats of
powerful research-intensive companies is to play a dangerous game indeed with Canada’s
economic prosperity.
The Canadian government is also getting pressure from generic drug manufacturers and
others to loosen the stranglehold multinational corporations have on the instruments of wealth
creation.  Concerned Canadians are raising important questions about the ethics of patenting
some of the things that are being patented these days.  
Issues such as artistic copyright and trademarks are straightforward; the fruits of the
artistic process should be protected to ensure that pirates do not divert proceeds away from
genuine creators.   Efforts should be made in the WTO to ensure that the rules pertaining to
copyright fully capture the potential offered by today’s electronic wizardry.  Diana Krall should
be the one making most of the money from her CD sales, not some bootlegger.  Nike and Gucci
should be free to charge exorbitant sums for running shoes and loafers bearing their logos, not
counterfeiters.  
For other areas of intellectual property, some global navel-gazing might be in order. 
First, serious questions should be asked about the scope of patent protection.  Unless and until
we have thought through the ethical and practical implications of patenting such things as
biotechnologies, genetic products, indigenous heritage, and perhaps even seeds and vaccines, we
should resist efforts to extend the TRIPs Agreement to cover these items.  
Second, we must be highly sensitive to the views of those in the developing world. 
Intellectual property is an area that breaks very much on developed - developing country lines. 
There is some scope for compromise, if developed countries are up to it.  One possibility would
be to offer a shorter period of patent coverage in developing countries for those products that are
essential to their basic development needs.  Another is for multinational companies to undertake
to fund a certain amount of basic research in developing countries on issues of importance to the
developing world, in return for patent protection on other products.   
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For their part, developing countries need to acknowledge that some form of intellectual
property protection would enhance their own interests.  Many of the advanced products and
processes that developing nations regularly use in the telecommunications, transportation and
health area would vastly improve the quality of life in the developed world.  However, unless
some basic level of patent protection is granted, they could very well remain outside the reach of
the nations that they would benefit most.           
The challenge of intellectual property both domestically and internationally is to achieve
a fair balance.  Innovators need to be rewarded with intellectual property protection but there may
be good and valid reasons for limiting this protection in some instances.  Economic prosperity
depends on the creation of good ideas.  At the same time, these ideas need to be easily and
efficiently diffused if we are to improve the well-being of our world community.
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Chapter 10
Defending Culture
Finding Common Ground 
Sheila Copps knows better than anyone of the painful nexus between culture and trade. 
As Minister of Canadian Heritage, she has been known to holler more than once at trade policy
bureaucrats who have tried to curb her passionate zeal.  While the serious guys in suits have won
the most recent trade policy battles, the odds are that Sheila is just taking a temporary breather to
lick her wounds.  She’s certain to be back and raring to go – just in time for the Millennium
Round.  
The interesting thing about disputes over trade and culture is that many of the problems
are entirely preventable.  They arise not from any fundamental issues inherent in the Agreements
or with Canada’s policy objectives but with an inability of those within the trade community to
understand the world of culture – and vice versa.  Two solitudes as self absorbed as those of
culture and trade diplomacy are hard to find.  It is little surprise that the debates have been
conducted on such different planes and with such scant success.
It does not help that events in the trade and culture file unfold under a microscope.  The
very raison d’être of cultural industries is to inform and entertain the general public.  They are
the media, or they have excellent access to it.  Consequently, when cultural industries come
under attack through a trade challenge, they meet it in the best way they can, by defending their
position on the airwaves and in magazines and newspaper columns.  In one sense, this is good
because Canadian culture is important and should be protected.  However, it can leave us with
the impression that fights over culture are the only ones that matter.  It can also lead to the
oversimplification of issues which makes for bad policy-making.  
 Cultural issues are complicated ones to solve.  Sometimes it is even tough to express
opinions about them.  It is an area where one has had to establish one’s bona fides before
weighing in.  The audience has to be assured that the commentator loves Canada more or at least
as much as the next person and is willing to stop at nothing to protect our culture.  Trade
consultants wanting to mine the cultural field are well advised to have a Can-lit or artistic icon as
an immediate family member.  Otherwise, they need not even bother hanging up a shingle.
Of course, this is all rather silly.  What we need for Canadian culture is less blather and
more strategy.   
Culture in Canada
Describing Canada’s cultural sector is made difficult by the fact that few people even
agree on a definition of culture.  Some consider culture to be an ubiquitous, all encompassing
thing like our shared values and beliefs.  The nationalists among us think the only culture that
counts is Canadians talking to other Canadians.  Economists tend to view culture more narrowly
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as a product or service that is produced by an identifiable industry and can be paid for and
consumed in the same way as any other.  To technocrats, culture is defined by the medium that is
used to deliver it – the airwaves, the sound waves, the printed page, the electronic message. 
Divergent as these perspectives are, the one common theme is that culture has important non-
market dimensions.  
While one should avoid making generalizations about Canada’s cultural sector, a couple
of observations are in order.  The first is that Canada is very open to foreign cultural influences. 
The following statistics underline this point:
•
foreign books account for 45 per cent of book sales in Canada; 
•
81 per cent of English-language consumer magazines on Canadian newsstands and over
63 per cent of magazine circulation revenue are accounted for by foreign titles; 
•
foreign-produced films represent 85 per cent of the revenues from film distribution in
Canada; and 
•
some 95  per cent of screen time in Canadian theatres goes to foreign (mostly American)
movies.
Hollywood has a strangle-hold on our imaginations, not to mention our pocketbooks.  A
high proportion of what we read, hear and watch, particularly in English-speaking Canada, is fed
to us from a foreign producer.
It is impossible to generalize about Canadian culture.  Our culture can be high-brow as in
the Royal Winnipeg Ballet or the Vancouver Symphony.  It can also be as low-brow as the Tom
Green show.  Canada boasts of some immense cultural successes like Shania Twain and Céline
Dion who operate in the global big leagues.  Indeed, our own “Lord-in-Waiting”, Conrad Black,
counts as one of the world’s leading media moguls.  At the other end of the commercial spectrum
are cultural producers that could not survive without Canada Council funding.  They are the
present-day equivalent of the starving artist in the garret studio.  
The fact that we deal with two rather distinct cultural communities makes it more
complicated to devise good trade and cultural policy.  One facet of our cultural sector is export-
oriented, technologically up-to-date and quite comfortable in the global marketplace.  The other
is geared to the domestic market.  It is the one most concerned about talking to Canadians about
Canada and other Canadians.  While this division is hardly unique to Canada, our proximity to
the American cultural powerhouse has unnerved us more than most.  We need to find ways to
preserve that segment of our cultural sector that reminds us of who we are and what we share.  At
the same time, we must avoid clipping the wings of those who would fly wide and high to bring
us acclaim, and export revenues, in world markets.   
Culture and Technology 
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To borrow the refrain from a once-popular song, has video killed the radio star?  When
last we checked, radio is still around but it and other traditional cultural vehicles are under
serious attack from new technologies.
Technology have always been an issue for the cultural sector.  One only has to think of
the introduction of  “talkies”, mechanized printing presses, recordable phonographs and  VCRs
to appreciate the constant adaption made by the industry over the years.  Indeed, to shield the
cultural sector from technological advancement would be both fruitless and misguided.  Culture
has to be exposed to the upheavals of technological change if it is to stay inspired, relevant and
connected to its users.  
But the current technological revolution is bringing change at a whirlwind pace.  The
Internet has made cultural products vastly more accessible but much harder to protect and
control.  Consumers in Canada can read magazines and newspapers from all over the world.  We
are not nearly as bound by time, location, nationality and financial resources in our enjoyment of
cultural products as our parents and grandparents were.  
As new technologies extend the range of cultural works well past their traditional
boundaries, it becomes much harder for governments to promote their domestic cultural sectors
with the same box of policy tools.  Internet versions of newspapers and direct-to-home satellite
transmissions are but two examples.  In earlier days, when governments wanted to protect
domestic broadcasters they would grant licenses to domestic players only and they would impose
a series of conditions on what programs could be broadcast and when.  With home satellite and
Internet broadcasts, regulators have lost much of their control of the airwaves.  
The split run magazine case that found its way to the WTO is another example of how
technology has undermined governments’ ability to restrict foreign cultural products.  Canada
used to impose a prohibitive tariff on imported magazines.  In an effort to get around this tariff,
American publishers started to beam versions of the magazine by satellite to publishers located in
Canada to be printed here.  The idea was that since the magazines were no longer physically
crossing the border, there was no product to be taxed or denied entry.  The Canadian government
met this development with a special excise tax imposed on split-run magazines, a tax that was
eventually shot down by the WTO.  The next technological wave promises to be even more
illusive, however.  New electronic versions of reading material and other cultural products can be
beamed directly to the home and customized with articles and advertizing that is geared to the
individual reader’s interests, income level and demographic profile.     
 This is not to say that new technologies will make it impossible for countries to protect
and promote their cultural sectors.  They do make it much harder though.  In their quest for new
policy tools to protect indigenous culture, a worldwide preoccupation, governments might be
well advised to do some collective brainstorming.  
How Canada Promotes and Protects its Cultural Sector Now
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If you believe the Reform Party’s culture critic, Canada’s cultural policy is preoccupied
with grants to the creators of dumb-blonde joke books and art exhibits comprised of rabbit
carcasses.  In fact, this is only the tip of the iceberg.
Canada uses three basic instruments to protect its cultural industries: financial support in
the form of subsidies and tax measures; Canadian content regulations; and foreign ownership
restrictions.  
Canada has a long, long list of government programs that provide financial support to the
cultural sector.  In addition to Canada Council grants to publishers and (dwindling) financial
support to the CBC, there are a host of special programs aimed at the sound recording business,
the video and television industry and the multimedia sector.  New funds are being established on
a regular basis to meet the needs of emerging technologies.
Over time, the structure of public support has gradually shifted away from pure cash
subsidies to loan guarantees, equity investments and tax credits.  An example is the Canadian
Television Fund, a Can $200 million vehicle for equity investment in TV programming.  
Financial assistance to cultural producers also comes in the form of tax relief.  To support 
Canadian broadcasters, the Canadian Income Tax Act permits advertisers to deduct the cost of
ads they place with Canadian stations but limits the deduction for ads placed with American
broadcasters.  Similar tax provisions apply to Canadian businesses taking out advertisements in
newspapers and magazines.  Canadian film and video producers are eligible for tax credits on
their production costs.
The second basic instrument - Canadian content regulations administered by the CRTC -
are considered to have been among the most effective vehicle for advancing our cultural sector. 
While best known is the requirement that radio programming reserve 30 per cent of its broadcast
time for Canadian products, ‘Can-Con’ regulations also apply to TV programming, and to
distribution systems including cable and Direct-to-Home satellite.  Essentially all broadcasting
systems are expected to provide Canadian programming and make a financial contribution to
Canadian content.  
The final instrument available to government is foreign ownership restrictions.  They are
based on the premise that Canadian-owned distributors, broadcasters and publishers are more
likely than their foreign-owned competitors to disseminate Canadian content.  While an arguable
proposition, it is not going to be true in all instances.  
 
The Investment Canada Act allows the government to review any foreign investment in
almost any cultural industry to determine its net benefit to Canada.  Depending on the sector,
additional restrictions can also exist, including performance requirements of various sorts.  For
example, a film distribution policy enacted in 1988 limits any new foreign film distributors
operating in Canada to distributing only those films that it has produced or controls itself.  The
fact that this restriction was “grandfathered” and does not apply to American distributors who
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were already in the Canadian market angered Polygram, the huge Dutch distribution giant. 
However, the EU turned the other cheek and did not pursue a trade case against Canada, less
because of the merits of the case and more because Polygram ended up being bought by the
Canadian corporate powerhouse, Seagram.   
Restrictions also apply in the book retailing business that limit foreign owned companies
from selling books as their primary activity.  In the broadcasting area, only companies with more
than 46.7 per cent Canadian ownership and de facto control by Canadians are granted licenses by
the CRTC.   
Many of the policies used to promote the cultural sector in Canada offend, if not the
letter, at least the spirit of our WTO obligations.  Other programmes and policies are no longer
effective because technological advances have rendered them powerless or redundant.  Canada is
far from the only country in this position.  The next round of WTO negotiations could not be
coming at a more interesting time for the cultural sector.  
The Trade Rules Governing Culture 
Despite the best efforts of the US negotiating team in the Uruguay Round, culture
occupies a very small place in the WTO Agreements.  In fact, its absence is rather conspicuous.  
As Canada discovered first hand in the WTO case over magazines, how cultural measures
are treated in the WTO Agreements depends very much on whether they fall under the General
Agreement on Trade in Goods (GATT) or the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  
This creates much uncertainty since deciding whether a cultural creation like a sound recording
or a film is a good or a service is a difficult proposition at the best of times.  Sadly for Canada,
the magazines dispute was not one of our best times.  
With two minor exceptions, the cultural sector is subject to all of the standard disciplines
encompassed in the GATT including the basic principles of most-favoured-nation and national
treatment.  The first of the exemptions falls in Article IV which permits countries to establish
quotas for the exhibition of films.  This is in recognition of the longstanding European practice of
maintaining screen quotas.  Second, Article XX allows exemptions from general GATT
principles for measures aimed at protecting national treasures of artistic, historic and
archeological value.  
In the GATS, culture is almost nowhere to be seen, despite hectic efforts right up to the
dying days of the Uruguay Round to hammer out an agreement on audio-visual services.  Canada
requested and was granted an MFN exemption for the film and television treaties we have with a
number of countries.  Moreover, we failed to make any commitments whatsoever on national
treatment in the cultural sector.  It is likely that our reticence will not go unnoticed in the next set
of negotiations, particularly since the GATS Agreement is one that has been singled out for
further liberalization.  Canada will be under pressure to include in its GATS schedule
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commitments to provide national treatment to foreign investors and exporters of some cultural
services.  
If the Americans have much to say about it, the next round of negotiations will probably
focus on resuscitating the failed audio-visual services negotiations and expanding the list of
commitments under the GATS Agreement.  Culture will also enter into other negotiating areas
including intellectual property, e-commerce and investment.  The existing TRIMs Agreement
prohibits performance requirements as a condition of foreign investment.   However, the current
Agreement covers only certain sectors, and culture is not one of them.   Culture would be hard-
pressed to escape unscathed from any comprehensive agreement on investment.
For Canada, the most significant trade issue arises not from the WTO Agreements, per se,
but from how they were interpreted in the recent trade challenge over magazines.  The
consequences of this has already had profound implications for how we conduct cultural policy
in this country.  
The Big Flap Over Magazines
Before getting into the specifics of the WTO case over split-run magazines, it is useful to
understand where the US is coming from on culture in general.  American entertainment giants
like Jack Valenti and Ted Turner believe that culture is really just a business like any other.  In
fact, entertainment is big business in the US, ranking second behind aerospace in terms of export
activity.  Not only do cultural exports generate lots of economic wealth in their own right but
they are a vehicle for the promotion of a whole host of other US-produced goods and services,
everything from Coca Cola to the Ford cars the X-Files stars drive around in.  Some cynics even
see cultural exports as part and parcel of the dissemination of American values and ideas
throughout the world.  
Of course, the US cultural sector has a soft underbelly just like ours.  The National
Endowment for the Arts is only one of a long list of well-heeled public benefactors.  Chances are
that US public sponsors might even have the odd meat dress, Voice of Fire and rabbit carcass
skeletons in their own cultural closets.  
The point is that the United States has taken an ambitious and aggressive attitude towards
trade and culture.  It has displayed little patience towards the efforts of countries like Canada,
France and Belgium to restrict access to American cultural exports, viewing such attempts as
simple protectionism.  
The Canadian magazine industry has long been concerned with split-run products
entering from the United States.  A split-run is a magazine with predominantly US editorial
content that is supplemented with Canadian advertisements.  Canadian publishers fear them
because split-runs siphon off lucrative advertising revenue which is the source of the majority of
their revenue.  Moreover, the fact that most of the costs of the US publications is covered in the
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larger American market means that they can offer cut-rate deals to Canadian advertisers and
subscribers.
 In December 1995, the United States launched a WTO challenge of three Canadian
measures aimed at protecting our magazine industry from its split-run competitors.  The first
measure that the US challenged was a tariff code that prohibits imports of split-run magazines. 
The second measure attacked was an 80 per cent excise tax on advertising revenue earned by
split-run publications   Finally, the US challenged a postal subsidy programme, the effect of
which was to allow Canadian publishers to put a cheaper stamp on magazines they mailed to
subscribers than their split-run counterparts.    
Canada lost conclusively on magazines.  It was a bad sign when the WTO panel refused
to accept our argument that magazines and their embodied advertising constitute a service as
opposed to a good and should be governed by the more lenient GATS.  With respect to the
import prohibition on split-runs, the panel’s decision was straightforward: such prohibitions
violate a number of trade provisions and are not permitted.  The panel went on to decree that
Canada’s excise tax discriminated against US imports, thereby violating the GATT’s national
treatment provision.    
Concerning the postal subsidy, the WTO ruled that any subsidy that is not granted directly
as a payment to domestic producers violates the GATT rules.  This was easy to fix in this
instance – Canada now gives postal subsidies directly to Canadian publishers – but the decision
might have implications for other cultural industries that indirectly benefit from subsidies to
others.  
Of course, it could have been much worse for Canada.   Luckily for us, the US chose not
to challenge the provisions of our Income Tax Act that allow Canadian businesses to deduct the
cost of advertising in Canadian, but not foreign, publications and television and radio stations.  
This was rather handy because by the time the WTO panel and Appellate Body had finished with
us, the income tax provisions were the only policy we had left to support our magazine industry.
The panic that greeted the WTO decision caused a lot of flailing around in the Canadian
culture and trade communities.  Officials at Canadian Heritage proposed Bill C-55 which would
have made it illegal for Canadian businesses to advertise in split runs.  Their logic was that in
focusing on advertising, a service, the policy would fall exclusively under the laxer GATS
provisions and could avoid getting caught by the WTO.  The US thought that we were trying to
be too cute by a half.  It saw the Bill as an outright attempt to avoid implementing the WTO’s
determination.  To turn up the heat, the US threatened to retaliate against a handful of very well
connected industries including steel and textiles.  An all-out trade war seemed imminent.    
Cooler heads prevailed in the end.  Canada and the United States entered into
negotiations over the amount of Canadian advertising a foreign publication should be allowed to
have.  The result was an agreement that up to 18 per cent of advertising revenue can be generated
from Canadian sources without the magazine having to add any Canadian editorial content.  The
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agreement allows American publishers to establish wholly-owned subsidiaries in Canada to
publish Canadian editions as long as the editions contain a majority or substantial amount of
Canadian content.  Canada also instituted a new subsidy scheme for magazines worth an
estimated $90 million per year.  The subsidy provided to individual publishers will be based on a
formula determined by lost advertising revenues and postal subsidies.  
Many in the cultural community believed that Canada was unwise to capitulate to the US
in the magazines dispute.  They viewed it as part of a slippery slope towards total cultural
domination by Washington.   Canadian culture is something they consider worth standing up for
notwithstanding the cost.  At least we should not give up before the first shots are fired they say.
Important as our cultural sector is, Canada cannot afford to flout international trade rules. 
The cultural sector cannot reasonably expect another Canadian industry to pay the price for its
refusal to meet our international trade obligations.  There are other ways to support our cultural
sector that do not violate trade principles.  We need to explore these.  
In the end, Canada had to accept the WTO decision.  We must rely on our status in the
international trading arena and use the system to change the system.  That means better rules for
culture that will help us avoid the kind of mess we got into with magazines.  
[Note to Kelvin: Insert Anthony Jenkins Cartoon from the Globe and Mail on magazine case. 
Camera ready art is available for scanning.]
Cartoon by Anthony Jenkins, Globe and Mail, May 22, 1999.  Reprinted with permission of the
Globe and Mail.
_____________________________________________________________________________
To Exempt or Not  to Exempt?
Many in the cultural community steadfastly maintain that culture should be off the table
in any trade negotiations.  A blanket exemption for culture is the minimum deal they would find
acceptable.  Their belief is that had such an exemption been in the WTO Agreements, as it is in
the NAFTA, we would never have lost the magazine dispute.  
Is the exemption route the best strategy for promoting and protecting our cultural sector? 
Probably not.      
The NAFTA’s supposed exemption for culture is not as good at it seems at first glance. 
What it allows is for Canada to pursue policies towards the cultural sector that might not be
consistent with other aspects of the Agreement.  They might violate the principle of national
treatment, for example.  However, in such situations, the United States is entitled to take
measures of equivalent commercial effect.  This means that Canada must pay a price for cultural
policies that violate the basic provisions of NAFTA.  The price is usually paid in the form of
trade retaliation against some other sector of the Canadian economy.  And one can bet that a
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favourite target for retaliation is an industry like steel that is based in the hometown of the
minister responsible for Canadian culture.  
Of course, this must sound rather familiar to those acquainted with the WTO case on
magazines.  The WTO rules allow a Member who has successfully challenged another to take
“appropriate countermeasures,” to equivalent commercial effect, if the losing Member does not
comply with the WTO panel and Appellate Body report.  If Canada lost a challenge to one of our
cultural policy measures and we refused to change the policy to comply with the WTO ruling, the
challenger could retaliate against another of our industries.  
Essentially then, the NAFTA exemption is worth little more than the WTO’s non-
exemption.  In fact, it may be worth less.  The WTO rules require the Dispute Settlement Body to
formally authorize countermeasures and to determine what the appropriate level should be.  The
situation could get much messier under the NAFTA.  The United States could decide on its own
accord to retaliate against one of our cultural policies and could unilaterally decide on the
retaliatory action it wanted to take.  In such circumstances, Canada could end up fighting with the
US for years over whether our cultural policies violated the NAFTA in the first place and
whether the countermeasures implemented by the US were appropriate.  
In truth, the NAFTA never really did exempt culture.  The suggestion that it did was just
slick marketing by those anxious to sell the deal and the FTA that preceded it.  The NAFTA’s
cultural exemption is little more than permission to break the rules on the understanding that the
US could retaliate in kind against some other industry.  This is more or less the same deal we
have in the WTO.    
 Okay then, the cultural pundits might argue, we should seek an unconditional exemption
for culture in the WTO.  Canada has negotiated such provisions in the bilateral foreign
investment agreements that we have signed with various countries.  They provide a carte blanche
exemption for investment policies for the cultural sector and do not allow for retaliatory
countermeasures.
We might, however, want to think this through.  The first question to ask is whether our
cultural sector could live with the kind of restrictions that a blanket and unconditional exemption
would impose.  Consider that culture is an ubiquitous and expansive phenomenon.  Countries
could decide that a whole host of things impact negatively on their culture – things like processed
cheese, polyester neck ties, or country music – and attempt to block their importation. 
Alternatively, a country could determine that having a national aerospace industry or a world-
class wine industry is essential to its national cultural identity and generously subsidize these
ventures, distorting world trade in the process.  While far-fetched, these examples underscore a
critical point.  Unless we put some limitations on what is and what is not considered culture, the
very idea of an unconditional exemption should be out of the question.
It is also important to remember that if Canada were to get an unconditional exemption,
so too would other WTO Members.  That might not sit well with some elements of our cultural
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sector, particularly those which depend on export markets.  Canadian television shows sell all
over the world.  It’s a good thing too, since TV shows are dreadfully expensive to produce and
foreign revenues make many of these productions possible.  Our national pride swells at the
thought that Margaret Atwood is enjoyed by readers in many foreign lands.  Having her books
restricted to our tiny market would take away much of our fun, not to mention our stature on the
world cultural stage.  But a cultural exemption is a cultural exemption.   We would have no leg to
stand on if our trading partners decided that our cultural products should be denied a place in
their markets.  
It does not take too long to see that a cultural exemption is an acceptable notion but only
if we define culture precisely and provide some guidelines on the types of instruments that could
be used to protect it.  In fact, what we are talking about is rules for culture as opposed to
exemptions for culture.  
What the Cultural Community Suggests  
An obvious place to start in preparing for the negotiations is to take stock of what the
cultural community suggests.  The trouble is that many of the statements that the cultural experts
make just do not get us very far.  Consider the declaration that “culture is not a commodity like
any other.”  While there is no disputing this, the same could be said of a lot of products, not to
mention services, that are the subject of international negotiations.  There is no doubt that culture
is a highly distinctive area.  But we are still better off in the end to engage our trading partners in
rational discussions about culture instead of making conversation-stopping statements that mean
almost nothing.
The trouble is that some of the basic myths are questionable.  One dominant myth is that
globalization is bad for culture and for cultural diversity.  Quite apart from the fact that there is
little evidence to support this claim –  indeed, there is evidence to the contrary –  it is a
misleading notion.  The very idea of protectionism should be anathema to culture.  After all,
culture depends on the spontaneous and unrestrained flow of creative ideas.  That, not the desire
to protect and shield, should be our basic point of departure.  
Another challenge that the cultural experts set out for trade negotiators is to affirm the
importance of cultural diversity.  Affirmations, in themselves, mean very little and therefore are
pretty harmless.  It is probably better this way.  For this affirmation to mean something would be
to create a potentially damaging outcome.   We must not give our trading partners the tools to
deny us access to their markets, at least not unless we fully realize what we are doing and get
something in return.  
A final observation concerns the special cultural instrument recommended by the Cultural
Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade (SAGIT).  While the specifics are lacking, the
thought is a constructive one.  It makes imminent sense for WTO countries to try to agree on the
kinds of domestic policies that should and should not be used to enhance cultural and linguistic
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diversity.  Similarly, the SAGIT’s suggestion that rules be developed on how trade disciplines
would apply to cultural policy is a sensible proposition that would greatly reduce the uncertainty
that presently exists.  
For the SAGIT’s cultural instrument to work, it will need to have some more meat on its
bones.  Concrete ideas will have to be developed and strategies refined.  For this to succeed,
trade negotiators and representatives of the cultural community will have to build a good working
relationship.  Are the two sides up to it?
 
Working Towards a Solution on Trade and Culture
Canadian trade negotiators will be under tremendous pressure to leave culture out of the
next round of trade negotiations.  Some of this pressure could well come from our own Minister
for Canadian Heritage.  There is a huge temptation to be protectionist about culture since that is
the easiest path to follow.  However, it is in the best interests of our cultural sector to resist this
temptation strongly.
The Canadian cultural community faces some immediate concerns.  The WTO decision
on magazines has left us with much uncertainty about our cultural policy instruments.  The
American cultural industry can barely restrain its appetite for the balance of our market and is
unlikely to be satisfied for long with its resounding win on magazines.  Rather than being forced
to negotiate market access with the United States on a case-by-case basis, as we did after our loss
at the WTO, or travel regularly to defend ourselves in Geneva, we would be well advised to
make some sense of the trade policy void that we now occupy.  
Our first course of action should be to look critically at the measures we now use to
support and promote culture in this country.  Many of these policy instruments are already under
serious pressure from technological innovation and have lost their usefulness.  Others are
blatantly inconsistent with our international trade obligations.  Instead of vowing to defend our
policy tools to the death, why not take the opportunity offered by the upcoming trade negotiations
to bring our cultural policy into the twenty-first century?  
This would mean less emphasis on ownership restrictions and content requirements,
policies that are inadequate in the Internet and satellite age in any event.  This will leave
subsidies as the instrument of choice for supporting our cultural producers.  
Subsidies are not favoured by their recipients in the cultural world who realize that they
are easier for the public to observe and for governments to take away than other types of support. 
Their visibility makes them a bigger target than other more hidden but equally costly and more
distorting forms of support.  However, subsidies have many endearing qualities.  First, they can
be more effectively targeted to reward the types of activity that the public considers desirable. 
Instead of supporting book sellers, broadcasters and song writers just because they are Canadian,
as our “Can-Con” and investment restrictions do, subsidy programmes can be designed to
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encourage the dissemination of Canadian stories, news and ideas.  But the most important feature
of subsidy programmes is their transparency.  This is better from a trade perspective and it makes
for better public policy.  
In terms of a WTO agenda, negotiators need to focus on several things.  First, they should
attempt to clarify whether cultural products like films and magazines are bound by the provisions
of the GATS or of the GATT agreements.  Second, they should craft rules to ensure that certain
subsidies to the cultural sector cannot be challenged by a foreign competitor, just as is already the
case for R&D, environmental, and regional assistance subsidies,.  Third, to ensure that countries
do not take undue advantage of special rules for culture, negotiators should define culture and
cultural industries as precisely as possible.  Above all, negotiators should avoid drafting
grandiose statements on the importance of such things as cultural diversity.  Such
pronouncements amount to little more than deceptive public relations for the folks back home
and end up creating a lot of unnecessary confusion in the application of WTO provisions.        
Ultimately, Canada’s interests are best served by a system that affirms the basic principles
of non-discrimination, fairness and transparency.  These fundamental principles should guide the
conduct of our domestic cultural policy and should govern the treatment of our cultural producers
in world markets.  The WTO negotiations offer a chance to develop solid rules to allow countries
to support legitimate cultural endeavours while reducing the barriers facing cultural exporters.  
All that is needed is for us to stay focused and remind ourselves what really is at stake.  It is not
protection for its own sake.  Rather, it is about the development and exchange of ideas by and
about Canadians.   Surely this is something that we have to take an expansive view of.  
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Chapter 11 
Greening the Rules
Global Environmental Concerns
Seen from space, the Earth is a lovely blue and green sphere enveloped in white, whispy
clouds.  Back on the ground though, in one of the world’s mushrooming mega-cities, the picture
is not as pretty.  The air is choked with black industrial smoke and the rivers are brown with
industrial and residential waste.  
Global ecosystems are coming under increasing stress from human activity.  The global
common is being abused.  The overall global environment is becoming more and more fragile. 
Planet Earth faces problems of global warming, desertification, the destruction of the rainforest,
the extinction of species, the loss of bio-diversity, water and air pollution, and the contamination
of soils.  These are all extremely serious, some would even say to the point of threatening the
future of humankind on our planet.  
Many environmentalists blame the WTO for doing little to solve environmental problems. 
This is no doubt true as the WTO is an organization set up to administer the rules of the
international trading system and is not the international environmental policing agency.  Some
environmentalists even take their criticism of the WTO farther and hold it responsible for
worsening environmental problems, claiming that it is encouraging “a race to the bottom” with
respect to environmental standards.  This is an obvious misrepresentation of the facts.
While the WTO’s mandate is not to protect the global environment, its impact on the
environment still needs to be taken into account.  “What has the WTO been doing and what can
it do for the environment?”  are important questions for everyone, not just for environmentalists.
Economists view environmental problems as arising when all environmental costs of
economic activity are not borne by the beneficiaries of the activity – the so called “negative
environmental externalities.” In this case, the unfettered functioning of the free market will lead
to the production of too much of the good in question.  Economists prescribe environmental
policies that seek to internalize these externalities and to restore the optimum allocation of
resources, including environmental resources of clean air, water and soil.
But even if national governments are successful in establishing environmental policies
that successfully internalize all national externalities (and only the most naive economist would
ever argue that they are), there are still international externalities to consider.  Since these are not
borne by national governments or their citizens, there is little reason for national governments to
take them into account and in fact none do fully.  There are many examples of such externalities. 
The most global are the so called greenhouse gases – carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and methane
– emitted by the burning of fossil fuels and by agricultural production.  Examples of more
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regional externalities would be untreated sewage in rivers flowing across national boundaries and
certain air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide that cause acid rain.
Trade actions are one possible response to cross-border environmental damage.  From the
point of view of economic theory, however, trade actions are not usually the best response as they
introduce production and consumption inefficiencies by distorting the relative prices of domestic
and international goods.  Better measures usually exist in theory that can produce the same
environmental result at a higher level of output and income.  But in some cases, trade actions
may be the best practical response even if they are not the best response from a theoretical point
of view.  One example is when the imported goods themselves are the potential source of the
damage as in the case of hazardous or nuclear wastes.  Another example is where the production
techniques used on one side of the border are the cause of the damage on the other such as when
untreated wastewater from a food processing plant is dumped in to a river upstream from the
border.
Trade measures can also be useful as levers in encouraging lagging countries to introduce
policies that are environmentally sound from a global point of view.  An example of such a
policy where it may be appropriate to consider trade measures in the future is the Kyoto Protocol
target for the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.  These gases are believed to be the cause of
global warming, which could be a serious threat to life on our planet.  The Kyoto Protocol
commits signatory countries to reduce these emissions 6 per cent from 1990 levels by 2008-12
Although trade sanctions are not specifically authorized in the Kyoto Protocol, they may
ultimately prove necessary if the target is to be met.  Since currently only developed countries
and Eastern European countries that are signatories of the Protocol have quantitative targets for
reductions, it will be necessary to find some means to get developing countries also to reduce
greenhouse gases.  After all, it wouldn’t make much sense to force domestic industries in
developed countries to comply with stiff greenhouse gas emission requirements if their offshore
competitors in developing countries were not to be subjected to similar requirements.  The
overall effect of this would be just to encourage greenhouse-gas-intensive economic activity to
move offshore and not to reduce greenhouse gases at all.  Trade sanctions could prevent this from
happening and provide some protection to domestic industries that are forced to comply with the
greenhouse gas reduction requirements.  They would also encourage developing countries to sign
on to the Protocol.
Trade measures have been used successfully to achieve environmental objectives in at
least two important instances.  Under the Montreal Protocol, there was a ban on the import of 
CFCs and other substances that were damaging the ozone layer.  This encouraged other countries
that were not signatories to stop using CFCs too, since they could no longer export products that
used CFCs such as refrigerators.  The ban was thus successful in ending the use of CFCs and
preventing further damage to the ozone layer.  Under the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES), there was also a trade ban, this time on ivory.  It helped to stem the
decline in African elephants, which were being slaughtered for their tusks.
The WTO Agreements and the Environment
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The Preamble to the WTO Agreement mentions the objective of sustainable development
and the need to protect and preserve the environment.  Under WTO rules, countries are allowed
to impose trade restrictions for environmental and for health reasons.  Two provisions in GATT
Article XX permit governments to take measures to protect the environment: section (b) for
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”; and section (g) for
measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.” To qualify, measures
cannot involve arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or be disguised trade restrictions.  An
additional, more controversial, qualification set out in Articles I and III proscribes discrimination
based on process and production methods (PPM).  This means that taxes and regulations on
imported goods must be the same as those on domestic regardless of the PPM used in producing
the good.  This is important because the process and production methods utilized often have
significant environmental consequences with some methods generating much more pollution
than others.
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement (SPS), which together allow measures for the protection of human, animal and plant
life, and health, or the environment, also impose disciplines on technical regulations and SPS
measures.  Again such regulations and measures can’t discriminate between countries or
constitute disguised trade barriers.  In addition, there is a “necessity test” that requires the
regulations or measure to be no more trade restrictive than necessary.  SPS measures must also
be based on scientific evidence.  Furthermore, regulations and measures that are based on
international standards are presumed to be consistent with the agreements.  SPS measures can be
stricter than international norms if there is a scientific justification and if they are supported by an
appropriate risk assessment.  Finally, regulations and measures must also be transparent if they
depart from international standards.  Eco-labelling programmes are another important
environmental policy instruments that are subject to the disciplines of the Agreement on TBT.
Other WTO Agreements also have environmental provisions.  The Agriculture
Agreement excludes environmental subsidies from the agricultural subsidy totals that must be cut
back.  The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures makes non-actionable
government assistance to industry for up to 20 per cent of the cost of upgrading existing facilities
to comply with new environmental legislation.  The General Agreement on Trade in Services,
similarly to GATT Article XX, permits measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health” in Article XIV (b).  The TRIPs Agreement can facilitate access to
environmentally-friendly technology and products.  Its Article 27 (2) allows the refusal of patents
“to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment.” Article 27 (3) allows the exclusion from patentability of “plants and animals... 
and essentially biological processes.”
Countries are becoming more sensitive about the impact of trade negotiations on the
environment.  Under pressure from environmental groups, the European Union, the United States
and Canada all intend to carry out environmental reviews of the proposals for trade liberalization
that come up in the round.
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Some Recent WTO Decisions Enrage Environmentalists
The WTO’s bad reputation with environmentalists, particularly in the United States,
stems from recent WTO panel decisions on several controversial cases against the United States
– the Tuna-Dolphin, the Shrimp-Turtle, and the Gasoline Standards case.  In each of these, the
rulings limited the ability of the United States to enforce its environmental laws, and have led, or
will lead, to a watering down of these laws.
The Tuna-Dolphin case arose from a complaint by Mexico in 1991 under the old GATT
regime that its exports of yellowfin tuna to the United States had been banned.  The Mexican
tuna was embargoed because the Mexican government was unable to prove to the US Authorities
that the tuna had been caught using fishing techniques that protected dolphins as required under
the US Marine Mammal Protection Act.  This Act forbids the sale in the United States of tuna
caught using the mile-long nets favoured by Mexico that were notorious for killing the large
schools of  dolphins that typically swam above the tuna, revealing their location.  The embargo
on Mexican tuna also applied to intermediary countries, including Canada, that processed and
canned Mexican tuna.
The panel ruled that the United States could not ban tuna products from Mexico simply
because the way the tuna was caught did not meet US regulations.  This decision was based on
the GATT Article III proscription against discrimination based on process and production
methods.  The panel also concluded that the United States could not take trade action to enforce
its own domestic laws in other countries such as Mexico in this case.  Under the old GATT
regime, the United States never had to formally accept the ruling.  It was able to maintain its
restrictions during lengthy bilateral consultations with Mexico and in the face of another,
contrary ruling by a second panel requested by the European Union to enforce the decision of the
first.  During this time, observers were introduced on Mexican tuna fishing boats and there were
some improvements in Mexico’s fishing practices but not enough to satisfy environmentalists
and the US government.  Nevertheless, the United States eventually agreed to comply with the
ruling.  Amendments to the MMPA proposed by the Clinton Administration will soon allow
foreign tuna to be imported even though it is still caught using mile-long nets lethal to dolphins. 
And to add insult to injury in the view of environmentalists, the tuna will be able to qualify for
the label, “dolphin-safe.”
The Shrimp-Turtle case was launched in 1997 by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand
against a US ban on the import of shrimp caught using nets without a turtle-excluder device
(TED).  This is a metal grid sewn into a net which protect turtles by guiding them through a hole
in the net.  In contrast, shrimp pass through the grid into the back of the net where they are
captured.  Nets without these devices are the biggest killers of sea turtles, which are listed as
endangered species under the CITES.  The US Endangered Species Act requires foreign
countries selling shrimp in the United States to use nets with TEDs.  The WTO panel, supported
by the Appellate Body, confirmed the earlier Tuna-Dolphin decision and ruled that the United
States could not ban the import of products that did not meet US PPM regulations.  Again the
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United States was slapped on the wrist for attempting the extraterritorial application of its
domestic environmental laws.
The Gasoline Standards case against the United States was the first heard under the new
WTO dispute settlement mechanism in 1995-96.  Venezuela and Brazil challenged a US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule, which enforced Congressionally-mandated clean
air standards to reduce smog and toxic air pollutants, on the grounds that it discriminated against
their exports.  The standards required that the cleanliness of gasoline sold in the most polluted
US cities improve by 15 per cent and that gasoline sold elsewhere in the US maintain 1990
levels.  For operational purposes, the EPA rule established a standard for contaminants in gas
from domestic and foreign refiners without adequate documentation on their 1990 levels of
contaminants, such as those in Venezuela and Brazil, that was based on the 1990 average of all
refiners able to provide documentation.  The WTO panel ruling, confirmed by the Appellate
Body, was that the EPA rules discriminated against foreign refineries.  Consequently, the United
States relaxed the standards.
In contrast, a 1994 GATT panel ruling on a EU challenge of the US gas guzzler tax and
other conservation measures ruled in favour of the United States even though the US exempted
primarily US-produced small trucks and utility vehicles from the fleet-wide, fuel-efficiency
standards.  This exemption made the required reduction in fleet-wide average gasoline
consumption much larger for European automobile manufacturers.  A clearer case of disguised
protectionism is hard to find.
For those interested in the legal fine points, it is worth noting that, while the Shrimp-
Turtle and Gasoline Standards cases both ruled against the United States, they provided a
different interpretation on the issue of the “extra-jurisdictional” application of domestic laws than
in the Dolphin-Tuna case.  Based on these cases, it is now accepted that measures “necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health” Article XX (b) and measures “relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources” Article XX (g) can be applied “extra-
juridictionally” as long as the measures are really “necessary” and are not a “disguised restriction
on international trade.” The earlier decision against the United States in the Dolphin-Tuna case is
attributed by some trade law experts to the fact that the United States acted unilaterally before
taking a reasonable approach to try to resolve the issue and not to any inherent prohibition on the
“extra-jurisdictional” application of domestic law.  
In another, environmentally-related case, Canada, which produces 95 per cent of exported
asbestos, is the complainant against a EU ban on asbestos imports, which applies even to
asbestos embedded in building materials.  It claims that the ban is a violation of the Technical
Barriers to Trade Agreement and runs counter to GATT Articles XI and III banning quantitative
restrictions on imports and discriminatory trade measures.  The EU counterclaim is based on the
right to a safe workplace free of a known carcinogen.  However, while there is ample scientific
evidence on the carcinogenic properties of asbestos, it is not clear that asbestos in building
materials constitutes a threat to human health.  A panel decision is awaited.
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A final case with environmental implications, which is discussed fully in Chapter 3
above, is the EU ban on beef treated with growth hormones.  Suffice it to say here that it puts
limits on the extent to which any country can set its own food standards that are higher than
international standards unless they are backed by substantial scientific evidence.  The
precautionary principle, which applies to drugs and requires the manufacturer to demonstrate that
a drug is safe, does not apply to foods, which are governed by the less strict criterion of risk
assessment.
Unilateral vs.  Multilateral Action
A common element in all the WTO decisions in the cases involving environmental issues
is an abhorrence of unilateral trade action.  Such actions are considered to be inconsistent with a
rules-based international trading system.  They allow large industrialized countries like the
United States to throw their economic weight around to the disadvantage of smaller, often
developing, countries.  However, there is little recognition that for environmental problems
unilateral action may be the only action possible and that some action is better than none given
the gravity of the situation.
The WTO’s preferred instruments for dealing with international environmental issues are
strengthened multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).  There are about 200 of these
instruments,  which are usually negotiated under the United Nations Environment Programme.
Around 20 of these MEAs have trade bans or rely on trade sanctions for enforcement.  The
CITES is an example of an agreement that allows the imposition of trade sanctions on countries
threatening endangered species.  The Kyoto Protocol is an example of a MEA without trade
sanctions.  So far, no WTO panel has yet been faced with a clear cut case of the use of trade
sanctions mandated by an MEA.  How such a case would be decided is anyone’s guess.
How to Green the WTO
After over twenty years of discussion and debate on trade and the environment in the
GATT, the WTO, the OECD and elsewhere, the time has come for action to make the WTO
more environmentally-friendly.  Surely, it is not beyond our capacity to reach agreement on some
ways to make sure the WTO treads more softly in the sensitive environmental field and does not
overturn domestic environmental laws unless they are truly discriminatory and constitute
disguised barriers to trade.  
The WTO Agreements need to be modified to make clear that the essential principles of
non-discrimination for environmental measures should be national treatment and most-favoured-
nation.  GATT Article III also needs to be amended to make clear that prohibitions on restraints
on process and production methods do not apply to environmental measures.  This is very
important because many of the most pressing environmental problems that must be addressed
such as reductions in greenhouse gas emissions may have to be handled on the level of process
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and production methods.  Trade-Related Environmental Measures (TREMs) should not be the
first weapons in our environmental arsenal, but they should be available for use where necessary.
There are many proposals to make the WTO more environmentally-friendly.  Even
though the United States has borne the brunt of the WTO challenges of domestic environmental
legislation, the European Union has been more progressive than the United States on the
environment front and has provided leadership in attempting to green the WTO.  At Singapore,
the EU proposed that the WTO recognize MEAs that utilize trade sanctions and that changes to
GATT Article XX permit the enforcement of MEAs in violation of WTO rules.  Surprisingly, the
US didn’t support this proposal.
GATT Article XX should also be amended to allow countries to take trade measures to
protect endangered species or marine mammals.  Changes may have to be made elsewhere in the
GATT to make sure that this right is not overruled by other provisions.  So far, no panel has
accepted the legitimacy of a measure permitted as an Article XX derogation if it were otherwise
inconsistent with other GATT provisions.
Another proposal is to substitute a “proportionality test” for the “necessity test” in the
WTO TBT and SPS Agreements.  Under this, it would just be necessary to show that the
environmental benefits of the measure were greater than the trade costs.  Under the necessity test
now in place, the measure must be the least trade restrictive available.
A final proposal is to eliminate all duties and barriers on environmental goods and
services.  This would make it cheaper to use the latest technologies to clean up or protect the
environment.  Canada would also benefit as a leading international supplier of such goods and
services.
Success in other areas of the Millennium Round could also contribute to the achievement
of environmental objectives.  The proposed reduction in agricultural subsidies (discussed in
Chapter 3 above) would promote more environmentally sound land use and curtail
overproduction which not only wastes water, energy and chemicals, but creates pollution as well. 
Cuts in fisheries subsidies would reduce over-fishing and the depletion of fish stocks. 
Unfortunately, there is one particularly environmentally damaging form of subsidies that won’t
get addressed in the round because they don’t directly affect trade.  These are coal subsidies,
which encourage the burning of a particularly dirty fossil fuel.
The WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was created with much fanfare
as a result of the Uruguay Round purportedly to make the WTO greener.  Environmentalists
argue with some justification that, contrary to its initial promise, it has acted perversely
identifying environmental measures that need to be eliminated to avoid trade disputes and
advancing proposals for greater constraints on the ability to enforce MEAs through trade
sanctions.  The CTE needs to become greener in its outlook.
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Developing countries can be expected to resist the legitimization of TREMs, which they
consider a particularly insidious form of disguised protectionism directed largely at them.  But
the developing countries need to recognize that they are not the worst polluters, and that all of
humanity will gain from an improved global environment.  
It’s the industrial countries of the North that burn the most fossil fuels and produce the
most greenhouse gases.  This is believed to be the cause of global warming which could have a
devastating effect on the global environment if it hasn’t started to already.  Developing countries,
largely in the South, still produce less greenhouse gas than the industrialized countries and are
not the main cause of global warming.  But in the next century, if developed countries are
successful in meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets, the developing countries, which are not
signatories of the Protocol, will overtake the developed world as the leading producers of
greenhouse gases.  It’s for this reason that some have argued that the Kyoto Protocol with its
coverage limited to industrialized countries was inadequate and would only slow the progress of
global warming by twenty years or so.
The Millennium Round offers a unique opportunity for a much larger North-South
consensus to improve the global environment.  The countries of the North could offer liberalized
access to their markets to the countries of the South in return for enforceable commitments to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  In addition, as part of the package, the North could also seek
commitments from the South on the conservation of rain forests.  They are an important source
of  the world’s oxygen supply by breaking down the carbon dioxide in the air.  They are also
invaluable reservoirs of global bio-diversity.  Furthermore, the package could be sweetened, as
suggested by Jeffrey Sachs in a recent article in The Economist, by transfers of funds from the
North to the South derived from a new proposed carbon tax on Northern fossil fuel consumption. 
More realistically, this is all probably dreaming in technicolour given the lack of past progress on
environmental issues.  Countries were all ready to make firm commitments to reduce greenhouse
gasses under the Kyoto protocol, but very few have yet ratified it and actual performance has
been very disappointing against the benchmark established.  Nevertheless, we have to keep trying
to make progress on the environment on all fronts, including the WTO.
The Environmental Benefits of Trade Liberalization
It’s also important not to forget the environmental benefits of trade liberalization.  The
economic growth produced will raise income all around.  The increases in income can be used to
improve the environment.  Richer countries tend to spend a larger portion of their GDP on
improving the environment.  The technology diffusion facilitated by trade makes the latest and
usually more environmentally-friendly technology more widely available.  This also will have a
positive impact on the environment.  Trade liberalization is good for the environment and can be
made even better if the rules are greened.
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Chapter 12 
Integrating Labour Standards
Not on the Agenda?
The official position of WTO Members is that labour standards are not on the WTO
agenda.  But it could be that the lady doth protest too much.  The US Administration is pushing
hard for something on labour standards to take home from Seattle.  Without this something,
however symbolic it might be, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the Administration to
garner the necessary additional Democratic Party votes in Congress to pass the fast-track
legislation required for the successful conduct and particularly for a successful conclusion of the
Millennium Round.  The Administration is keen to find some way to quiet “fair-trade”
Democrats and their supporters in the AFL-CIO, who have been railing tirelessly against the
bogeyman of unfair competition from sweatshops in low-wage countries.
Developing countries, whose prosperity depends on exports of cheap labour-intensive
goods to industrialized countries, are equally adamant that nothing be done to undermine their
comparative advantage in these goods.  For these countries, labour standards are nothing less
than a politically correct cloak for protectionism.
The WTO wrestled mightily with these competing views at the 1996 Singapore
Ministerial and came up with the following motherhood declaration:
“We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core
labour standards.  The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent
body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work
in promoting them.  We believe that economic growth and development fostered
by increased trade and further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of
these standards.  We reject the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes,
and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly the low-wage
developing countries, must in no way be put into question.  In this regard, we note
that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration.”
Core Labour Standards
Labour standards are the responsibility of the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
The ILO is a UN-affiliated body made up of representatives of governments, workers, and
employers from 174 member countries.  Since 1919 , the ILO’s annual Conferences have passed
heaps of conventions on labour standards.  Seven of these conventions constitute what the ILO
calls “core labour standards:”
• Convention number 87 on freedom of association;
• Convention number 98 on collective bargaining;
• Conventions number 29 and 105 on freedom from forced labour;
• Convention number 100 on equal remuneration;
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• Convention number 111 on non-discrimination in employment;
• Convention number 138 on the minimum working age.
These so-called “enabling rights” do not cover wages or working conditions.  Rather, they
provide the framework within which wages and working conditions are determined.  The trade
unions that are well represented at the ILO are naturally enough big supporters of the right to
freedom of association and collective bargaining.  In this, they differ from some economists who
believe that union monopolies distort resource allocation just like business monopolies and
should be similarly outlawed.
For years, the ILO was content to sit around in Geneva with stacks of its labour standard
conventions that had yet to be ratified by all of its members.  Only 35 members have ratified all
seven of the core conventions.  One of the worst footdraggers among its members was the current
champion of labour standards, the United States, which had only ratified the convention on the
abolition of forced labour.  The problem was that unless a convention was passed by its
members, the ILO had no mandate to monitor its application and enforcement.  
With the debate on labour standards raging all about it, the ILO finally had to do
something.  At the ILO Conference in June 1998, a declaration was ratified by the ILO members
specifying that:
“all members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of
membership in the Organization, to respect, to promote and to
realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the
principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject
of the Conventions, namely:
(a) freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right of collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour;
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation.”
With this new declaration, countries will be required to report annually on the progress
they have made in meeting these four fundamental rights.  The ILO will in turn issue an annual
report on global progress.  Hopefully, this report will be hard hitting and pull no punches. 
International public opinion can be a powerful force for improvement once the spotlight is turned
on particular abuses of labour rights.
In the same June 1998 declaration, ILO members “stressed that labour standards should
not be used for protectionist purposes, and that nothing in this declaration and its follow-up shall
be invoked or otherwise used for such purposes; in addition, the comparative advantage of any
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country should be in no way called into question by this declaration and its followup.”  That the
language is almost the same as used in the WTO Singapore Ministerial declaration is no
coincidence.  They were singing from the same hymnal.  It is not only at the WTO that countries
express their reservations about making links between labour standards to trade sanctions. 
Jawboning seems to be the preferred alternative.
Child labour is a particularly contentious issue.  While everyone abhors the exploitation
of children, there is genuine concern that efforts to prevent poor children from working could end
up making them and their families even worse off.  Some forms of child labour, though, are so
abhorrent to everyone that it was possible to reach agreement to adopt a convention banning the
worst forms of child labour at this year’s annual ILO conference.  The convention, which applies
to all persons under 18, calls for measures to stop: “all forms of slavery or practices similar to
slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage, serfdom and forced or
compulsory labour; forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; use
of a child for prostitution, production of pornography or pornographic performances; use,
procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and the
trafficking of drugs; and, work which is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.”
In deference to the views of developing countries, there is no outright prohibition on work by
very young children such as exists in almost all industrialized countries.
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Cartoon by Clay Bennett, The Christian Science Monitor.  Reprinted with his permission.  
______________________________________________________________________________
Why the WTO?
The WTO is not close to the hearts of most trade unionists.  Many view it as an uppity
institution, usurping national sovereignty and forcing reluctant governments to yield to global
market forces.  Yet at the same time, they do give it a grudging respect, which they may not have
for their own handmaiden, the more passive ILO.  Trade unionists see the WTO protecting
business from unfair competition and ask why it can’t do the same for them.  In their view, the
threat of trade sanctions that the WTO has at its disposal is a powerful tool that can be wielded
for good as well as evil.  The ILO may be able to bark, but the WTO can bite.  This is just what
Trade unionists feel is needed to make rapid progress on labour standards after too many years of
inaction.  The trick is to get the WTO to put its teeth at the service of labour standards in a
politically-acceptable and non-trade-distorting manner.
What, if Anything, is the WTO doing already?
In a nutshell, not much.  Article XX (e) of the GATT 1947 permits WTO Members to
take measures against “the products of prison labour.”  Reference to slave labour, child labour or
any other type of forced labour is conspicuously absent.  Under the WTO agreements, a country
could prohibit the import of products produced by prisoners, but could do absolutely nothing
about goods made by slaves, not that there are probably very many still around producing
internationally traded goods.
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The NAFTA Approach
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), which was tagged on
to the NAFTA at the last minute, was a response to the fearsome prospect of Ross Perot’s “giant
sucking sound.” While it does not establish common minimum standards, it commits the
NAFTA partners to promote the following guiding principles:
• freedom of association and the right to organize;
• the right to bargain collectively;
• the right to strike;
• prohibition of forced labour;
• labour protection for children and young persons;
• minimum employment standards;
• elimination of employment discrimination;
• equal pay for women and men;
• prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses;
• compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses;
• protection of migrant workers.
These labour principles go far beyond the ILO’s core labour standards.  In addition, an
institutional framework was established to oversee the agreement which includes a Commission
for Labor Cooperation with a Secretariat in Dallas, Texas, and National Administrative Offices in
each of the NAFTA countries.  A dispute settlement mechanism was also created with
consultation and arbitral panels.
The most common complaints under the agreement have been filed by US unions against
Mexican companies that have allegedly violated the right of unions to organize.  A complaint
was also launched by a coalition of Mexican unions and supported by American unions accusing
the Washington state apple industry of violating the rights of Mexican apple pickers and
threatening their health and safety.
The achievements of the NAALC may not be very impressive to trade unionists.  But
even they must admit that the agreement represents a pioneering effort to introduce labour
standards into a trade agreement.  It might eventually serve as a model for a multilateral
agreement under the WTO.  However, the world is not yet ready to contemplate such an
ambitious solution to the labour standards issue.
What can be done?
One of the most controversial proposals is to add a “social clause” in the WTO
agreements that would allow trade sanctions to be used to enforce core labour standards.  Under
this proposal, the ILO would be responsible for monitoring compliance and identifying violations
while the WTO would determine and administer the appropriate trade remedies.    This would be
a departure from the usual practice as the WTO does not administer multilateral sanctions, but
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authorizes compensating trade measures to restore previously negotiated trade benefits.  Judging
from the statements on using labour standards for protectionist purposes contained in both the
WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration and the ILO Declaration on fundamental principles and
rights of work, there is little enthusiasm for this proposal at either the WTO or the ILO. 
Another possibility would be to add a provision for products of forced labour similar to
that for prison labour contained in Article XX of GATT 1947.  Forced labour runs contrary to the
fundamental principle of voluntary exchange which underlies market-based economies.  Even
though this proposal would not be a major change, it still could run into opposition from some
developing countries.
Even more controversial would be the addition of a provision to Article XX for the
products of children under, say, 12.  But even from a narrow economic point of view, let alone
the social, it’s not in the interest of any developing country to allow children to work rather than
to complete their primary education.  And the labour of very young children is not voluntary and
is usually forced by their parents constituting nothing more than a particular type of forced
labour.  Nevertheless, any restrictions on child labour would be strongly resisted by many
developing countries.
The EU has an incentive scheme that provides extra benefits to developing countries that
are eligible for lower GSP tariffs if they can demonstrate that they meet core labour standards. 
Other developed countries could also consider providing such a carrot.  The EU, which opposes
any efforts to use labour standards for protectionist purposes, advocates the use of such positive
measures rather than the stick of trade sanctions.  The EU is considering a proposal to establish
some kind of forum to oversee labour standards.  This forum could be inside the WTO,  joint
between the WTO and ILO, or outside the WTO entirely.  
Through its Trade Policy Review Mechanism, the WTO could also be involved in
monitoring labour standards, particularly in Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which are directly
related to trade.  As part of a package of tax and other incentives, some countries have offered
waivers from national labour laws, especially those relating to union rights, to foreign companies
setting up in the EPZ.  Other countries just don’t enforce their labour standards in EPZs.  In these
limited cases, a direct link can be established between trade and lower labour standards.
The WTO and the ILO will definitely need to work together more closely to ensure that
core labour standards are respected, and that, more generally, progress is made in improving
standards of living and working conditions.
Nothing substantive may get done on labour standards in the Millennium Round.  But
there will at least be something symbolic.  More substance will probably have to await future
rounds.  At least a start can be made now.
Freer trade will increase productivity and incomes.  This may be the most important
contribution of a successful Millenium Round to labour standards.  As a rule, the countries with
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the highest incomes also have the highest labour standards.  Labour standards, and not only cash
standards, will improve with incomes.  Some of the least developed countries still have the
dismal labour standards that Dickens chronicled for England during the Industrial Revolution,
largely because they have similarly low levels of income.  Economic development and improved
labour standards go together.
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Chapter 13
Settling Disputes
The WTO’s Crowning Glory
The WTO’s dispute settlement system is perhaps the greatest single accomplishment of
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.  So much so that everyone from human rights
advocates to environmentalists want access to it.  They recognize that the WTO’s mechanism for
resolving disputes is truly unique among international institutions in that it actually has some
teeth.  
While the dispute settlement mechanism works well, there are a couple of areas that need
improvement in the next round of trade negotiations.
Singing its Praises    
The WTO’s settlement procedures are a vast improvement over the previous system that
existed under the GATT.  Under the old GATT regime, countries could ignore the decisions of
panels with impunity.  Even Canada, the boy scouts that we are, did so on occasion.  The result
was that countries felt it was hardly worth pursuing a trade dispute since, even if they won, there
was no guarantee that anything would change in the end.    
The new system makes panel and Appellate Body decisions binding.  Countries whose
practices are found to be inconsistent with WTO obligations must bring their measures into
conformity or face the prospect of WTO-sanctioned countermeasures.   
The WTO panel decisions can be appealed, something that was not possible under the
previous GATT system.  The WTO Appellate Body (AB) is a permanent group of seven
individuals, each appointed for a term of up to eight years.  While the AB considers only matters
of law and does not rehear the facts of a case, the possibility of an appeal was important in
getting members to agree to be bound by dispute settlement decisions.  
Countries that get embroiled in disagreements are required to consult for at least 60 days
in an effort to reach a mutually satisfactory “out of court” resolution.  If consultations are
unsuccessful, the dispute proceeds through a series of steps from the creation of a dispute
settlement panel, panel hearings, interim and final panel reports, and Appellate Body hearings
and report.  Despite all these stages, the WTO system has still shaved months off the time the
GATT used to take to deal with disputes.
The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding provides a single forum for resolving
disputes that arise under a handful of WTO agreements, including the GATT, GATS, TRIPs and
even some plurilateral agreements like the Agreement on Government Procurement.  The single
window aspect adds vastly to the coherence and effectiveness of the WTO system.
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The Dispute Settlement Body has been instrumental in convincing the developing world
of the utility of the WTO.  The very first case brought was a developing country’s challenge of a
developed country practice – Venezuela and Brazil’s case against the US on gasoline.  The fact
that newer Members of the WTO are guaranteed access to and have made ample use of the
dispute settlement provisions has been central in dispelling the notion that the WTO is an old
boys’ club.  
  To the cynics, the huge proliferation of WTO disputes suggests that the system is out of
control and that judicial policy is trying to take over trade policy.  In fact, it demonstrates
something quite different.  The effectiveness of the dispute settlement procedures shows the faith
that WTO Members have placed in the agreements they negotiated.  Their willingness to use the
system shows their commitment to a rules-based system for liberalizing world trade.  
The Results
The best evidence of the superiority of the new system is the use that it gets.  In the 47
years of the GATT, some 300 disputes were brought for resolution, an average of 6 or 7 per year. 
By late September 1999, less than six years into its operation, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Body had received 180 requests for consultation representing 140 separate cases.  This is over
five times the annual caseload handled under the GATT.
By our tally, there have been 140 separate WTO disputes (Table 2).  As cases often
involve multiple parties and can disappear only to reappear later, totals under each category are
approximate estimates.  The difficulties of precision aside, however, two striking facts stand out
in the table.  The first is that many disputes are resolved during the consultation stage and are
then settled or withdrawn.  The importance of consultation is even more apparent when one
recognizes that a large number of cases have languished in consultation for some time.  The
second observation is that almost all cases that proceed to the stage of a panel report end up
going on to appeal.  
Stretched Resources    
The success of the dispute settlement mechanism has put severe strains on the system.  It
is being used to the point of being over burdened.  
The requirement to create qualified panels within the short time frame stipulated in the
WTO provisions has proven to be a difficult challenge.  The panels are made up from a list of
candidates put forward by WTO Member countries.  Ideally, panel members have a knowledge of
international trade and are either lawyers or trade specialists who have been active in the field.  
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Table 2
Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
Consultation Requests 181
Panel rulings 24
Appellate Body reports 21 
Cases withdrawn or settled 37
Pending consultations 66
Total Distinct Cases 140 
Source: http://www.wto.org.dispute/bulletin.htm
Compiled September 24, 1999
Note:                The figures presented in this table do not add.  This is owing to the fact that
many of the cases have multiple parties or can be recorded at more than one stage of
resolution.  For example, a case might have been designated as completed since it is the
subject of a panel and Appellate Body ruling.  However, one of the challenging parties might
request consultations on the same product but under a related but different matter. 
Alternatively, a Member might reach a negotiated settlement with one of the challenging
parties but not the others.  
Grumblings are being heard about the quality of some recent WTO panels.  Some have
come close to unseemly conflict of interest situations.   None of this is surprising given the shear
number of panels that have been needed in the past five years, the complexity of the issues and
the limited number of qualified but independent individuals available with expertise in this
specialized area.  Over time, this situation is certain to improve.  In the meantime, the growing
pains are evident.  
One solution might be to create a permanent body of experts who would do nothing but
serve on dispute settlement panels.  This would make the panel process rather like the WTO
Appellate Body, which is a permanent group.   While a permanent body would improve the
consistency of panel decisions, we would lose the varied perspective and expertise that ad hoc
panels bring.  Besides, one wonders if we really need another body of Geneva-dwellers that have
been captured by the Lac Léman mind-set.  
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At a minimum, there is a need to expand the number of individuals on the panel roster list
and to enlarge the legal, translation and other resource staff.  This will be no mean feat since
WTO budgetary resources have been flat due to the unwillingness of important contributors to
open their pocketbooks wider.  
The other burden imposed by the new system is on the resources of the member countries. 
Even keeping a watching brief on cases before the dispute settlement body, let alone participating
as a principal or observer, can prove to be extremely taxing.  If developed countries like Canada
are feeling the pinch, it is difficult to imagine how countries in the developing world can cope. 
In fact, many cannot.  A case in point is the inability of important Central American banana
producers to participate in the recent bananas dispute despite its overwhelming importance to
their economies.  
While the enthusiasm for dispute settlement might well abate in time, the present strains
are proving hard to bear.  WTO decisions are having quite fundamental effects on domestic
policy making.  Moreover, the repercussions of the WTO rulings have extended beyond the
countries directly involved in the disputes.  To maintain the confidence of Members in the
overall system, panels need to have the resources and credentials necessary to do a good job.  The
Millennium Round provides an opportunity to do something about this.  A good start would be to
make provision for more generous funding.   
Negotiators at the Millennium Round might also give some thought to a programme to
assist developing countries to participate more fully in dispute proceedings.  The issue is a
transitional one since trade expertise in much of the developing world will certainly increase with
time.  At present, however, the complexity, volume and expense of cases is overwhelming.  The
interests and perspective of the developing country Members needs to be heard.  Otherwise,
much of the WTO’s effectiveness will be lost.  It will come to be perceived, perhaps justifiably,
as a club where only rich countries get a chance to a fair hearing.            
Improving Compliance 
A couple of recent WTO cases have revealed a rather disturbing weakness in the dispute
settlement provisions.  Getting the losing party to implement a panel report or Appellate Body
determination can be a long and messy business.  
Dispute Settlement Body determinations are supposed to be binding.  If a party’s
measures are found to be inconsistent with its WTO obligations, the Member must bring its
practices into compliance.  If they do not, the successful challenger is entitled to take
countermeasures of equivalent commercial effect.  The countermeasures must be blessed by the
WTO and usually take the form of suspending trade concessions or some kind of financial
compensation.
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While this sounds all very straightforward, it can be anything but in practice.  Certain
provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, specifically Articles 21.5, 22 and 23, which
deal respectively with disagreements over compliance measures, retaliation in cases of non-
compliance and discouraging unilateral action, are ambiguous.  As a result, it is unclear as to
which provision applies in a situation when a challenging Member is unsatisfied with the actions,
or inaction, of another Member in response to a WTO panel ruling.    
In a couple of recent cases, losing parties have made minor changes to their policies,
maintaining that they have complied with WTO requirements.  The challenging countries have
disagreed, claiming that one non-conforming measure has merely been substituted for another. 
Because the provisions are unclear, a Member intent on dodging an unfavourable ruling could
force its adversaries into a never-ending series of panels, indefinitely delaying implementation of
the original ruling.  
Compliance became an issue in the American challenge of Europe’s banana import
regime.  After being ruled against in the bananas case, the EU showed no desire to make
meaningful changes to its practices.  The Americans did not take this news calmly.  Not content
to wait for guidance on countermeasures from the Dispute Settlement Body, the US threatened to
impose a host of trade sanctions of its own.  The prospect of unilateral action by any Member,
particularly a powerful country like the US, is very damaging for the multilateral trading system
whose integrity depends on the coordinated action of all WTO participants.  If trading partners as
large as the European Union and the United States they are unable to resolve their disputes
amicably, what kind of example does this set for newer and less powerful Members of the WTO?
More Transparency
In crafting the WTO’s dispute settlement provisions, negotiators bent over backwards to
devise a system that is non-confrontational.  Among other things, this meant limiting the hearings
and other formal proceedings to official delegates representing the countries involved in the
dispute.  It also meant restricting the circulation of documents to only the parties involved in the
dispute.   
The desire was well-intended.  A low-key, conciliatory approach is more likely to result
in negotiated compromises than a winner-takes-all litigious model.  The idea was that if one
could keep the private trade lawyers out, especially the $400-per-hour, Gucci-loafer-wearing,
Washington D.C.  variety of trade lawyer, we would all be a lot better off.  
The trouble is that all the secrecy that surrounds the proceedings gives off a bad aura.  A
lot of important things are being decided by WTO panels.  Panel and Appellate Body reports can
significantly change the way that governments conduct their business.  This is true even for
countries that were not involved in the disputes under consideration.  It is only appropriate that
non-member participants be given an opportunity to attend the proceedings and read the
submissions filed.
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Those opposed to the idea of more transparency raise concerns that confidential
information will be released.  Unless Members are confident that proper safeguards are in place,
they will not come forward with the information panels require to do their work.
The protection of truly confidential information can still be accomplished in a more open
and transparent system.  Canada has already taken a step in this direction by pledging to prepare
non-confidential summaries of any submissions it makes to the WTO.   While it has to tighten up
its timing to ensure that the public version is available at the same time as the confidential brief
is filed in Geneva, and before the juicy bits have already been leaked to the business press,  
Canada’s idea is a good one.  Countries involved in disputes should have to file both confidential
and non-confidential submissions.  The public versions should be immediately available on the
WTO website.  
This idea would make things a lot easier for the WTO itself.  The existing system creates
all sorts of confusion and extra work.  Some information is in the public domain, while other is
not even though there is no real rationale for keeping it secret.   WTO panels, who have to
prepare public reports, have to go through the considerable effort of paraphrasing information
that could otherwise have been taken directly from parties’ submissions.  The result is that a lot
of energy gets expended handling material that really does not need to be protected.  Not only
does this cost more in the end, but the illusion of secrecy does not engender confidence in the
system.
The other argument against more transparency is that WTO panel and Appellate Body
proceedings would turn into circuses for the disaffected.  Imagine the horror going through the
minds of trade bureaucrats at the thought that their sedate existence in Geneva might be disrupted
by environmentalists and activists of other ilk.  Its enough to make them want to put in for a
transfer to the OECD.
There might be good reason to deny non-governmental organizations and others not party
to a dispute the right to actually participate in the proceedings.  The GATT/WTO tradition has
long been one of government-to-government dealings as a way of minimizing rancour and
encouraging constructive diplomacy.  This does not mean, however, that non-participants should
be shut out completely.  In addition to being granted access to public briefs and information, they
should be allowed to attend panel and Appellate Body proceedings provided confidential
information is not being discussed.  Although political cultures and structures differ amongst
WTO Member governments, they should consider instituting mechanisms for gathering the
views of domestic groups, the so-called “civil society”.  What is more, governments should make
sincere attempts to reflect these opinions in their own submissions before dispute settlement
bodies.
Finally, there is the issue of interim reports.  In the old GATT days, first drafts of panel
reports were released on a confidential basis to the countries involved in the case prior to being
circulated to all Members.  The idea was that the early release would provide those directly
affected with an opportunity to catch and correct any mistakes made by the panel.  This practice
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has been carried over to the WTO, even though the job of the Appellate Body makes it
redundant.  After all, appellate review is supposed to clear up any errors made by the panel.  
The interim report business has created no end of confusion.  Some governments have not
considered themselves bound by the report’s confidential status and have commented publicly on
its contents.  This puts other parties to the dispute in an awkward situation, not wanting to break
WTO protocol but being frustrated at being put at a disadvantage in the public relations game. 
One common scenario is for one party to claim victory in a case upon release of the interim
report.  Given the complexity of these cases, it is not difficult to find at least one minor point that
a panel will decide in a party’s favour.  The adversary, who might well have been victorious
overall, has little recourse.  The interim decision is not available for members of the press to
analyze for themselves.  By the time the official report is released some weeks later, the press and
public have lost interest.  In the meantime, the folks back home are livid at their trade policy
officials for having lost a case that they might really have won.  
It is high time to end this messy state of affairs.  WTO panel decisions should be released
in public and only once.  This would place all WTO Members on an equal footing and provide
the transparency and openness the public deserves.  
The chances are good that reforms will be made to improve the transparency of the
dispute settlement system.  In its July 29  position paper by WTO Ambassador Esserman, theth
United States proposed “providing for earlier circulation of panel reports, making parties’
submissions to panels public, allowing for submissions of amicus briefs and opening hearings to
observers from the public”.  These proposals were reportedly submitted to the Dispute Settlement
Review which is supposed to report and make recommendations to the Seattle Ministerial for
ratification.  If we are lucky, this might be one of the early-harvest accomplishments in Seattle.  
Little Dispute over Disputes
By and large, the WTO’s dispute settlement provisions operate remarkably well.  The few
problems that exist can be solved with increased resources and clearer drafting to remove some
ambiguities related to enforcement and compliance.  This should be easy to achieve in the
Millennium Round negotiations.
The issue of transparency is a tremendously important one.  It is crucial to have domestic
constituencies on side if we are to advance the cause of trade liberalization.  Disputes are dealing
with issues that hit very close to the bone in terms of national sovereignty – matters relating to
environment, health and safety, for example.   The fears of citizens that dispute settlement bodies
are over stepping their boundaries and trampling on legitimate national prerogatives need to be
addressed and allayed.  An important element of that is to remove the intrigue and secrecy that
now exists, and make the whole process more open.  There is no reason why the non-
participating governments and the public at large should not be given more access to dispute
proceedings.  In fact, the integrity of the system might well depend on it.       
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Chapter 14 
Joining the Club
The Need for New Members
With the growth in international trade and investment and the spread in market-based
strategies for economic development, it is becoming increasingly important that the WTO rules-
based international trading system be extended to cover all the world’s economies.  It is
especially important that the larger economies of China and Russia be brought into the WTO
club.  Countries that are not members of the WTO tend to have much higher tariffs than
Members, as well as more barriers to trade.
The benefits of an expanded WTO will accrue to all Members, new as well as old.  The
newly-acceding countries will benefit from more secure access to the domestic markets of
member countries on a most-favored-nation basis.  This is vital for their continued growth and
prosperity.  In return, they will have to open up their domestic markets to exports from WTO
Members and subject their economic policies to the disciplines of the WTO agreements, which
of and by itself will have very beneficial effects on their economies.  The existing WTO
Members will also benefit from improved access to the domestic markets of the acceding
countries.  Any disputes that arise with newly acceding countries will have to be settled under the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism rather than by unilateral action.  This will help to prevent
the resort to beggar-thy-neighbor policies and trade wars.
Bringing China and Russia into the WTO and integrating their economies more closely
into the global economy will also improve prospects for world peace.  Countries that are
dependent on each other to maintain their standards of living don’t usually go to war.  This was
one of the main reasons that France and Germany joined together after the devastation of the
Second World War to form the European Coal and Steel Community and later the European
Economic Community.  Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, the co-fathers of the EU, were driven
by a vision of an integrated and peaceful Europe that would never again be ravished by war as it
had already been twice in the Twentieth Century.
The Accession Process
Under Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, any state (or
customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations
and of other matters provided for in the WTO agreements) wishing to join the WTO and accede
to the WTO agreements can apply for membership by communicating its desire to the Director-
General.  The General Council then considers the application and establishes a Working Party to
examine it further and to prepare recommendations including a draft Protocol of Accession.
The Working Party begins its investigations by considering a memorandum provided by
the applicant that describes its trade regime and tariff schedules in detail.  The applicant then is
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required the defend before the Working Party the conformity of its regime with all the WTO
agreements.  Once this fact-finding is sufficiently advanced, bilateral negotiations commence
either with the applicant tabling its initial offer on goods and services or with interested Members
presenting their requests for concessions.
The negotiated terms of accession include acceptance of all the WTO agreements as well
as the consolidated results of bilateral negotiations with current WTO Members on schedules of
concessions in goods and specific commitments in services.  All WTO Members benefit from the
bilateral negotiations because they are extended to all Members on a most-favoured-nation basis. 
The bilateral negotiations with the largest WTO Members, namely the United States, the
European Union, and Japan, are obviously the most important as these countries have a de facto
veto on new Members.  Put another way, they can blackball new members in the club.
A decision on an accession is usually taken by the WTO’s General Council after it
receives the Draft Report, the Draft Protocol and Schedules on Goods and Services from the
Working Party.  But according to Article XII:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement the final decision is
the prerogative of  the Ministerial Conference like the one held at Seattle.  Formally, the terms of
accession must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the WTO Members, but by custom a
consensus is required.  Following this approval, the Protocol of Accession enters into force.  The
applicant becomes a WTO Member thirty days after it completes its own legal formalities for
acceptance.
Countries Negotiating Accession
WTO/GATT membership has increased sharply since the fall of communism and the
completion of the Uruguay Round.  Everyone wants to join the WTO, which sets the rules for the
global marketplace.  The number of members is now 135 up from around 100 in 1990.  More
recently, there has been some further progress in extending WTO membership.  The Kyrgyz
Republic and Latvia have just joined and Estonia will officially become a Member on November
13.  A further 29 countries and customs territories have applied to join.  China, Chinese Taipei
(Taiwan), Russia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Vietnam are among 20 applicants with
which active negotiations are proceeding.  Seventeen of the countries negotiating accession are
transition economies.
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Countries Negotiating Accession to the WTO
Albania Croatia Moldova Sudan
Algeria FYR Macedonia Nepal Chinese Taipei
Andorra Georgia Oman Tonga
Armenia Jordan Russian Federation Ukraine
Azerbaijan Kazakstan Samoa Uzbekistan
Belarus Laos Saudi Arabia Vanuata
Cambodia Lithuania Seychelles Vietnam
China
Charlene Barshefsky, the US Trade Representative, told the US Senate Agricultural
Committee in June that the United States has completed its bilateral negotiations with Chinese
Taipei, and has made significant progress with nine other countries including Albania, Armenia,
China, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Lithuania, Moldova, and Oman.  This provides a good
indication of the countries that are next in line for accession.
Given the number of countries seeking accession, critics that argue that the WTO is an
obstacle to economic development should ask themselves, “Why do so many developing
countries want to join?”
China
By far the most important accession negotiations have been those underway for thirteen
years with China, a country that exported US$184 million in 1998 and is one of the world’s top
five traders.  The international trading system can hardly be considered global as long as China
with its 1.3 billion people or over one-fifth of the world’s population remains outside the WTO.
The bilateral negotiations between the United States and China have been very prolonged
and difficult.  This stemmed from the fundamental philosophical differences that were played out
at the negotiating table.  The United States wanted China to introduce the stringent liberalization
measures imposed on developed countries in the WTO.  China felt that it should be allowed to
adopt the more lenient measures allowed developing nations.
The seemingly never-ending bilateral negotiations between China and the United States
and other countries over accession seemed to be finally nearing an end when Premier Zhu Rongji
visited the United States last April.  China offered a very attractive package containing
concessions on agriculture, including improved access for citrus, wheat and beef, and tariff cuts
of more than a half.  Non-tariff barriers on a range of agricultural products were to be replaced by
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tariff rate quotas, which were substantially above current import volumes.  Foreigners were to be
allowed to own 49 per cent of telecommunication ventures.  Tariffs on automobiles were to be
cut from 80 per cent to 25 per cent.  At that time, the remaining sticking points included US
demands for more opening of financial services and telecommunications and US insistence on
additional protection for its steel, textiles and clothing industries.  
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that this deal offered by the Chinese Premier may
have been the best China was prepared to offer and that some of its elements may no longer be
on the table.  The Chinese Premier and other Chinese negotiators lost much face when they had
to return home from the United States empty handed.  This strengthened the hands of those who
oppose the economic liberalization required to join the WTO.  In contrast, in the United States,
business groups criticized the Administration for walking away from what looked to them like a
pretty good deal.
If the Chinese Premier’s failure to reach agreement after going out on a limb wasn’t bad
enough, China’s prospects of joining the WTO suffered another major setback.  Shortly after the
Premier  returned home, NATO accidently bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 7
precipitating a wave of anti-American demonstrations, including some that vandalized the US
Embassy and consulates in China.  Meanwhile in the United States, the release of the
Congressional report on Chinese nuclear espionage didn’t do much to help assuage
Congressional opposition to a trade deal with China.  Nevertheless,  in July the House approved a
bill extending normal trade relationships with China for another year.
By early September, the situation had cooled enough for substantive talks to resume. 
President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin met at the APEC Summit in Auckland on
September 10-12.  Further talks were held in Washington in late September.  The United States
was seeking the same deal that had been offered in April plus restrictions on textile exports. 
China claimed that there were ten or fifteen errors in the reported offer and was seeking
“clarifications.” Even if the Chinese manage to reach an agreement with the United States soon,
there are other hurdles to clear.  Bilateral negotiations with other WTO Members including the
EU and Canada must be completed.  All of this will, of course, take time.  Consequently, it now
looks increasingly unlikely that China will be admitted into the WTO before the Seattle
Ministerial begins in late November.  This is unfortunate, as it is desirable that China be a full
participant in the next round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Bringing China fully into WTO presents some unique challenges.  Much of China’s
economy is run by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose purchasing decisions can be subject to
political pressure.  This is the reason the United States wants China to sign the Agreement on
Government Procurement.  In addition, the Chinese government regulation of the financial sector
and telecommunications and other sectors tend to favour SOEs.  Finally, much of China’s trade is
conducted by State Trading Enterprises (STE).
It will be impossible to resolve all the outstanding issues prior to China’s accession.  That
will take several rounds of trade negotiations.  This is why it is important to bring China into the
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WTO before the Millennium Round gets well underway.  It will subject China to the disciplines
of another round of negotiations.
Russia
Russia is the next most important country that is not a Member of the WTO. 
Negotiations over accession have been underway since 1993.  While some progress has been
made, the process was slowed by the Russian financial crisis in August 1998 when Russia
defaulted on its debt and the ruble collapsed.  However, a goods and market access offer and a
service offer have recently been circulated.  It is important to bring this process to a reasonably
swift conclusion.  But unfortunately the signs point otherwise.  Michael Moore, the new Director
General of the WTO who began his three year term in September, offered his assessment that
“Russia won’t be in my time.”
 The state-owned sector in Russia has been reduced by privatization, and is no longer as
important as it is in China.  Nevertheless, there is still a crying need to subject the Russian
economy to the disciplines of the WTO agreements.  This will provide some protection for
Russia’s trading partners against the widespread corruption in Russian business and politics that
makes trading with Russia so difficult.  It should also have some beneficial spillover effects in
terms of creating a badly-needed rules-based framework for domestic economic activity.
Canada’s Role
Because of the size of the markets concerned and the extent of the barriers to trade at
issue, the accession negotiations are very important for Canada.  The Canadian Government,
representing Canadian interests, has been an active participant in the WTO Working Parties set
up to examine the new applicants trade regime and to identify required reforms.  The Canadian
Government is also pursuing Canadian interests through bilateral market access negotiations,
including most importantly with China and Russia.
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Chapter 15 
Looking Ahead
The Millennium Round Gets Underway
After the end of Seattle’s four-day stint as the protest capital of the universe, it will be back to
business as usual and the WTO Millennium Round will be officially underway.  The Seattle
Ministerial Declaration, which was already circulating in draft form in Geneva in September, will
set the parameters of the talks.  In addition to the WTO committees, which will still continue to
function in support of the talks, negotiating structures will be created.  Negotiating committees
will be set up to deal with the main issues.  Working parties will be established to grapple with
more technical questions.  Bilateral negotiations will be scheduled.  And all will be governed by
ambitious timetables with tight deadlines.  There will be little time to waste arguing about the
size and shape of the table.
Concerning the structure of the negotiations, there are two possibilities.  One would be to
create a separate Trade Negotiations Committee to run the negotiations.  Another would be to
leave the negotiations under the General Council.  The Uruguay Round negotiations was headed
up by a separate Trade Negotiations Committee.  But at that time here was no WTO and no
permanent organizational structure existed.  Now that the General Council exists, it would be the
logical choice to coordinate the negotiations and the committee structure reporting to it could
continue to function as negotiating committees.  An advantage of this would be that it would
avoid duplication and economize on scarce technical and negotiating expertise both from the
member countries and the WTO itself.  Many, particularly developing countries, have difficulties
fully participating in existing committees and would not be able to participate in a parallel
committee structure.
A key milestone in the Millennium Round will be the Fourth Ministerial Meeting, which
should take place late in the year 2001.  This meeting will probably serve as a mid-term  review
of the progress of the round like the Montreal Ministerial Meeting in December 1988 did for the
Uruguay Round.  It will provide an opportunity to take stock, review draft changes to
agreements, and identify contentious outstanding issues that need to be resolved before the round
can be brought to a successful conclusion.
The Millennium Round negotiations will have the largest number of participants ever. 
And many of the new participants will be transitional or developing countries, that export
resources and labour-intensive goods and have much different concerns than the industrialized
countries.  This will make for a much more complex negotiations and a more volatile negotiating
dynamics.  In addition, huge external imbalances, including most notably a US trade deficit of
$250 billion,  have been allowed to build up to unsustainable levels to promote recovery from the
Asian crisis.  The need to reduce these imbalances will be a source of friction in the trade round. 
On the other hand, the issues are easier this time than in the Uruguay Round.  The WTO already
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exists and doesn’t need to be created out of nothing.  Most of the difficult areas outside the
GATT were already brought into the rules-based trading system.
The overall economic climate will be very important for the success of the Millennium
Round. The Asian crisis underlined the vulnerability of the international financial system and the
need to keep protectionist forces in check. The large external imbalances, particularly the
enormous US current account deficit and the corresponding surpluses in other countries, that
have emerged in its wake have given rise to tensions in the international trading system. The US
economy is operating at a high level of activity and low rate of unemployment. Any increase in
inflation could trigger a monetary policy response that would have a major impact on the
international economy and dramatically affect the climate of negotiations and the prospects for a
successful Millennium Round.
The Negotiating Agenda
The Quad countries, particularly the United States and the European Union and to a lesser extent
Japan, will as usual be in the driving seat for the Millennium Round.  Canada will be going along
for the ride, but maybe able to do some selective back seat driving.  Other countries, especially
the developing countries, will be even further away from the steering wheel, and less likely to
influence the direction of the vehicle.  But to get a final agreement it will be necessary to find
something that is acceptable to the most important of them as well as to the United States, the
European Union and Japan. To facilitate this, it might be necessary to create something for the
Millennium Round like the G-20, which was formed to deal with international financial issues
and includes key developing countries such as India and Brazil.
The big issues are already on the table in the position papers prepared by the main
players.  Their positions on these issues are summarized in Table 3.  
The APEC Leaders meeting in Auckland in September was a dry run for Seattle, minus
the EU.  The accommodation reached there provides an indicator of the likely parameters of the
Millennium Round negotiations.  The Leaders’ Declaration called for a new round that would:
• “include comprehensive market access negotiations covering industrial
tariffs in addition to the already mandated negotiations on services and agriculture”
• “lead to timely and effective improvements in market access to the benefit
of all participating economies, particularly developing economies, and”
• “consistent with this objective, provide scope to review and strengthen
rules and disciplines,”
• “have a balanced and sufficiently broad-based agenda and be concluded
within three years as a single package which does not preclude the possibility of early
results on a provisional basis”
• have, “as one of the important objectives of the negotiations on
agriculture, the abolition of export subsidies.”
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This language of the declaration was carefully crafted to embrace the positions of all the
participants, particularly the Americans and the Japanese.  The Japanese desire for
comprehensive, single undertaking negotiation was accepted without precluding
the possibility of an early harvest of provisional sectoral agreements as was sought
by the United States.  Such sectoral agreements could include those covered by 
the Accelerated Tariff Liberalization initiative, which the United States is pushing
and which had its origin in APEC’s EVSL initiative.  The sectors covered are:
chemicals; energy equipment; environmental goods; fish and fishery products;
gems and jewelry; medical equipment and scientific instruments; toys; and forest
products.  Japan has dug in its heels in the fish and forest products sectors.
A three-year time frame was endorsed in the Declaration reflecting the American
objective of keeping the negotiations “manageable.” It probably represents
wishful thinking given the number and complexity of the issues likely to be on the
table.  But it is necessary to set an ambitious timetable to make sure that the
negotiations don’t go on forever like the Uruguay Round.  This time however,
with the WTO and its permanent committee structure in existence, it will be
possible to continue negotiations on some issues, on which it is impossible to
reach agreement, in a sort of “rolling negotiation.” 
The need to abolish agricultural export subsidies and prohibitions and restrictions was
emphasized.  This is an objective that is strongly supported by APEC agricultural
exporting countries like the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
and by some of the ASEAN agricultural exporting countries.  It was much less
enthusiastically embraced by Japan, a country that is known for its protectionist
agricultural policies.  It also won’t be welcomed in Europe whose Common
Agricultural Policy is its chief target.
The question of modalities for the market access negotiations was left open.  They could
be zero/zero initiatives, proportional, offer-request, harmonization, or peak tariff
cuts.  Nothing was said about the desirability of lowering bound tariff rates to the
level of applied tariffs.
No mention was made of the American objective of doing something on core labour
standards and the environment.  The developing countries of Asia, and even
Japan, don’t see any need to do anything in these controversial areas.  There is a
concern that any such initiatives could easily turn into some form of disguised
protectionism to their disadvantage.
In its informal paper on the Millennium Round, the EU also accepted the need for a
comprehensive three-year round covering the built-in agenda of agriculture and
services as well as industrial tariffs.  The EU argued in favour of a single
undertaking, but allowed the possibility of an early harvest as long as the final
package did not become unbalanced.
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Agriculture is an area where the EU parts company from the APEC consensus.  The EU’s
negotiating position for agriculture, which was approved in September by
agricultural ministers, calls for a defence of production subsidies.  The rationale is
that domestic producers with higher production costs resulting from superior
standards of animal welfare or environmental protection need to be protected from
low-cost competition.  The EU also seeks rules on the use of export credit
guarantees.
Still smarting from the loss of the recent WTO panel decision on hormone-treated beef
and facing consumer concerns about the health risks of genetically modified
foods, the EU will be trying to make its approach to food regulation WTO-
consistent.  This will entail seeking more recognition of the legitimacy of the
precautionary principle in regulating foods and/or some weakening of the science
test that must be met to ban foods considered hazardous to health.  The US and
Canada, which were on the winning side of the WTO case, can be expected to
resist.
The US and EU will be seeking more market access in the service sector.  But the EU is
calling for “cultural diversity” to be taken into account in liberalizing the trade in
audio-visual services.
The US initiative to develop an Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement
seems to have been proceeding well.  It will likely be an early harvest of the
Millennium Round at Seattle.
The US, which proposed the moratorium on tariffs on e-commerce, has been
championing a permanent elimination of tariffs and barriers.  Other countries are
likely to go along with the proposal as long as e-commerce is defined narrowly
enough, but the devil will be in the details.
Investment is a very sensitive issue politically in the United States and Europe.  While
there is a recognition of the benefits to be derived from multilateral rules for
investment, there is also a reluctance to push the issue too hard lest it stir up the
same sort of opposition that scuttled the MAI negotiations and jeopardize other
objectives of the Millennium Round.  Japan is pushing more actively for an
investment agreement.  It has proposed a bottom-up approach to the agreement
such as was employed in the Uruguay Round service sector negotiations.  Under
this approach, countries have to make specific commitments with respect to
particular sectors.  Japan has also proposed that national treatment only be
extended on a post-establishment basis and that the agreement not allow for
investor-state disputes.  The EU had a similar proposal, but is soft pedaling it, out
of fear of a repeat of the MAI.
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The EU is seeking to establish a common multilateral framework of rules and principles
for competition policy.  This is a new and complex area that is not a high priority
in the United States and might meet resistance from that quarter if it seems likely
to delay the conclusion of the round.
Japan is very keen on negotiating additional disciplines on anti-dumping.  The recent
application of US anti-dumping actions to the Japanese steel industry has
reinforced their desire.
The EU is even more aggressive than the US in pushing for action on trade and the
environment.  But while the EU favours a strong statement on protecting labour
rights and is calling for a new “forum” to monitor labour standards, it is against
the use of  trade measures to encourage the observance of core labour standards. 
Instead,  it prefers to a “more cooperative and consensus-oriented approach” that
includes the use positive measures.
There is also a lot of housekeeping that needs to be done to make sure that all the
Uruguay Round agreements are working as they should and that all of the
commitments are being honoured.
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Summary of Positions of Quad Countries on Key Issues in Negotiating Agenda
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Canada’s Role
There are so many question marks in Table 3 regarding Canada’s position on the key Millennium
Round negotiating issues because at the time this book was being written Canada
had not yet released an overall position paper.  It’s not that no effort was made to
study the issues.  A discussion paper entitled Opening Doors to the World
released in March by the Minister of International Trade launched an ambitious
round of public consultations spearheaded by the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.  The Committee issued its
report Canada at the WTO: Towards a Millennium Agenda in June which
provided the Government with detailed, if somewhat vague, recommendations. 
The Canadian government has also provided nine communications on specific
issues to the WTO General Council, which provide some information on
Canada’s position on a few of the issues.
It’s unfortunate that Canada could not take the process that final step to produce an
official position paper well before Seattle as the United States and the EU did.  In
the past Canada’s influence in trade negotiations, which in the jargon of boxing
enabled us to fight above our weight, stemmed from an uncanny ability to come
up with creative positions on controversial issues early in the negotiations before
the positions of the other players had crystalized.  This time Canada will have to
play more of a role as a mediator or an honest broker to exercise the same kind of
influence.
Canada will also need to get better prepared to deal with sectoral and industrial issues. 
During the FTA, Uruguay Round and NAFTA negotiations, an International
Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC) and Sectoral Advisory Groups on
International Trade (SAGITs) provided a unique business and labour perspective
on negotiating priorities and strategies, that helped the Government to negotiate
more effectively.  The ITAC has been replaced by the Team Canada Inc. 
Advisory Board whose mandate is export promotion, not trade negotiations, and
the SAGITs are dormant with a few exceptions such as agriculture and culture. 
These groups need to be resurrected to provide the Government with the kind of
focussed business and labour input on overall and sectoral trade issues that it will
require to successfully negotiate for Canada in the Millennium Round.
Finally, Canada will have to decide who is really going to be responsible for trade policy
if it is going to play a leading role in the upcoming negotiations.  Provincial
governments seem to be unwilling to let the federal government speak for Canada. 
Quebec wants a seat at the negotiating table and Alberta wants a larger role in the
negotiations.  The provincial governments have already prevented Canadian
businesses from getting access to procurement opportunities in sub-federal
governments under the GPA..  This is totally unacceptable.  The provinces should
limit their participation in trade negotiations to making sure that their legitimate
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concerns in their own areas of jurisdiction such as health and social policy are
respected.  They should not try to dictate the federal negotiating position.
Developing Countries
The developing countries, which are still having difficulties coming to grips with the disciplines
of the Uruguay Round agreements and commitments, are not as enthusiastic about
a new round as the Quad and other industrialized countries.  India opposes a new
round outright and Malaysia would like to see the start of the round postponed
until after 2000.  But since there is likely to be a round whether they like it or not,
developing countries have to be ready.  Consequently, seventeen developing
countries came together as the misnomered G15 to prepare a joint negotiating
agenda at a meeting in Bangalore, India in August.  They will be seeking to
improve market access for their products in developed countries’ markets.  In
particular, they will be targeting developed country tariffs on many manufactured
goods produced in developing countries which are still relatively high.  They will
also benefit from any improved access to the huge European agricultural market
that the United States is able to extract.  Developing countries will also be
defending their hard-won benefits from previous rounds.  The big Uruguay-Round
prize for developing countries, which might come under attack around the edges if
China accedes to the WTO, is the phased elimination of the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement.
The developing countries will also face increased demands from the developed world. 
This will include pressure for additional reductions in the very high tariff rates
levied by developing countries and tougher enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement. 
There will also be pressure on the developing countries to go along with whatever
is negotiated with respect to environment and labour standards.  This is something
the G15 vowed to resist in Bangalore.
The developing countries that are best placed to benefit from the Millennium Round are
the least developed countries, of which thirty are WTO Members.  Michael
Moore, the new WTO Director General, has declared himself their champion and
is pushing for guaranteed duty-free access for all their exports.  This picks up a
proposal initially put forward by the EU.  It has now made its way into the Draft
Ministerial Declaration, at least with square brackets indicating it is on the table
and requires a political decision at the Ministerial. As the least developed
countries count for less that ½ per cent of world trade, according them duty-free
access should not threaten industry in the developed countries.  But the United
States reportedly wants to maintain its system granting duty-free access based on
their human rights record.  Moore also wants to make more technical assistance
available so that these countries can participate more fully in the WTO and
comply with their WTO obligations.  He is likely to get a sympathetic hearing
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from the Quad countries on his proposals as the US and the EU have already
recognized the need in their pre-Seattle discussion papers.
Our Millennium Round Wish List
In our view, a successful Millennium Round would include:
• Tariffs  Reductions averaging of at least a third and elimination of
nuisance tariffs below 2 or 3 per cent.
• Non-Tariff Barriers  Significant progress in decreasing NTBs, including
most notably the negotiation of an Agreement on Trade Facilitation.
• Agriculture   The elimination of export subsidies.  Drastic cuts in
production subsidies.  Large decreases in high tariff rates established through
tariffication.  Improved minimum market-access commitments.  Acceptance of
precautionary principle for foods such as hormone-treated beef and genetically modified
crops.
• Services   Expansion of market access commitments to include a much
broader range of services.  Getting all WTO Members to sign on to the agreements on
Financial Services and Basic Telecommunications.
• Government Procurement   An new Agreement on Transparency in
Government Procurement reached at Seattle.  Expansion of the coverage of the
Government Procurement Agreement to include more signatories and more government
sector entities for existing signatories.  Ideally, a multilateral agreement to replace the
existing plurilateral one.  Canadian commitments for provincial and local government
procurement.
• E-commerce An agreement on e-commerce including a permanent
moratorium on tariffs on the international transmission of digitalized information.
• Subsidies and Countervailing Measures   Stronger disciplines on subsidies
and countervailing measures.  Extending coverage to services.
• Investment A bottom-up agreement based on commitments by individual
countries providing post-establishment national treatment and offering investor
protection, but providing no mechanism for investor-state dispute settlement.
• Intellectual Property  Full compliance with intellectual property
obligations under TRIPs.
• Culture Clarification of whether cultural products are covered by GATT or
GATS.  Rules to permit domestic subsidies to a narrowly defined cultural sector.
• Environment Amendment to Article XX of the GATT to permit trade
measures authorized under Multilateral Environmental Agreements.
• Labour Standards  The creation of some joint WTO-ILO mechanism to
monitor and report on the implementation of core labour standards.
• Dispute Settlement Mechanism   Improved transparency and an opening up
of access to panel proceedings to non-participating governments and the public. 
Elimination of the delay in the release of panel decisions.
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• Accession Getting China into the WTO in time to participate fully in the
Millennium Round.
• Developing Countries Removal of tariffs on imports from least developed
countries.  The provision of technical assistance to assist in the implementation of WTO
agreements.  Financial assistance to least developed countries to participate in the WTO.
World Trade in the 21  Centuryst
The WTO Millennium Round is critical for the future of the world trading system.  Since World
War II, great progress has been made under the GATT/WTO in bringing down
tariffs, and eradicating trade barriers.  The global economy that has sprung up is a
powerful engine of economic growth.  It has created prosperity in the advanced
industrialized countries of the world and fostered economic development in the
developing world, thus reducing poverty.  Continued material progress depends
on the preservation and expansion of the WTO-managed  multilateral trading
system.  And global free trade is only a couple of more successful WTO rounds
away.
The WTO has come under unprecedented attack from the forces that would turn back the
clock of globalization and retreat into the protectionist shells of their national
economies.  And it’s not only the protest groups.  Faced with the Asian crisis and
growing trade deficits in some countries, some governments have taken
protectionist steps.  These misguided forces of protectionism must be resisted.
The new round provides an opportunity to enter the new millennium with a renewed
international commitment to a truly global, rules-based international trading
system that will provide a sound framework the functioning of markets.  The
achievement of this vision, which inspired all those that have participated in the
GATT/WTO, offers the best prospect of a prosperous and peaceful global
economy in the 21  century.st
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